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 Abstract 
 
 This thesis explores the relation in Peirce’s philosophy between his theory of 
categories and his pragmatism. My most central claim is that the possibility and 
validity of metaphysics as a philosophical science depend on the appropriateness of 
its method. I argue that an appropriate method for metaphysics is possible, and that 
in Peirce’s pragmatism as founded on his theory of categories we find such a method. 
 In developing this thesis I seek to demonstrate four key propositions: 
1. Peirce’s ‘pragmatism’ is fundamentally a form of metaphysical and 
epistemological realism and in this respect differs from logical positivism 
and other types of pragmatism that are overtly anti-metaphysical and 
skeptical about the possibility of our knowledge of real generals. 
2. Peirce’s ‘theory of categories’ is the key to understanding his philosophy 
and demonstrates the extent to which he embraces a form of dialectical 
realism that bears striking resemblance to certain forms of scholastic 
metaphysics. 
3. Peirce’s ‘semiotic’ or theory of signs can only be properly understood if we 
take full account of his theory of categories and the form of metaphysical 
and epistemological realism it implies. 
4. Peirce’s account of semiotic is based on an irreducible trichotomy that he 
holds to exist between the categories, and which is reflected in the triadic 
relationship between Sign, Sign User and Thing Signified. 
 The apparent inconsistencies and indecisiveness in Peirce’s account of his 
‘pragmatism’ can be explained if we recognise that he takes the four propositions 
outlined above for granted. Because he takes these propositions for granted as 
virtually self-evident, he fails to make fully explicit the internal logical connections 
between them and the different parts of his system. Despite appearances to the 
contrary, I maintain Peirce is a coherent and systematic thinker. 
 Based on the evidence drawn from reviewing the literature, and arguing the 
case in defence of these propositions, I propose to set out my argument in the 
following chapters, and the summary of the contents of each should make explicit the 
structure and content of my overall argument and conclusions. 
 
 6
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Declaration 
 
This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any 
other degree or diploma in any university or institution; and to the best of my 
knowledge it contains no material previously published or written by any other 
person, except where due reference is made in the text. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Siosifa Ika 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7
 Acknowledgements 
 
 This thesis could not have been completed without the assistance of various 
persons and organisations to whom I would like to express my sincere gratitude. First 
of all I must thank my supervisor, Professor Ian E. Thompson, for his tireless advice 
and encouragement both in academic and personal matters. His suggested revisions 
and comments he made on the various drafts of the thesis have been most helpful. 
His love, sympathy, and kindness during the family bereavements I suffered during 
my PhD candidacy, helped me to carry on despite such difficult times. His consistent 
dedication as a supervisor proved to be vital when he continued to supervise my 
research, and to critique my work, after returning to Scotland two years ago. 
 I would also like to thank Professor Donald Watts, the Dean of Research and 
Postgraduate Studies of the University of Notre Dame Australia, for his friendly and 
encouraging advice both when I first made inquiries to enrol at Notre Dame, and 
during my candidacy at the University. My thanks are also due to my fellow 
postgraduate student, Phillip Matthews for the many fruitful discussions we had; to 
Dr Shasta Dawson, who co-supervised my research with Dr Thompson during the 
first semester of 1999; to Dr Catherine Legg for bringing to my attention the Peirce-l 
forum on the internet, and giving me a copy of her PhD thesis, both of which I found 
useful; and to Alison Thompson and Teresa Ika for their help with correcting my 
grammatical and typographic errors. 
 Financially, my work on this thesis has been made possible by an Australian 
Postgraduate Award (APA) from the Australian Commonwealth Government, and a 
Notre Dame Research Scholarship from the University of Notre Dame Australia. 
 To Rodney and Kathleen Gosper, my special thanks for their help with looking 
after my children — so ensuring I could have more time to work on this thesis. Last 
but not the least, I would like to thank my wife, Teresa, and my children, David and 
‘Ana, for their support and patience with my neglect of some of my family 
responsibilities in order to complete this thesis. 
 
 8
  
 
 
 
Abbreviations 
 
CP - Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, and 
A. W. Burks. (References stand for volume and paragraph number. Eg. CP 1. 
5 refers to volume 1, paragraph 5.) 
 
SS - Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and 
Victoria Lady Welby, ed. C. S. Hardwick. (References stand for page 
number.) 
 
W - Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, ed. M. H. Fisch, C. J. 
W. Kloesel, E. C. Moore, et al. (References stand for volume and page 
number. Eg. W 2:14 refers to volume 2, page 14.) 
 
All references to the above editions are inserted in brackets at the end of the quote. 
 
 9
  
 
 
 
 
In memory 
of 
my late grandparents and adoptive parents, 
Siosifa (Snr.) and ‘Ana Ika, 
whose love has sustained my life 
and 
whose faith in me has inspired my studies 
 
 
 
 10
 INTRODUCTION 
(i) Overall Aim of the Thesis 
 The primary aim of this thesis is to clarify the relationship between Peirce’s 
theory of categories and his pragmatism. The claim defended in this thesis is that 
Peirce’s theory of categories is the ultimate foundation of his pragmatism and that 
the realist metaphysics this implies, enables him to avoid the anti-metaphysical 
conclusions of logical positivism and logical empiricism. The practical objectives of 
the thesis are to explain why and how Peirce’s pragmatism avoids the pitfalls of these 
rival theories. 
 Logical positivism, especially in its early form, as represented in the work of 
the philosophers1 of the Vienna Circle, is characterised by a strong proposal for a 
rejection of metaphysics on the ground that metaphysical statements are basically 
sense-less or meaningless non-sense because they are neither analytic statements nor 
empirically verifiable propositions. By contrast, Peirce’s pragmatism rests on 
metaphysical pre-suppositions in that he claims that his Categories are grounded in 
reality. For Peirce, as scientist and mathematician, the ontological question, the 
reality status of our fundamental concepts, is a question that logical positivists and 
logical empiricists would simply reject as a meaningless pseudo-question. 
 The metaphysical position of Peirce’s pragmatism stems from his commitment 
to both a metaphysical realism and epistemological realism, both being in his view 
logical requirements of any adequate theory of categories. Generally, metaphysical 
realism is the view that things exist independently of our knowledge of them; and 
epistemological realism maintains that we can know things as they really are. 
 Peirce’s theory of categories, with its unique treatment of the basic elements of 
reality, or ‘modes of being’, determines the distinctive characteristic of his 
pragmatism. It requires our approach to the meaning of concepts to be a matter of 
irreducible triadic relations, rooted in the structure of given reality, and that in every 
meaningful situation all three of his fundamental categories are involved. His 
metaphysically and epistemologically grounded ‘pragmatism’ requires that 
determining meaning involves the ability to predict the “would-be” situation of 
events. 
                                                 
1 Eg. Moritz Schlick, ‘The Turning Point in Philosophy,’ Logical Positivism, ed. A. J. Ayer, (New 
York: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 53-9. 
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 (ii) Peirce on the Foundations of Pragmatism 
 There are indications in Peirce’s writings that the connections between his 
theory of categories and his pragmatism are fundamental to understanding his 
philosophy. His statements on the nature of pragmatism as a philosophical method or 
maxim appear to reflect different viewpoints.  
 On the one hand, he attributes his discovery of this approach to his study of 
signs. In a draft of a book review written about 1904, Peirce claims that the “maxim 
[of pragmatism] is put forth … as a far-reaching theorem solidly grounded upon an 
elaborate study of the nature of signs” (CP 8.191). He reiterates this claim in a letter 
to Christine Ladd-Franklin written c.1904: “Pragmatism is one of the results of my 
study of the formal laws of signs, a study guided by mathematics and the familiar 
facts of everyday experience and by no other science whatsoever.”2 These two 
statements suggest that Peirce claims a logical basis for his pragmatism — given the 
fact that the study of signs is, for Peirce, a logical study, and his insistence that 
pragmatism is a ‘logical maxim’. 
 On the other hand, other statements of Peirce indicate that he grounded, or at 
least wanted to ground, pragmatism upon a theory of categories rooted in reality (as 
Aristotle’s claimed to be). He said of the construction of pragmatism, c.1905: 
Pragmatism … had been designed and constructed … architectonically. Just as 
a civil engineer, before erecting a bridge, a ship, or a house, will think of the 
different properties of all materials, and will use no iron, stone, or cement, that 
has not been subjected to tests; and will put them together in ways minutely 
considered, so, in constructing the doctrine of pragmatism the properties of all 
indecomposable concepts were examined and the ways in which they could be 
compounded. Then the purpose of the proposed doctrine having been analyzed, 
it was constructed out of the appropriate concepts so as to fulfill that purpose. 
In this way, the truth of it was proved (CP 5.5). 
The way he envisages a theory of categories to be involved in constructing 
pragmatism is indicated in this passage by the ideas ‘architectonically’ and 
‘indecomposable concepts’. The word ‘architectonically’ designates the idea of 
system, that is, a system of pragmatism, whose design and construction requires 
‘indecomposable concepts’. The term ‘indecomposable concepts’ is another label 
Peirce sometimes uses in place of ‘categories’. In a letter to William James written in 
1902, Peirce emphasised: 
                                                 
2 Quoted in John J. Fitzgerald, Peirce’s Theory of Signs as Foundation for Pragmatism (The 
Hague: Mouton, 1966), p. 10. 
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 I have advanced my understanding of these categories much since Cambridge 
days; and can now put them in a much clearer light and more convincingly. 
The true nature of pragmatism cannot be understood without them (CP 8.256). 
 I do not believe these two seemingly different views on the foundation of 
pragmatism are fundamentally incompatible. Instead, they are inter-related just as 
Peirce considered his theory of categories and theory of signs to be connected. The 
problem is that Peirce did not offer any clear account of how his statements of ‘signs-
based’ pragmatism are related to those of his ‘categories-based’ pragmatism.3 This is 
evident when he often speaks of the categories and signs interchangeably, defining 
the categories in terms of signs, and signs in terms of the categories (eg. CP 2.274). 
(iii) The Foundation of Peirce’s Pragmatism and the Uniqueness of the Thesis 
 Some work has already been done on the foundation of his pragmatism. There 
are studies that have already pointed out the relation between Peirce’s theory of 
categories and pragmatism, some of which have offered some indications in one way 
or another of a foundational role of the theory of categories in pragmatism. However, 
as far as I can ascertain, these studies, in their indications of the foundational role of 
the categories in his pragmatism, are either too brief and halting, though suggestive,4 
or only partial5 in their treatment of the foundational role of the theory of categories, 
                                                 
3 From now on I will use the expression ‘signs-based’ pragmatism wherever I mean to say the 
theory of signs is the foundation of pragmatism, and ‘categories-based’ pragmatism wherever I mean 
to say the theory of categories is the foundation of pragmatism. 
4 Eg. Max H. Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, ed. Kenneth Ketner and Christian J. W. 
Kloesel, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), especially ch. 5. I share Fisch’s view on this 
matter, but his discussion omits a whole range of related issues that I intend to consider in this thesis 
viz. the uniqueness of Peirce’s system of categories, and the realist philosophical basis of his 
pragmatism. 
5 Eg. Eugene Freeman, The Categories of Charles Peirce (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing, 
1934). Freeman puts the emphasis in his analysis on the relation between the theory of categories and 
pragmatism on the category of Thirdness. It is understandable, given that Freeman is concerned with 
pragmatism as a theory of meaning, that he stresses the category of Thirdness and pays little attention 
to Firstness and Secondness because meaning, is an element of the category of Thirdness, according to 
Peirce. (Pragmatism itself being among other things a theory of meaning.) However, unfolding the 
foundational role of the theory of categories in pragmatism by emphasising the category of Thirdness 
is too narrow to appreciate the extent of the foundational role of the theory of categories in 
pragmatism. That is, it is not the category of Thirdness alone that serves as the foundation of 
pragmatism, but all three categories taken together. 
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 or take the theory of categories as secondary to the theory of signs in their 
foundational role in pragmatism.6 
 Some other studies7 take Peirce’s doubt-belief theory of inquiry (presented in 
his papers ‘The Fixation of Belief’ and ‘How To Make Our Ideas Clear’) as the 
foundation of his pragmatism. As I will argue, despite no mention of the categories 
in these papers, there are reasons and evidence that the categories are the framework 
within which Peirce formulates his belief-doubt theory of inquiry. 
 However, despite much scholarly work on the foundation of Peirce’s 
pragmatism, no one, as far as I am aware, has considered why pragmatism is bound 
to presuppose metaphysics as a means to determining its foundation. The 
significance of this approach is that: firstly, it will clarify how the foundation of 
pragmatism can be attributed to both the theory of categories and the theory of signs; 
secondly, it will show that to attribute the foundation of pragmatism to the theory of 
signs alone fails to account for the fact that Peirce speaks of the signs not only from a 
logical point of view, but also from a metaphysical point of view (though the latter, 
generally speaking, is less explicit than the former). 
 In this thesis, I argue that Peirce’s attribution of the foundation of his 
pragmatism to his theory of signs is conducted within the context of his development 
of his theory of categories. Once this is realised, it will become clear that for Peirce 
the theory of signs and the theory of categories are virtually inseparable. This is not 
to say that no distinction can be drawn between what a category is and what a sign is. 
The point is that to take Peirce’s claim of a signs-based pragmatism too literally 
without giving serious attention to his theory of categories would fail to account for 
two central points of his pragmatism, namely, that it involves commitment to his 
scholastic realism and that it has a metaphysical task. 
                                                 
6 Eg. John J. Fitzgerald, Peirce’s Theory of Signs as Foundation for Pragmatism, (The Hague, The 
Netherlands: Mouton, 1966). The upshot of Fitzgerald’s book is that pragmatism is related to the 
theory of categories indirectly via the theory of signs. Thus in Fitzgerald’s view, whereas pragmatism 
is directly related to the theory of signs, its relation with the theory of categories is of secondary 
importance. The problem with Fitzgerald’s view is that it fails to recognise that Peirce’s pragmatism 
has a direct, primary connection with his theory of categories. For it is within the context of his theory 
of categories that Peirce demands a realist basis for his pragmatism. 
7 Eg. Hjalmar Wennerberg, The Pragmatism of C. S. Peirce: An Analytical Study, (Lund: CWK 
Gleerup, 1962); Bruce Altshuler, ‘The Nature of Peirce’s Pragmatism,’ Transactions of the Charles S. 
Peirce Society, vol. XIV, no. 3 (Summer, 1978), pp. 147-175. Note that Altshuler, though basing his 
analysis on the belief-doubt theory of inquiry, goes beyond it to suggest an alternative reading of 
Peirce’s pragmatism from the point of view of his theory of signs in general, and interpretant in 
particular; Jeff Kasser, ‘Peirce’s Supposed Psychologism,’ Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce 
Society, vol. XXXV, no. 3 (Summer, 1999), pp. 501-526. 
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 (iv) Thesis Overview and Three Parts of the Thesis in Summary 
Part I: Peirce’s Theory of Categories 
 Part 1 is divided into chapters 1 and 2. Its main purpose is to give a critical 
exposition of Peirce’s theory of categories and the role of phenomenological method 
in his pragmatism. 
 In chapter 1 I seek both to give an introduction to the main features of his 
thought and to identify the unique characteristic features of his theory of categories. I 
will begin by analysing Peirce’s paper ‘On a New List of Categories’ comparing and 
contrasting his position with Aristotle’s and Kant’s theories of categories, so as to 
bring out the distinctive features of Peirce’s own theory. 
 When Peirce first derived his categories in his paper ‘On a New List of 
Categories’ (1867), he was already familiar with the categorical systems of Aristotle 
and Kant.8 At this stage in the development of his thought Peirce regarded these 
systems, especially those of Aristotle and Kant, as having a great significance in 
recognising “that the commonest and most indispensable conceptions are nothing but 
objectifications of logical forms.”9  
 While there are some similarities between Peirce’s theory of categories and 
those of Aristotle and Kant, what is important for my purpose is to characterize and 
to clarify the unique features of Peirce’s theory of categories and how it differs from 
the theories of categories of philosophers before him. In this way I seek to explore 
and assess the significance of his contribution to philosophy. 
 Peirce’s system of categories is a “uniform chain of conceptions,”10 that are 
interdependent to the extent that the manifold of sense experience could not be 
unified and made intelligible by applying the categories singly or separately. For 
Peirce an achieved unity in our attempt to render the manifold of experience  
                                                 
8 These names are not mentioned in ‘On a New List of Categories’, Peirce’s first published paper 
on his theory of categories. The preliminary drafts of the paper, however, bear references to these 
names. These drafts are reproduced in Murray G. Murphey, The Development of Peirce’s Philosophy 
(Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), pp. 411-422. 
9 Charles S. Peirce, ‘Preliminary Drafts of the “New List of Categories”,’ reproduced in Murray G. 
Murphey, The Development of Peirce’s Philosophy (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1993), p. 412. 
10 Ibid., p. 413. 
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 intelligible presupposes a joint application of all the categories. The mutual 
interconnection and interdependence between the categories is shown in Peirce’s 
treatment of “signs” and “categories”. In his analysis of signs and their functions, he 
treats these terms as virtually inter-changeable and as capable of being defined in 
terms of one another: 
A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic 
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, 
called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which 
it stands itself to the same Object (CP 2.274). 
 Chapter 1 concludes with a general discussion of Peirce’s classification of the 
sciences and how he employs his theory of categories in that classification. The aim 
is not only to emphasise the obvious, that Peirce was a systematic thinker, concerned 
to build up a coherent philosophical system, but also to argue that a serious 
consideration of the question of the foundation of his pragmatism must take account 
of his classification of the sciences. 
 Chapter 2 deals with Peirce’s phenomenology, aiming to show that Peirce’s 
categories were meant not only as abstract theoretical tools, but also they represent 
structural and essential elements of experience with empirical manifestations. Thus 
chapter 2 will develop an analysis of Peirce’s categories in order to demonstrate that 
pragmatism becomes a theory of meaning which he conceived to be workable not 
only in the domain of theoretical discourse but also in concrete experience. 
 A subsidiary purpose of chapter 2 is to explain how Peirce’s phenomenology 
plays a role in his view that philosophy is both an “observational” science and a 
“science of discovery”. For Peirce what phenomenological method requires is that 
one merely observes the ‘phenomenon’ (i.e. what appears to the mind in pure 
imagination or as a result of real experience) and studies the most universal elements 
(or the categories) manifest in it. Phenomenology thus plays a somewhat paradoxical 
function in Peirce’s thought. On the one hand, it aims at undertaking an experiential 
derivation of the categories, thus showing their empirical manifestations. On the 
other hand, phenomenology does not restrict what it counts as observational to things 
that are experienceable by or through the senses alone. Rather, it takes as 
observational whatever appears to the mind regardless of what kind of source it has. 
Despite this seemingly paradoxical aspect of phenomenology, it is important to stress  
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 here that phenomenology opens up the scope of what is to be regarded as 
observational — including entities that would normally be taken as metaphysical (or 
fictitious) by the logical positivist. 
 Here it is important to note that there is a similarity between Peirce’s 
phenomenology and his theory of signs (which is the focus of Part 3). According to 
his theory of signs, Peirce claims: “every thought is a sign” and every “thought is in 
signs” (W2: 207). With these ideas in place Peirce goes on to argue that every 
science is observational, since every science involves thought and since “every 
thought is a sign.” The subject-matter of study in any science is a sign in the sense 
that it stands in a triadic semiotic relation to the scientist and his/her understanding of 
it. So, what is subject to observation in any science are the signs it deals with in its 
field of inquiry. 
Part II: Pragmatism and the Third Grade of Clarity 
 Part 2 is divided into chapters 3, 4, and 5. 
 The aim of chapter 3 is primarily to show how Peirce’s pragmatism is founded 
upon his theory of categories. It will be argued that the attribution of the foundation 
of pragmatism to the theory of signs is only one half of the story; the other half, 
which is the focus of this study, is the foundational role of the categories in 
pragmatism. It will become evident in chapter 3 how the categories serve as the 
framework for his doubt-belief theory of inquiry. Chapter 3 will introduce the two 
versions or formulations of his pragmatism (which we refer to in this thesis as the 
‘original’ or ‘early’ and the ‘later’ versions) and how they are shaped by his theory of 
categories. 
 Chapter 4 argues that Peirce’s demand for a realist basis for pragmatism has 
more to do with his theory of categories than with his theory of signs. This is 
especially manifest in Peirce’s exposition of his scholastic realism where his main 
target is to argue for the reality of the categories, that all his three categories are real 
generals. Thus pragmatism is a commitment to the reality of the categories. Chapter 
4 goes on to compare and contrast the early and later versions of Peirce’s pragmatism 
(introduced in chapter 3), showing how the phenomenological extension of the 
categories allows for an extension of pragmatism from a “restricted” to a “wider” 
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 form, or, to use Fisch’s words, from “a simple take-it-or-leave-it maxim” to a 
doctrine.11 
 Chapter 5 develops the specific relationship between pragmatism and 
metaphysics by showing that the extension of pragmatism from being merely a 
logical maxim for meaning clarification to a form of philosophical doctrine with 
metaphysical assertions is a further consequence of its commitment to the reality of 
the categories. It will emerge in chapter 5 that Peirce, with his unique brand of 
pragmatism, belonged to a group of philosophers who were associated with a 
revolution in philosophy in which the emphasis of inquiry is put on the centrality of 
the question of meaning.12 Peirce differs from these philosophers, however, by 
exploring the ontological basis of meaning and by endorsing the need for 
metaphysics. I will also discuss Peirce’s critique of positivism and its limited view of 
metaphysics. This is followed by a brief evaluation of Peirce’s own account of 
metaphysics. In this exposition it will become evident how the unique way in which 
pragmatism formulates the metaphysical question of his scholastic realism implies a 
certain metaphysical position. 
Part III: Peirce’s Theory of Signs (or Semiotic) 
 Part 3 consists of chapters 6 and 7. 
 Chapter 6 presents a general exposition and critical appraisal of Peirce’s theory 
of signs or semiotic, aiming to determine its role in his account of inquiry. It will be 
shown that on the basis of the representative nature of signs semiotic requires 
observation and objectivity as essential elements of inquiry. A comparison of the 
ideas the ‘object of sign’ and the ‘object of thought’ will be conducted, and it is 
shown how the former ensure objectivity to a greater extent than the latter. 
 The so-called metaphysical neutrality of semiotic will be clarified, arguing that 
it is more to do with ‘division of labour’ in the classification of the sciences than 
with whether or not semiotic has any metaphysical implication or presupposition. 
 Chapter 7 will discuss the relationship between Peirce’s categories, his theory 
of signs, and his pragmatism within the context of his theory of inquiry. It will 
become evident that the categories are pertinent to logic. An attempt will be made to 
                                                 
11 Max H. Fisch, ‘Hegel and Peirce,’ in Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, ed. Kenneth Laine 
Ketner and Christian J. W. Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 268-9. 
12 Ian E. Thompson, Being and Meaning: Paul Tillich’s Theory of Meaning, Truth and Logic 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981), pp. 34-35. 
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 identify the senses in which there is a distinction between the categories and signs. 
The scholastic distinction between ‘real beings’ and ‘beings of reason’ will be used 
both to help clarify any distinction between the categories and signs, and to mark 
how Peirce’s semiotic goes beyond that of the scholastics. It will emerge that Peirce 
came to see an ontological dimension to signs, making it reasonable to ascertain that 
the sign is not a category. 
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 1.1 Some Preliminary Remarks 
1.1.1 Reasons for beginning with Peirce’s Theory of Categories 
 There are three main reasons for beginning my inquiry into Peirce’s 
pragmatism with his theory of categories. 
 First, Peirce attached a central importance to his theory of categories. This is 
because Peirce, (like Aristotle and Kant before him) takes it for granted that to build 
a philosophical system requires that its foundations should be put in place before you 
start. In his draft of a proposed work entitled ‘A Guess at the Riddle,’ written in 
1887-1888, Peirce says: 
The undertaking which this volume inaugurates is to make a philosophy like 
that of Aristotle, that is to say, to outline a theory so comprehensive that, for a 
long time to come, the entire work of human reason, in philosophy of every 
school and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, in physical science, in history, 
in sociology, and in whatever other department there may be, shall appear as 
the filling up of its details. The first step toward this is to find simple concepts 
applicable to every subject (CP 1.1). 
The foundation that Peirce looks for is a set of categories — the most basic “concepts 
applicable to every subject.” Peirce takes the view that the strength and value of a 
philosophy lies in the strength of its foundation, or the adequacy of the fundamental 
categories it employs. 
 The second reason is that I believe, and intend to demonstrate that Peirce’s 
theory of categories is the key to understanding his pragmatism. In a letter to William 
James in 1902, Peirce says: 
[M]y three categories, … in their psychological aspect, appear as Feeling, 
Reaction, Thought. I have advanced my understanding of these categories 
much since Cambridge days; and can now put them in a much clearer light and 
more convincingly. The true nature of pragmatism cannot be understood 
without them (CP 8.256). 
I also intend to show that because Peirce adopts a fundamental set of categories as 
the foundation for his system, on pain of inconsistency he must inevitably endorse 
the need for metaphysics in his philosophy of pragmatism. This is despite Peirce’s 
strong insistence on pragmatism as merely a logical principle for meaning 
clarification. 
 Thirdly, Peirce claims with great confidence that his theory of categories is 
“my one contribution to philosophy” (CP 8.213). Since Peirce maintains that 
adoption of a set of categories is necessary for building a philosophical system, and 
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 since he was thoroughly familiar with the sets of categories used by other 
philosophers, his claim that his theory of categories is “my one contribution to 
philosophy” must be taken seriously. This indicates not only that Peirce questioned 
the adequacy of the categories employed by other philosophers, but also that he 
claimed that there was something unique in his own list of categories. 
 Peirce’s dissatisfaction with the categories identified by other philosophers led 
him to explore the grounds for a new set of categories to serve as the foundation for 
his philosophy. In 1867, Peirce took “the first step toward” the development of his 
philosophical system by producing his paper ‘On a New List of Categories,’ the first 
published exposition of his theory of categories. 
 For all the above reasons it can be said that Peirce’s general philosophical 
project was most fundamentally concerned with some kind of methodological quest; 
a quest that seeks to establish the most fundamental categories that are both logically 
and metaphysically presupposed in any inquiry. The categories are logical 
presuppositions in the sense that they are principles or norms to be necessarily 
followed in the process of inquiry. They are also metaphysical presuppositions in the 
sense that Peirce rightly regarded them as reflections or representations of reality. 
Peirce’s unique brand of pragmatism, with its blend of logical rigour, practical 
orientation and realist metaphysical foundations was the end result of his 
methodological quest. 
1.1.2 What is meant by a ‘Theory of Categories’? 
 A theory of categories is an inquiry into the most fundamental conceptions 
required in order to render our experience intelligible and meaningful. The 
underlying assumption made by those who advance a theory of categories is that 
without categories, we cannot make sense of our experience — whether real or 
imaginary experience. Moreover, it is argued that the set of categories identified 
must be universal; that is, they must be applicable to every object or phenomenon 
that human beings can experience or think about. 
 Because categories are our concepts of widest application and most 
encompassing generality, Peirce regards the theory of categories to be directly 
relevant to phenomenology, logic, and metaphysics, and he proceeds to treat them as 
such in his exploration of these fields. The importance of these fundamental 
categories to these three divisions of philosophy demonstrates for Peirce that a 
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 relation of irreducible trichotomy holds between experience, thought, and being. 
According to Peirce, the development of a theory of categories requires the methods 
of phenomenological inquiry for phenomenology aims to discover the most universal 
and essential elements of phenomena as they appear to us in our experience. The 
theory of categories is fundamental to logic in so far as it seeks to define and analyse 
the relationships between the most universal conceptions of thought, which are 
presupposed in and required for every kind of thought process. Metaphysics, in so far 
as it is concerned with the nature of the real, requires an adequate theory of 
categories to establish the most universal elements of reality. Peirce thus claims that 
his list of categories is “a table of conceptions drawn from a logical analysis of 
thought and regarded as applicable to being” (CP 1.300). 
1.2 ‘On a New List of Categories’: An Introduction to Peirce’s Theory of 
Categories 
 In ‘On a New List of Categories’13 Peirce sets out to formulate a theory of 
categories that can specify and demonstrate what the universal conceptions of 
thought and reality are. The paper introduces ideas that I shall argue are fundamental 
to the whole of his philosophical system and shows that his theory of categories is 
basic to his understanding of phenomenological method, his form of pragmatism, and 
his theory of signs and their functions. 
1.2.1 The Aim of the ‘New List’ 
 Peirce begins the ‘New List’ by remarking: 
This paper is based upon the theory already established, that the function of 
conceptions is to reduce the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity, and 
that the validity of a conception consists in the impossibility of reducing the 
content of consciousness to unity without the introduction of it (W 2: 49). 
By “the theory already established” Peirce refers to Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason.14 In about 1894 Peirce wrote more specifically of the indebtedness his 
theory of categories owed to Kant. “My list [of categories] grew originally out of the 
study of the table of Kant” (CP 1.300). 
 Christopher Hookway remarks that “The argument of ‘On a New List of 
Categories’ … is self-consciously Kantian.”15  Peirce follows Kant in holding the  
                                                 
13 Henceforth ‘New List’. 
14 Especially book 1 of Transcendental Analytic. 
15 Christopher Hookway, Peirce, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), p. 90. 
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 view that an understanding of sensuous impressions given in experience requires 
universal conceptions to render them intelligible. The categories that Peirce seeks to 
establish are not universal classes of things, but universal conceptions, or elementary 
conceptions. In a later commentary on the ‘New List’ made in c.1905, Peirce 
indicates that he is concerned with “the fundamental categories of thought” (CP 
1.561; my emphasis). It should be remembered that Peirce’s categorical project aims 
not at a psychological but a logical account of the categories. He says, “throughout 
this process, introspection is not resorted to. Nothing is assumed respecting the 
subjective elements of consciousness which cannot be securely inferred from the 
objective elements” (W 2: 51-52). 
1.2.2 The Method Employed in the ‘New List’ 
 Peirce employed a method he called prescision in deriving the categories of the 
‘New List’. Peirce explains that prescision (which he also identifies as abstraction) is 
a form of mental separation that: 
arises from attention to one element and neglect of the other. Exclusive 
attention consists in a definite conception or supposition of one part of an 
object, without any supposition of the other (W 2: 50). 
There are two other kinds of mental separation, according to Peirce. They are 
“discrimination” and “dissociation.” But Peirce cautions that “Abstraction or 
prescision ought to be carefully distinguished from … discrimination and 
dissociation” (W 2: 50). The latter, Peirce believes, are not adequate for his purpose. 
For “Discrimination has to do merely with the essences of terms, and only draws a 
distinction in meaning” (W 2: 50). As such it does not help identify the 
interrelationship between the categories as required in the order of “gradation.” For 
the establishment of the meaning of a concept does not necessarily make that concept 
a category. In other words, the categories are principles used in determining the 
meaning of concepts, but they are not arrived at merely by determining the meaning 
of concepts. 
 Dissociation “is the consciousness of one thing, without the necessary 
simultaneous consciousness of the other” (W 2: 50). The mental separation of 
dissociation lacks the ability to indicate how a category is truly necessary; because 
for Peirce the categories are both necessary and sufficient conditions of interrelations 
holding between them. This ‘lack of ability’ in dissociation is due to its openness to 
psychological flexibility, in which the logical distinction between the categories 
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 could not be made. As Carl R. Hausmann puts it, separation by dissociation 
“involves psychological considerations of what consciousness can be about.”16 But 
this is contrary to Peirce’s purpose, namely, a non-psychological description of the 
categories. In c.1880, Peirce wrote confirming the inadequacy of dissociation when 
employed to search for the categories: “the categories cannot be dissociated in 
imagination from each other, nor from other ideas” (CP 1.353). 
 Instead, Peirce holds that prescision is the only form of separation that can 
serve his purpose. The method of prescision requires two general principles. First, 
that the universal conceptions must be necessary in order to explain the category 
immediately succeeding it. Every conception found to be involved in the process of 
bringing unity to the manifold of sense impressions is a necessary element of the 
process, for it “consists in the impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness 
to unity without the introduction of it.” By this principle of necessity the universal 
conceptions are justified as members of the unifying process. 
 Second, as members of the unifying process, the universal conceptions are in 
an order of “gradation” — i.e. strictly hierarchical — as far as their function is 
concerned. Peirce explains what he means by “gradation” as follows: “For one such 
conception may unite the manifold of sense and yet another may be required to unite 
the conception and the manifold to which it is applied; and so on” (W 2. 49). Thus 
the necessary universal conceptions are viewed as members of a system in which, as 
Hausmann says, they “cannot function independently of one another.”17 Within this 
hierarchically categorical system the categories are related to one another in a 
distinctly asymmetrical manner. Each category performs a function that cannot be 
replaced by another category. 
 “Prescision,” Peirce says, “is not a reciprocal process” (W 2: 51). He continues, 
giving an account of what he means by this statement: 
Elementary conceptions only arise upon the occasion of experience; that is, 
they are produced for the first time according to a general law, the condition of 
which is the existence of certain impressions. Now if a conception does not 
reduce the impressions upon which it follows to unity, it is a mere arbitrary 
addition to these latter; and elementary conceptions do not arise thus 
arbitrarily. But if the impressions could be definitely comprehended without 
the conception, this latter would not reduce them to unity. Hence, the 
                                                 
16 Carl R. Hausmann, Charles S. Peirce’s Evolutionary Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), p. 101. 
17 Ibid., p. 97. 
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 impressions (or more immediate conceptions) cannot be definitely conceived 
or attended to, to the neglect of an elementary conception which reduces them 
to unity. On the other hand, when such a conception has once been obtained, 
there is, in general, no reason why the premises which have occasioned it 
should not be neglected, and therefore the explaining conception may 
frequently be prescinded from the more immediate ones and from the 
impressions (W 2: 51). 
 This passage summarises the key ideas Peirce considers when specifying the 
categories by means of prescision. It shows that the necessity of a universal 
conception is determined by the necessity of the function it delivers. If a 
comprehension of the impressions is possible without a conception, that conception 
is proved unnecessary for comprehending the impressions, and, therefore, it cannot 
be a category. And, furthermore, each category has a function that is distinct to itself, 
and thus irreplaceable by the function of another category. Now it is clear what 
Peirce is trying to emphasise in the last sentence of the passage above. He is saying 
that in the whole process of unifying the impressions a category can be disregarded 
once its function is completed. For the next category in order of gradation takes over 
the unifying process, which is not complete yet, from the category preceding it and 
delivers its function in the process. And this goes on until the unity of the 
impressions is achieved. 
 It is important to notice that when Peirce speaks of the neglect of a category at 
the completion of its function, he means the cessation of that category in its 
functioning, (which is a kind of process), whereas the unifying process carries the 
outcome of the function of that category to the next category. And upon this outcome 
lies the possibility for the next category to perform its function distinctively. The 
word “neglect” in this sense implies a stage of inactivity that a category comes to 
when its function is completed. 
1.2.3 The Categories of the ‘New List’ 
 By means of prescision Peirce distinguished five categories. They are: 
 BEING, 
  Quality (Reference to a Ground), 
  Relation (Reference to a Correlate), 
  Representation (Reference to an Interpretant), 
 SUBSTANCE (W 2: 54). 
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 1.2.3.1 Substance and Being: The Beginning and End of Conception 
 Substance and being, according to Peirce, “are the beginning and end of all 
conception” (W 2: 50) respectively. The category of substance (“the present, in 
general” or “IT” as Peirce also calls it) is a universal conception that is the “nearest 
to sense” (W 2: 49). It is simply “the general recognition of what is contained in 
attention, [it] has no connotation, and therefore no proper unity” (W 2: 49). Further, 
it is “neither predicated of a subject, nor in a subject” (W 2: 49). At the level of the 
conception of substance no predicate has been distinguished in a subject; it amounts 
to nothing more or less than recognition of the IT as such. 
 The validity of the conception of substance lies in being the essential first stage 
of concept formation. “Before any comparison or discrimination can be made 
between what is present, what is present must have been recognized as such, as it”  
(W 2: 49). Peirce considers substance the most immediate of all the five universal 
conceptions. It is the first thing that enters the consciousness when the mind attends 
to an object. Yet in itself it has no connotation. In terms of function, Peirce explains 
the conception of substance “is the pure denotative power of the mind, that is to say, 
the power which directs the mind to an object, in contradistinction to the power of 
thinking any predicate of that object” (W 2: 49). For this reason Peirce calls 
substance the beginning of conception, since it is the very first thing taking place in 
any conception. 
 At the opposite limit there is the conception of being. Peirce explains that “The 
conception of being arises upon the formation of a proposition” (W 2: 52), and the 
“unity to which the understanding reduces impressions is the unity of a proposition”  
(W 2: 49). The conception of being is simply expressed by the copula, whose 
function is to connect the predicate to the subject of the proposition. Because the 
conception of being is a formal entity with no content, it is able to unify the manifold 
of sense impressions in terms of a predicate united to a subject. 
 Peirce emphasises that no unity could be achieved without the conception of 
being, for it “is that which completes the work of conceptions of reducing the 
manifold to unity”  (W 2: 49-50). Thus he describes being as the end (or terminus) of 
conception. There is a degree of vagueness in Peirce’s explanation of the conception 
of being. Sometimes he appears, as in the quotation just given, to place the 
conception of being above all the rest of the categories. At other times he seems to 
attribute the function of completing the unification of the manifold to the conception 
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 of representation instead. This vagueness, however, is prompted mainly by Peirce’s 
style of presenting his analysis. He fails to clearly explain some of the moves he 
makes in his analysis. For example, he offers no account as to why he talks about 
“passing from being to substance” (W 2: 52, 54), after all he contends that substance 
is the beginning of conception and being the end of it. Since I do not believe that 
there is a real contradiction between the accounts just referred to, I will attempt to 
address his conception of being in a way that will both do justice to Peirce and at the 
same time make sense of what he appears to have said. 
 I suggest that the conception of being may better be understood as logically 
prior to the three intermediate categories — Quality, Relation and Representation. (I 
will show in section 1.2.3.2 below, that the conception of being is also ontologically 
prior to the intermediate categories.) That is, any attempt to unify the manifold of 
sense experience presupposes some idea of what the ‘unity’ in question is like. Peirce 
identifies (in the ‘New List’) this unity with (the function of) the copula ‘is’ in any 
given proposition. The intermediate categories express different aspects of the 
manifold which is brought to unity within the framework of a particular proposition. 
That is to say an object can be made intelligible only within the formal framework of 
a specific proposition, but until the intermediate categories have completed their 
function, no particular object is made intelligible. 
 Therefore, any particular attempt to unify the impressions of experience 
without the aid of the conception of being could never be completed, because the 
conception of being provides the necessary formal basis for the unity, or within 
which the manifold is “sorted out.” Likewise, without substance, no unifying process 
for the manifold of impressions would ever be needed. Peirce expresses this point as 
follows. 
If we had but one impression, it would not require to be reduced to unity … 
But since there is a manifold of impressions, we have a feeling of complication 
or confusion, which leads us to differentiate this impression from that, and 
then, having been differentiated, they require to be brought to unity (W 2: 54). 
 The conceptions of substance and being are depicted in the ‘New List’ as two 
necessary conditions for the unity and coherence of the overall categorical system. 
When they are said to be the beginning and end of conception, Peirce is quite clear 
that the conception cannot occur without the use of both the categories of substance 
and being. The description of substance and being as the beginning and end of 
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 conception leaves us with a pattern (or intentional structure) which may be 
represented as follows. (See figure 1, below). 
 Figure 1: 
Substance [Beginning] →  {Quality/Relation/Representation} →  Being [End] 
1.2.3.2 Quality, Relation, Representation: The Intermediate Conceptions 
 Between substance and being are three intermediate conceptions of quality, 
relation, and representation, which Peirce termed “accidents.” In the ‘New List,’ 
Peirce does not explain what he means by calling the three intermediate conceptions 
“accidents.” Yet, his intention is clear, as Hausmann remarks: 
[It] is obviously not intended as a retraction of the point that they are categories 
and thus universal and necessary. It is rather a way of indicating their status in 
relation to the framing foundations of categories [substance and being], that is, 
to their serving as a means to the end of making intelligible what otherwise 
would be chaos, which is to serve the purpose of unifying the diversity of what 
is encountered in experience.18  
Hausmann rightly points out that Peirce’s use of the word “accidents” in referring to 
the intermediate categories is simply to indicate “their status in relation” to the 
conceptions of substance and being. This shows two different levels at which the 
categories of the ‘New List’ are necessary. At one level, or what we may call loosely 
the ‘foundational level’ of conception, only the conceptions of substance and being 
are necessary, since there cannot be a conception without a beginning and an end. At 
this level the intermediate conceptions are sufficient conditions, or accidents, of the 
particular event required to bring unity to the manifold of impressions, for they 
determine the circumstances in whose presence the event will occur. 
 At the level of “passing from being to substance,” each intermediate category 
is both a necessary and sufficient condition, depending on its relation to other 
categories. The category of quality is a sufficient condition of the category of being, 
but also a necessary condition for the category of relation. The category of relation is 
a necessary condition for the category of representation, while it is a sufficient 
condition of the category of quality. Regarding the category of representation, it is a 
necessary condition for the category of substance, and at the same time it is a 
sufficient condition of the category of relation. The designation “accidents” thus 
                                                 
18 Ibid., p. 108. 
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 applies correctly to the intermediate categories only at the ‘foundational level,’ but 
not at the level of “passing from being to substance.” 
 When Peirce distinguishes the three intermediate conceptions he consistently 
refers to “passing from being to substance;” and we may represent it thus. (See figure 
2, below). 
 Figure 2: 
 Being → {Quality/Relation/Representation} →  Substance 
 
 By the conception of being, represented by the copula of a proposition, a 
quality (predicate) is united to the substance (subject) in a particular relation and in a 
particular mode of representation. “Quality, therefore, in its very widest sense, is the 
first conception in order in passing from being to substance” (W 2: 52). Quality is 
not given in the impression. It is on the contrary “a pure species or abstraction” (W 2: 
52). Consider Peirce’s example “the stove is black.” The quality black, or blackness, 
is predicated of the subject “the stove.” But before predication, a quality, in order to 
be applicable to a subject, “must first be considered without regard to this 
circumstance, and taken immediately” (W 2: 52). Peirce argues further: 
the conception of a pure abstraction is indispensable, because we cannot 
comprehend an agreement of two things, except as an agreement in some 
respect, and this respect is such a pure abstraction as blackness. Such a pure 
abstraction, reference to which constitutes a quality or general attribute, may be 
termed a ground. (W 2: 52-53). 
 This passage explains what Peirce means by quality as a relation of “reference 
to a ground.” The ground, or respect, is the very basis of attributing or unifying a 
quality to a subject. So when attribution, or ‘unifying’ a quality to a subject, takes 
place there is a relation involved in which we refer to a ground of that quality. In 
unifying the quality “black” to the subject “the stove”, we do so because we know 
what “black” looks like. 
 Peirce may be understood to have demonstrated by the principle of prescision 
both the logical and ontological priority of being to quality, quality to relations and 
relations to representations. He says, “Reference to a ground [quality] cannot be 
prescinded from being, but being can be prescinded from it” (W 2: 53). This is 
because quality presupposes being, but not vice versa. About the validity of its 
introduction, Peirce tells us, “The occasion of the introduction of the conception of 
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 reference to a ground is the reference to a correlate, and this is, therefore, the next 
conception in order [of passing from being to substance]” (W 2: 53). 
 Just as reference to a correlate is the occasion of reference to a ground, 
reference to an interpretant is the occasion of the introduction of the correlate. Thus 
representation, reference to an interpretant, is the third and last intermediate 
conception in the order of “passing from being to substance.” Reference to an 
interpretant operates by means of comparison, thus Peirce claims: 
[E]very comparison requires, besides the related thing, the ground, and the 
correlate, also a mediating representation which represents the relate to be a 
representation of the same correlate which this mediating representation itself 
represents (W 2: 53). 
Peirce goes on, 
Such a mediating representation may be termed an interpretant, because it 
fulfils the office of an interpreter, who says that a foreigner says the same thing 
which he himself says (W 2: 53-54). 
For example, suppose we think of teaching — a relation between a teacher and a 
student. In the conception of teaching it is represented that there is a teacher being in 
relation to a student with whom the teacher himself is in relation. This conception of 
teaching is an interpretant which not only represents a teacher as a representation of 
the relation of teaching a student, but also the relation of the student (being taught) as 
well. 
 Peirce is aware of the ambiguity of the word ‘representation’, but he considers 
it harmless to his purpose. He explains the scope of his usage of the word 
‘representation’ as follows. 
The term “representation” is here to be understood in a very extended sense, 
which can be explained by instances better than definition. In this sense, a 
word represents a thing to the conception in the mind of the hearer, a portrait 
represents the person for whom it is intended to the conception of recognition, 
a weathercock represents the direction of the wind to the conception of him 
who understands it, a barrister represents his client to the judge and jury whom 
he influences (W 2: 54). 
The universal conception of representation presupposes the universal conception of 
relation, but not vice versa. Thus “Reference to an interpretant cannot be prescinded 
from reference to a correlate; but the latter can be prescinded from the former” (W 2: 
54). Here, again, the non-reciprocal nature of prescision is maintained. Peirce 
continues his explanation of representation: 
the reference to an interpretant arises upon the holding together of diverse 
impressions, and therefore it does not join a conception to the substance, as the 
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 other two references do, but unites directly the manifold of the substance itself. 
It is, therefore, the last conception in order in passing from being to substance 
(W 2: 54). 
 Perhaps it is not surprising that Peirce spent only the first few paragraphs of the 
‘New List’ on discussing the conceptions of substance and being as the beginning 
and end of conception respectively, and then focussed the rest of the paper on 
“passing from being to substance” and the intermediate conceptions. This shows that 
the analysis conducted to identify the universal conceptions in the ‘New List’ is 
primarily concerned with the necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of 
propositions, and the functions of components of propositions. Although substance 
and being are two of the five universal conceptions of the ‘New List’ there is a 
reason to believe that the three intermediate conceptions are the primary focus of 
Peirce’s attention in the paper under consideration. 
1.2.4 Numerical Description of the Categories 
 Peirce assigns numerical titles to the three intermediate conceptions, saying: 
This passage from the many to the one is numerical. The conception of a third 
is that of an object which is so related to two others, that one of these must be 
related to the other in the same way in which the third is related to that other. 
Now this coincides with the conception of an interpretant (W 2: 55). 
 In this, the only passage on numerical description of the categories in the ‘New 
List’, Peirce continues, “An other is plainly equivalent to a correlate. The conception 
of second differs from that other, in implying the possibility of a third” (W 2: 55). 
There is no mention of the conception of quality in numerical terms, but it is clear 
that a conception of first would be equivalent to the conception of quality, 
considering Peirce’s statement on the order of implication between the conceptions 
of second and third. In the last two sentences of the same passage Peirce states, “In 
the same way [the conception of second implies the possibility of a third], the 
conception of self implies the possibility of an other. The Ground is the self 
abstracted from the concreteness which implies the possibility of an other” (W 2: 
55). Here “Ground is the self abstracted from the concreteness” is no different from 
the description of the conception of quality (see section 1.2.3.2 above). 
 However, Peirce’s numerical description of the three intermediate categories 
by no means indicates that substance and being could be given a similar description, 
nor does it contain any sign of an attempt by Peirce to so describe them. Peirce 
appears to suggest that their usefulness as two separate categories is coming to an 
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 end. However, there is still an indirect reference to substance and being in the next 
paragraph after his numerical description of the intermediate categories, when Peirce 
makes a list of “supposable objects” of the categories. In the list there are:  
What is. 
 Quale — that which refers to a ground, 
 Relate— that which refers to a ground and correlate, 
 Representamen— that which refers to a ground, correlate, and interpretant. 
It. (W 2: 55) 
“What is” and “It” are listed as the “supposable objects” of being and substance 
respectively. But there is nothing else said about them and how they might be related 
to the “supposable objects” of the intermediate categories. 
1.2.5 Types of Representations and Logic 
 In the ‘New List’ Peirce had already started to work on some application of the 
categories. One part of Peirce’s concern is an attempt “to show how the three 
conceptions of reference to a ground, reference to an object, and reference to an 
interpretant are fundamental ones of at least one universal science, that of logic” (W 
2: 56). Peirce does not include the categories of being and substance in this attempt, 
nor does he explain why. The most reasonable conjecture that can be made to explain 
this is that Peirce no longer thinks of the categories of being and substance as 
fundamental to logic or that logic qua logic is not directly concerned with either. 
This is consistent with the suggestion made in section 1.2.4 concerning why 
substance and being are not included in his numerical description of the categories. 
This suggestion is further supported by the features of the basis of Peirce’s claim that 
the three intermediate conceptions are fundamental to logic. 
 By using the principle of prescision Peirce distinguishes three kinds of 
“representations” which differ from one another in terms of how they are related to 
their objects. This indicates Peirce’s certain understanding of the intermediate 
categories. He treats them as (different forms of) relations of reference. Recall his 
lists of the intermediate categories and their “supposable objects”: 
 34
  
List of intermediate categories:- 
 Quality (Reference to a Ground), 
 Relation (Reference to a Correlate), 
 Representation (Reference to an Interpretant). 
List of “supposable objects” of intermediate categories:- 
 Quale — that which refers to a ground, 
 Relate — that which refers to a ground and correlate, 
 Representamen — that which refers to a ground, correlate, and 
interpretant. 
 Judging these two lists by themselves reveals the latter to have the merit of 
being more complete, and thus more descriptive than the former, in that it shows the 
number of item(s) involved in the relation of reference of each category and why a 
category is prescindable and/or unprescindable from another category. Quality is 
prescindable from both the categories of relation and representation, because quality 
refers neither to a correlate nor to an interpretant. Relation cannot be prescinded from 
quality for relation necessarily involves quality, reference to a ground. But relation 
can be prescinded from representation since the former does not involve reference to 
an interpretant. The category of representation involves reference “to a ground, 
correlate, and interpretant,” and thus it cannot be prescinded from both quality and 
relation, for they are both necessary conditions for its occurrence. 
 The term ‘reference’ (or ‘refer’) plays a significant role in Peirce’s analysis of 
the categories. It designates a kind of representative power within the categories, 
which Peirce purports to express by the term ‘reference’. This is evident in Peirce’s 
defining of the three intermediate categories consistently using the word ‘refer.’ Note 
that the third intermediate category is the only one called ‘representation’. But this 
simply means that the third intermediate category is the representation proper, or 
representation in total. For it includes the first two intermediate categories. The 
categories of quality and relation are representations but with a lesser number of 
terms involved in their whole process of representation. 
 Peirce analyses the relations of reference of the three intermediate categories, 
and concludes that these relations hold between its terms in three different ways, 
which he calls: (1) “concurrence or community in some quality,” (2) 
“correspondence in fact,” and (3) “imputed quality.” By “concurrence or community 
in some quality” Peirce means that which refers to something is in possession of 
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 some character by virtue of which it renders itself representative. The relation of 
reference of a relatum (or what Peirce calls “relate”)19 to its ‘correlate’ is due to 
“correspondence in fact,” by which he means not only that the relate possesses a 
certain character that makes it representative, but it factually corresponds to its 
correlate. ‘Imputed character’ being the basis of the third mode of representation is a 
general law by which the ground and the correlate are brought together. 
Representation based on an imputed character involves the first two intermediate 
categories, but it differs from them in having an interpretant. Distinguishing these 
three different modes of representation enables Peirce to develop and explain the 
representative power of the categories. He says, “It follows that there are three kinds 
of representations” (W 2: 56). 
 1st. Those whose relation to their objects is a mere community in some 
quality, and these representations may be termed Likenesses. 
 2nd. Those whose relation to their objects consists in a correspondence in 
fact, and these may be termed Indices or Signs. 
 3rd. Those the ground of whose relation to their objects is an imputed 
character, which are the same as general signs, and these may be termed 
Symbols (W 2: 56). 
 The identification of these three kinds of representations makes it possible for 
Peirce to distinguish three different classes of signs: likenesses (which Peirce later 
called icons), indices or signs, and symbols. Peirce, by showing the methodological 
value of the three intermediate categories thus demonstrates that they are 
fundamental to logic insofar as they enable us to distinguish between these three 
classes of signs and their functions. Without the specific understanding of the 
categories as modes of representations, Peirce could not have demonstrated their 
application to logic. This is important and necessary for him in that logic is the study 
or science “of second intentions as applied to first. … second intentions are the 
objects of the understanding considered as representations, and the first intentions to 
which they apply are the objects of those representations” (W 2: 56). If logic were 
not considered a study of second intentions (or representations), as he maintains 
along with scholastic logicians, but is concerned with first intentions, then the 
category of representation could not be part of the subject matter of logic. 
 At the time of publication of the ‘New List,’ however, Peirce held a more 
nominalistic view of logic, namely, that it operates by means of symbols alone and 
                                                 
19 Note Peirce uses the term ‘relate’ here as a noun, not as a verb as we normally understand it. 
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 does not require likenesses and indices. This is because Peirce’s interest in logic then 
was very much focussed on classification of arguments,20 and for him “no arguments 
can be constructed of these [likenesses and indices] alone” (W 2: 56). Also, Peirce 
took the view that “The objects of the understanding, considered as representations, 
are symbols, that is, signs which are at least potentially general” (W 2: 56). Logical 
rules apply to likenesses and indices not in their own right and independently of the 
category of representation, but as members of it. 
 This leads Peirce to distinguish three branches of logic, three divisions of 
symbols, and three modes of arguments, focussed merely on symbols. The three 
branches of logic being: formal grammar, logic (proper), and formal rhetoric. Each is 
concerned with the formal conditions of symbols but in different respects. Formal 
grammar is concerned with the formal conditions necessary for combinations of 
symbols to yield a meaning. Logic proper (or ‘critical logic’ as Peirce also calls it) 
studies “the formal conditions of the truth of symbols” (W 2: 57). The third branch of 
logic, formal rhetoric, deals with how symbols appeal to, or refer to, an interpretant, 
thus showing “the force of symbols” (W 2: 57). The three divisions of symbols are: 
 1: Symbols which directly determine only their grounds or imputed 
qualities, and are thus but sums of marks or terms; 
 2: Symbols which also independently determine their objects by means of 
other term or terms, and thus, expressing their own objective validity, become 
capable of truth or falsehood, that is, are propositions; and, 
 3: Symbols which also independently determine their interpretants, and 
thus the minds to which they appeal, by premising a proposition or 
propositions which such a mind is to admit. These are arguments (W 2: 57). 
 Peirce’s triadic divisions of symbols shows that ‘terms’, ‘propositions’ and 
‘arguments’ are each recognised as part of the subject matter of logic, as symbols can 
be treated as general signs, or principles. What Peirce is saying is that particular 
terms, propositions and arguments can only be regarded as logically significant if 
they are considered in relation to some general rules. 
 Just as particular terms, propositions and arguments have logical significance 
due to the generality of symbols, likenesses and indices also play a part in logical 
consideration, as components of an argument. 
 Peirce divides arguments into three kinds: deduction, hypothesis (or 
“abduction” as he later called it), and induction. In each of these forms of argument 
                                                 
20 Max H. Fisch, 1986, pp. 214, 336. 
 37
 the premises represent the conclusion in a certain way, depending on how they are 
related to one another. Thus the premises of a particular form of argument are a 
certain class of signs. “In deductive argument,” Peirce says, “the conclusion is 
represented by the premises as by a general sign under which it is contained” (W 2: 
58; emphasis added). The premises of a hypothesis represent a likeness of the 
conclusion. With induction “the premises are an index of the conclusion” (W 2: 58, 
emphasis added). 
1.3 Aristotle, Kant, and Peirce on Categories: A Brief Comparison and 
Contrast 
 The influence of both Aristotle and Kant on Peirce is undeniable, and it has 
become a commonplace in Peirce scholarship. Peirce had a great admiration for both 
these philosophers, remarking that they are two of the greatest philosophers of all 
time. As indicated in section 1.1.1, Peirce’s philosophical project was quite similar in 
aim to those of both Aristotle and Kant. When Peirce first derived his categories, he 
had both Aristotle and Kant in mind, among others. In attempting to demonstrate the 
uniqueness of Peirce’s theory of categories, I need to compare his theory with both 
Aristotle’s and Kant’s. 
 I have already mentioned one similarity between Peirce’s, Aristotle’s, and 
Kant’s lists of categories: that they were all regarded as foundational to their 
respective philosophical systems. Another similarity is that they all held the view that 
logic plays an important role in discovering the categories they wanted. Interestingly, 
however, it is the extent of their employment of logic in deriving their categories 
where the difference between them is most remarkable. 
1.3.1 Aristotle’s Categories 
 Aristotle’s theory of categories is an attempt to identify the types of things that 
can be said of something else or an object. Thus his categories, ten in number, are 
called ‘predicates.’ Each category is predicable of the subject of any given 
proposition; and the proposition resulting from each predication is an answer to a 
question asked of that thing or object. 
 Aristotle’s Categories, in which he derived his ten categories, opens with a 
brief discussion of three different kinds of words: equivocal, univocal, and derivative 
words. Two things are equivocal if the same word can apply to them but in different 
senses. For example, both a man in reality, and a man in a portrait may be called 
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 ‘animals’, but what the word ‘animal’ means in the case of man is different from 
what it means when applied to the case of the portrait. A word is univocal if it 
applies to different things in the same sense. Thus when the word ‘animal’ is applied 
to both a man and an ox it is used univocally since the word ‘animal’ applies to them 
in the same sense. Thirdly, there are derivative words, which get their name from 
similar words but of different form (or function). The word ‘grammatical’, for 
example, is a derivative of ‘grammar’.21 
 Aristotle then states that all words or expressions are either compound or 
simple expressions. “We may or we may not combine what we call words, 
expressions and phrases. Combine them; you have propositions.”22 As to simple 
words, Aristotle explains, “Each uncombined word or expression means one of the 
following things,”23 which are his categories. 
what (Substance), how large (that is, Quantity), what sort of thing (that is, 
Quality), related to what (or Relation), where (that is, Place), when (or Time), 
in what attitude (Posture, Position), how circumstanced (State or Condition), 
how active, what doing (or Action), how passive, what suffering (Affection).24 
 Aristotle treated these categories as both logical and ontological 
representations. They are logical, in that they represent the ways in which we think 
about things. For example, we think of an object either as a substance (as in ‘Socrates 
is a man’) or as a determination of it (as in ‘Socrates is five-foot tall’). Used in an 
ontological sense, the categories represent different modes of being, or ways how 
things exist.25 To say that a person, Peter, for example, exists implies that Peter is 
somewhere, i.e. in a place; he must have a certain height; and so on. 
 Aristotle’s method of deriving his categories is a mixture of logic and appeal to 
the form of language itself. As William and Martha Kneale put it, “Aristotle is 
classifying types of being … but he uses the differences between rules for different 
linguistic expressions as a clue to the differences between types of being.”26 Peirce 
                                                 
21 Aristotle, The Categories, in The Organon, vol. 1, trans. Harold P. Cooke (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1938: reprinted 1949, 1955), 1. All quotations from 
Aristotle’s The Categories are from the same translation. 
22 Ibid., 2, 1a16-18. 
23 Ibid., 4, 1b25. 
24 Ibid., 4, 1b25-28. 
25 Frederick Copleston, S. J., A History of Philosophy, vol. 1, Image Books edition (New York: 
Doubleday), 1993, pp. 278-9. 
26 William and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic, reprint from corrected sheets of the 1st 
edition (Oxford: At The Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 27. 
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 holds a similar view when he says that Aristotle’s categories “are derived from a 
half-logical, half-grammatical analysis of propositions.”27 
 The main important difference, however, between Aristotle’s and Peirce’s 
theories of categories is that in case of the former theory each category can be 
applied to form a meaningful proposition without necessarily requiring the 
involvement of the other categories. For example, we can say, “Stove is black” with 
the category of quality, which is ‘black’ in this example, being the only category 
employed, and yet we appear to still have quite a meaningful proposition. However, 
for Peirce, as I have discussed earlier, all his categories must be involved in the 
proposition “Stove is black.” He would argue that we cannot make sense of any 
proposition or concept without the involvement of all the categories. 
 There is an exception to what I have just said about the difference between 
Aristotle’s and Peirce’s categories; namely, Aristotle’s category of substance, which 
is significantly different from the rest of his categories. The category of substance, 
according to Aristotle, can neither be predicated of a subject, nor is it in a subject. 
This is because for Aristotle substance is both logically and ontologically prior to the 
rest of the categories. For in every predication there is always a substance, which is 
signified by the subject of a proposition, of which we predicate any of the rest of the 
categories. Aristotle explains: 
 Everything else but first substance is either affirmed of first substance or 
present in such as its subject. This is evident from particular instances taken by 
way of examples. We predicate ‘animal’ of ‘man.’ So we predicate ‘animal 
also of any particular man. Were there no individuals existing of whom it could 
thus be affirmed, it could not be affirmed of the species. Colour, again, is in 
body; so also in this or that body. For were there no bodies existing wherein it 
could also exist, it could not be in body at all. In fine, then, all things 
whatsoever, save what we call primary substances, are predicates of primary 
substances or present in such as their subjects. And were there no primary 
substance, nought else could so much as exist.28 
 Aristotle draws an important distinction between what he calls primary and 
secondary substances. By ‘primary substance’ Aristotle means the individual things 
or existents such as man, horse, and so on; and secondary substances are things, or 
more properly called ‘concepts’, like ‘man’, ‘horse’, etc. An example will suffice to 
                                                 
27 This is from a draft of his ‘New List.’ This draft does not appear in the Collected Papers of 
Charles Sanders Peirce. It is reprinted in Murray G. Murphey, The Development of Peirce’s 
Philosophy (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1993), p. 412. 
28 Aristotle, The Categories, 5, 2a34-2b6. 
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 demonstrate Aristotle’s idea of the distinction. Consider the proposition “Socrates is 
a man.” The term ‘man’ is a secondary substance, or species in Aristotle’s alternative 
terminology; and ‘Socrates,’ which is the subject of the proposition considered, is a 
primary substance. According to Aristotle, the primary substance ‘Socrates’ cannot 
be predicated of, nor does it exist in, any subject. On the other hand, a secondary 
substance can be predicated of a subject but it is not in a subject. Thus ‘man’ can be 
predicated of Socrates, but it is not in Socrates or any other individual man. 
1.3.2 Kant’s Categories 
 Kant, unlike Aristotle, derived his categories directly from an analysis of the 
logical forms of judgements. This is because for Kant the categories are a priori or 
“pure concepts of the understanding,”29 meaning that they are neither given in 
perception nor experience, nor can be abstracted from it. Rather, they are 
presupposed by the logical forms of judgement. Kant held the view that all 
knowledge rests on three main factors. Firstly, there is a given “manifold of pure 
intuition” by which he means the impressions received by intuition (i.e. in direct 
experience). Secondly, this “manifold of intuition” is synthesised by our imagination, 
which Kant takes as a “blind but indispensable function of the soul.”30 The third 
factor involved in knowledge is the concepts (of the understanding) which bring 
unity to the synthesis of the manifold of intuition by imagination. These concepts, 
according to Kant, “rest on the understanding.”31 
 All acts of the understanding are reducible to judgements, according to Kant.32 
This is because, Kant claims, “the only use which the understanding can make of … 
concepts is to judge by means of them.”33 Thus for Kant to identify the categories, 
requires an identification of all different possible forms of judgements. Kant came up 
with twelve logical forms of judgements (given below in figure 3), which he 
classified according to their quantity, quality, relation, and modality. 
                                                 
29 Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 
1950), B105. 
30 Ibid., A78. 
31 Ibid., A79. 
32 Ibid., B94. 
33 Ibid., B93. Emphasis added. 
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 Figure 3: 
Kant’s Table of Judgements34 
I Quantity     II Quality  III Relation  IV Modality 
Universal     Affirmative  Categorical  Problematic 
Particular     Negative  Hypothetical  Assertoric 
Singular     Infinite  Disjunctive  Apodeictic 
 Since the logical forms of judgement are distinct from one another, 
corresponding to each one of them is a distinct category. Kant thus derived twelve 
categories (given in figure 4 below) from his table of judgements. 
 Figure 4: 
Kant’s Table of Categories35 
I Of Quantity     II Of Quality 
 Unity     Reality 
 Plurality     Negation 
 Totality     Limitation 
III Of Relation     IV Of Modality 
 Of Inherence and Subsistence  Possibility — Impossibility 
  (substantia et accidens)  Existence — Non-existence 
 Of Causality and Dependence  Necessity — Contingency 
  (cause and effect) 
 Of Community (reciprocity between 
  agent and patient) 
 Kant argues that the categories are necessary for all knowledge and experience. 
For the categories, according to Kant, provide “the objective ground of the 
possibility of experience.”36 He says: 
Concepts of objects in general thus underlie all empirical knowledge as its a 
priori conditions. The objective validity of the categories as a priori concepts 
rests, therefore, on the fact that, so far as the form of thought is concerned, 
through them alone does experience become possible. They relate of necessity 
and a priori to objects of experience, for the reason that only by means of them 
can any object whatsoever of experience be thought.37 
 Like Aristotle’s categories, as explained above, Kant’s categories do not have 
the characteristic of inter-dependence inherent in Peirce’s list of categories, namely 
that all the categories are involved in every meaningful proposition. Peirce, in 
                                                 
34 Ibid., A70, B95. 
35 Ibid., B106. 
36 Ibid., A94. 
37 Ibid., B126. 
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 realising the difference between his list of categories and that of Kant, draws a 
distinction between what he calls “particular categories” and “universal categories.” 
He identifies Kant’s categories as particular categories, and his own as universal. 
The particular categories form a series, or set of series, only one of each being 
present, or at least predominant, in any one phenomenon. The universal 
categories, on the other hand, belong to every phenomenon, one being perhaps 
more prominent in one aspect of that phenomenon than another but all 
belonging to every phenomenon (CP 5.43). 
Then, two sentences later, Peirce continues, saying the following of Kant’s 
categories. 
But in Kant we have Unity, Plurality, and Totality not all present at once; 
Reality, Negation, and Limitation not all present at once; Inherence, Causation, 
and Reaction not all present at once; Possibility, Necessity, and Actuality not 
all present at once. On the other hand Kant’s four greater categories, Quantity, 
Quality, Relation, and Modality, form what I should recognize as Kant’s 
Universal Categories (CP 5.43). 
 Despite Peirce’s identification of “Kant’s four greater categories” as universal 
categories, it should be pointed out that he does not mean to say that they are the 
same as his own categories. For not only are they different in number, but, more 
importantly, Kant’s “universal categories” do not have the inter-dependence and 
irreducible triadic relation (or triadicity) of Peirce’s categories. Kant would classify 
Peirce’s example “The stove is black” (discussed in section 1.2.3.2 above) as a 
categorical judgment, and one that embodies his category of ‘inherence and 
subsistence’ (or substance and accident). Whereas for Kant this judgment is formed 
by applying the category of ‘inherence and subsistence’ only, Peirce maintains all his 
categories are involved in the formation of the judgment. 
1.4 Some Changes to the Categories of the ‘New List’ 
 Peirce later, in 1885,38 revised his theory of categories formulated in the ‘New 
List’ in the light of the developments he made to his theories of cognition, reality, 
and logic of relations. 
1.4.1 From Five to Three Categories 
 In his writings after publication of the ‘New List’ in 1867 to the end of his 
philosophical career, Peirce maintained only three categories. He dropped being and 
                                                 
38 According to Murray G. Murphey, 1993, p. 296, “although some tentative attempts at a revision 
of the categories were made in the late 1870’s —  e.g. the correlation of Thirdness with continuity —  
no thoroughgoing revision was made until 1885.” 
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 substance from his list of categories and retained only the three intermediate 
categories of the ‘New List,’ as explained above in section 1.2.3. 
 Between 1868 and 1877 Peirce wrote a series of papers, published in the 
Journal of Speculative Philosophy.39 Three of these papers constitute what is known 
as the ‘cognition series’: ‘Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man’ 
(1868), ‘Some Consequences of Four Incapacities’ (1868), and ‘Grounds of Validity 
of the Laws of Logic’ (1869). The ‘cognition series’ contains developments of some 
of the ideas of the ‘New List;’ for example, the theory of signs and its application to 
cognition. All these developments culminate in an attack on what Peirce calls “the 
spirit of Cartesianism,” which he understands to be a doctrine of introspection 
emphasising methodological doubt and the certainty of individual self-consciousness 
as principles of knowledge. His opposition to the spirit of Cartesianism contains four 
denials. 
 1. We have no power of Introspection, but all knowledge of the internal 
worlds is derived by hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of external 
facts. 
 2. We have no power of Intuition, but every cognition is determined 
logically by previous cognitions. 
 3. We have no power of thinking without signs. 
 4. We have no conception of the absolutely incognizable (W 2: 213). 
 A radical consequence of his denial of these four principal assumptions of 
Cartesian metaphysics is that Peirce has to reformulate his five categories given in 
the ‘New List.’ I argue that despite the fact that the actual reformulation of his list of 
categories did not take place until 1885, the fundamental ideas of the ‘cognition 
series’ suggest that there would be some changes to be made to the categories of the 
‘New List.’ This is evident, as I shall explain, in Peirce’s view of substance and 
being presented in the ‘cognition series.’ (As far as I know, Peirce does not offer any 
explanation as to why he dropped ‘being’ and ‘substance’ from his list of 
categories.)40 
                                                 
39 According to Max H. Fisch, this is “The first philosophical journal in the United States - indeed 
the first in English anywhere.” ‘Introduction,’ Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, 
vol. 2, ed. Edward C. Moore, Max H. Fisch, et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 
xxv. 
40 It is true, as Hausmann (1993, p. 137) points out, that Peirce “has not abandoned these 
conceptions [being and substance] completely [after the ‘New List’], because he does refer to them in 
other contexts.” The point is despite Peirce’s reference to being and substance in other contexts after 
the ‘New List,’ he never regarded them in those contexts as distinct categories as he did in the ‘New 
List.’ 
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  Fundamental to ‘cognition series’ is the idea that the products of cognition are 
relations (W 2: 209), meaning that “every cognition is determined logically by 
previous cognitions” (W 2:213). What Peirce opposes here is the idea that there is an 
absolutely first principle, which he identifies as an element of the “spirit of 
Cartesianism.” Since being and substance are not forms of relations, nor forms of 
representations, nor signs, nor forms of cognition, it follows that they have to be 
excluded from the list of primitive categories. This leaves only the three 
(intermediate) categories, namely: Quality (Reference to a Ground), Relation 
(Reference to a Correlate), Representation (Reference to an Interpretant). 
 The arguments of the ‘cognition series’ (which lead to the exclusion of being 
and substance from his list of categories) indicate what Peirce thinks about the nature 
of categories. Namely, that categories must themselves be universal conceptions, and 
that they must result from some conceptual activity, or cognition. Although being 
and substance are identified in the ‘New List’ as universal conceptions, in the light of 
the arguments he puts forward in the ‘cognition series,’ he concludes that they cannot 
be conceptions. Peirce’s proof of this is that they are not relations. For Peirce 
conceptions involve representation of some sort, whether a conception is based on 
concurrence, or correspondence in fact, or imputed quality. Terms such as being and 
substance are normally called absolute terms; they involve no relation, and thus they 
are not able to involve representation. But, according to Peirce’s argument, absolute 
terms, if there are really any, are “absolutely inconceivable” (W 2: 238). 
 Peirce becomes clearer in the ‘cognition series’ about his view of what the 
relation of substance and being to cognition really is. He explains substance more 
explicitly, saying “that the first impression of sense is not cognition but only the limit 
of cognition. … At the very first instant of this process [of experience of any object], 
there is no consciousness but only the beginning of becoming conscious” (W 2: 191; 
my emphasis). Although Peirce has already indicated this in the ‘New List,’ that 
substance is the beginning of conception and it has no connotation, it is in the 
‘cognition series’ instead that he makes a clear distinction between the limit of 
cognition and cognition per se. To put it in the language of the ‘New List,’ the 
distinction is now clearly made between the beginning of conception and conception 
itself. In the light of this distinction Peirce argues, “Thus the first impression is out of 
the mind in the sense that the degree of consciousness in it is zero” (W 2: 191). It 
follows that the categories Peirce has in mind are supposed to be products of some 
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 degree of consciousness, in which some representation of them is possible and their 
representative power is realised. An object or substance that involves no degree of 
consciousness cannot afford any representation of it. In other words, Peirce is saying 
that we cannot make representations of the “incognizables or inconceivables,” if 
there are any. 
 Peirce’s sign theory of cognition allows the term ‘being’ to be treated, for all 
practical purposes, as synonymous with ‘thought.’ This means that ‘being’ is no 
longer considered a category but ‘a conception about a category’. Peirce says, 
because “all thought is in signs” (W 2: 208), and being is synonymous with thought, 
the conception of being is “a conception about a sign - a thought, or word” (W 2: 
231). Peirce arrives at this conclusion by arguing that: 
A conception … which was quite universal in every respect would be 
unrecognizable and impossible. We do not obtain the conception of Being, in 
the sense implied in the copula, by observing that all the things which we can 
think of have something in common, for there is no such thing to be observed. 
We get it by reflecting upon signs - words or thoughts; - we observe that 
different predicates may be attached to the same subject, and that each makes 
some conception applicable to the subject; then we imagine that a subject has 
something true of it merely because a predicate (no matter what) is attached to 
it, - and that we call Being. … and since it is not applicable to every sign, it is 
not primarily universal, although it is so in its mediate application to things (W 
2: 231). 
 Here Peirce brings in his sign theory of cognition to explain both how we 
arrive at a conception of being and the logical function of the term ‘being’ in logical 
discourse. He denies any existence to being as such (considered as “something” 
conceivable in itself), arguing that the only concept of being that is meaningful and 
intelligible to us is that which is conveyed to us through signs, or representations. 
This is how Peirce comes to view thought, which for him is a sign (W 2: 173), as 
synonymous with being. 
 It should be emphasised that this notion of being stems ultimately from his 
denial of the view that there is an absolutely first premise or cognition. Peirce takes 
the idea of an absolutely ultimate cognition or conception as untenable for such an 
idea would be inconceivable. He emphasises that “The only thought … which can 
possibly be cognized is thought in signs. But thought which cannot be cognized does 
not exist. All thought, therefore, must necessarily be in signs” (W 2: 207). It follows 
from this that being which is cognisable is only that which results from cognition 
conducted in signs. 
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  In denying “the spirit of Cartesianism,” and its resort to psychological 
introspection, Peirce comes up with a theory of cognition that requires him to 
exclude being and substance from his list of categories. He argues that the concept of 
substance does not involve cognition and as such it cannot function as a category. 
Being is considered not a category but a conception about a category. This reinforces 
Peirce’s insistence on categories as kinds of relations with representative power, and 
having established the categories as kinds of relations with representative power, 
Peirce realises that he has to give a phenomenological account of the categories, 
showing how they link to experience. 
1.4.2 The Impact of the Logic of Relations and Quantification Theory on Peirce’s 
Approach to Categories 
 After the publication of the ‘New List,’ Peirce made some logical discoveries 
which also required changes to be made to his categories. These discoveries relate to 
his logic of relations (which Peirce also calls ‘logic of relatives’) and the theory of 
quantification. He set out his account of the logic of relations in his 1870 paper 
‘Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives, resulting from an 
Amplification of the Conceptions of Boole’s Calculus of Logic.’41 His quantification 
theory was first presented in 1883, in his paper ‘The Logic of Relatives,’ and was 
published together with papers on logic by his students42 (most notably O. H. 
Mitchell) at The Johns Hopkins University. Peirce refined his quantification theory 
and presented it in his paper ‘On the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution to the 
Philosophy of Notation,’ 1885.43 (It should be noted that there is some similarity 
between elements of the description of the intermediate categories in the ‘New List’ 
and some of the conclusions of Peirce’s logic of relations, however there is no 
evidence that Peirce used logic of relations44 in his analysis in the ‘New List’.) 
 In the ‘New List’ Peirce treats the three intermediate categories as forms of 
relations. There Peirce was concerned primarily with these forms of relations as  
                                                 
41 Originally published in Memoirs of the American Academy, 1870; W 2:359-429. 
42 In Johns Hopkins Studies in Logic, ed. by C. S. Peirce, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1883; CP 
3.328-358. 
43 Originally published in The American Journal of Mathematics, 1885; CP 3.359-403. 
44 Peirce had a copy of De Morgan’s paper on the logic of relations (‘On the Syllogism IV, and the 
Logic of Relations’) in 1866, a year before his ‘New List.’ CP 1.562. 
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 conditions of the proposition. A quality is predicated of the subject, thus forming a 
relation between the subject and the quality, and finally the process of predication is 
conducted by an interpretant. Although Peirce understood the three intermediate 
categories as kinds of relations, his understanding of them was still restricted to 
traditional ‘Aristotelian’ subject-predicate logic, according to which a proposition is 
constituted of a subject and a predicate united by a copula. 
1.4.2.1 Logic of Relations 
 Peirce’s logic of relations allows certain logical operations which traditional 
logic is unable to handle. Unlike traditional logic, the logic of relations both 
demonstrates for Peirce that there are propositions (such as “A gives B to C”) that are 
not reducible to subject-predicate logical form, and makes it possible to analyse 
three-term propositions. Peirce distinguishes three classes of logical terms, which he 
calls “absolute terms,” “simple relative terms,” and “conjugative terms.” These 
classes of terms, according to Peirce, represent things in three different logical forms. 
 Absolute terms like “man,” “tree,” etc. have the logical form “a _____ ”, using 
the indefinite article ‘a’ or ‘an’ and leaving the blank space to be filled in with 
whatever term is under discussion. One characteristic of absolute terms is that there 
is no discrimination involved. The logical form of absolute terms “involves only the 
conception of quality” (W 2: 365), according to Peirce. 
 Simple relative terms are terms like “lover of,” “father of,” and so on, and they 
have the logical form “_____ is a lover of _____”. The characteristic feature of 
simple relative terms is that they discriminate between objects themselves or their 
relatives. For example, “John is the father of Peter”. In this sentence, the simple 
relative term “father of” is a relation holding between John and Peter, in which John 
is discriminated from Peter. 
 The fundamental idea of the third class of logical terms, conjugative terms, is 
that it “involves the conception of bringing things into relation,” thus requiring “the 
addition of more than one term to complete the denotation” (W 2: 365). Examples of 
conjugative terms include terms like “giver,” “buyer,” and they stand in the logical 
form such as “giver of _____ to _____”, or “buyer of _____ for _____ from _____” 
(W 2: 365). The difference between simple relative terms and conjugative terms is 
that the latter involve both ability to distinguish between different relations and their 
relata, and consciousness of their origin. For example, the proposition “A gives B to 
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 C” has three subjects (A, B, and C) brought together by the notion “giver.” To put 
this example in the form “giver of _____ to _____,” we will have “A is the giver of 
B to C,” in which the giver is specified as A and the two blanks filled in with B and 
C. 
 Peirce, in realising that he has to explain his limiting of classes of logical terms 
to only three, given that there are propositions containing more than three terms (e.g. 
‘x pays y to z for w’45), says the following: “The conjugative term involves the 
conception of THIRD, the relative that of second or OTHER, the absolute term 
simply considers AN object” (W 2: 365). He then continues: 
No fourth class of terms exists involving the conception of fourth, because 
when that of third is introduced, since it involves the conception of bringing 
objects into relation, all higher numbers are given at once, inasmuch as the 
conception of bringing objects into relation is independent of the number of 
members of the relationship (W 2: 365; emphasis added). 
 The idea of “bringing objects into relation” is apparently the basis of Peirce’s 
argument in limiting the number of his categories to three. From this passage it 
appears that for Peirce any relation with a number of terms higher than three would 
perform the same function as that by the conception of third, namely, “bringing 
objects into relation.” He does not seem to be concerned with whether or not a 
relation with more than three terms would render its objects more intelligible than the 
objects of a triadic relation. But he seems to think that this could not be the case, 
since a polyadic relation could not necessarily make its objects more intelligible than 
if they are reduced to and rendered in a triadic relation. Peirce argues that because 
polyadic relations are compounds of triadic relations (CP 1.347), they are reducible 
to the latter relations. 
 Absolute terms, simple relative terms, and conjugative terms are three kinds of 
predicates.46 An absolute term is a one-place predicate, simple relative term a two-
place predicate, and conjugative term a three-place predicate.47 Further, these three 
kinds of predicates are three different kinds of relations: they are monadic, dyadic, 
and triadic relations, and correspond to absolute, simple relative, and conjugative 
                                                 
45 W. V. Quine, Methods of Logic, 4th edition, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1982), p. 168. 
46 Murphey, 1993, p. 153. 
47 Daniel D. Merrill, ‘Relations and Quantifications in Peirce’s Logic, 1870—1885,’ Studies in the 
Logic of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Nathan Houser, et al. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1997), p. 159. 
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 terms respectively. These (relational) predicates become Peirce’s three categories of 
Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. 
 These categories correspond to the intermediate categories of the ‘New List.’ 
There is an important difference between the two, however. Whereas the 
intermediate categories of the ‘New List’ are conceptions involved in connecting 
being to substance in the subject-predicate form, Firstness, Secondness, and 
Thirdness (or the conceptions of first, second, and third as Peirce also calls them) 
now revised under the discovery of the logic of relations are “kinds of predicates.”48 
 The category of third (or Thirdness) constitutes the climax of Peirce’s 
categorical system. The methodological capacity of this system rests ultimately on 
the conception of third and much of what Peirce’s categories are capable of depends 
on it.49 For example, although the conceptions of first and second are necessary steps 
in seeking for the meaning or intelligibility of objects, together they cannot fulfil that 
goal without the conception of third. Monadic and dyadic relations have to develop 
into a triadic relation in order to make their objects intelligible. And relations of 
terms higher than three are reducible to a triadic relation in which the meaning of 
their objects could be made available for understanding. 
1.4.2.2 Theory of Quantification 
 Peirce’s discovery of the theory of quantification50 in 1883, and its refinement 
in his 1885 paper51 referred to above, made him revise his category of relation or 
Secondness. This is because the theory of quantification demonstrates for Peirce that 
all the three kinds of signs, which he calls “token” (or “symbol” as he also calls it), 
“icon,” and “index” are necessary for logical thought. He says, “in a perfect system 
of logical notations signs of these several kinds must all be employed” (CP 3.363). 
 A token is a sign “related to its object only in consequence of a mental 
association, and depends upon a habit” (CP 3.360). Tokens “are always abstract and 
general, because habits are general rules to which the organism has become 
                                                 
48 Murphey, 1993, pp. 152-3. 
49 Peirce describes the significance of the conception of third in different places in his writings. 
See, for example, CP 4.332. 
50 Peirce discovered quantification theory independently of Gottlob Frege who made the same 
discovery four years earlier in his Begriffsschrift, 1879. 
51 Between 1870 and 1885, Peirce made some developments to his logic of relations which 
anticipated his theory of quantification. For an account of the history of these developments, see W. 
V. Quine, ‘Peirce’s Logic,’ Peirce and Contemporary Thought: Philosophical Inquiries, ed. Kenneth 
Laine Ketner (New York: Fordham University Press, 1995), pp. 23-31. 
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 subjected” (CP 3.360). Since “generality is essential to reasoning,” and since tokens 
“are the only general signs,” tokens are thus necessary for logical thought (CP 
3.363). An icon is “a sign which stands for something merely because it resembles 
it” (CP 3.362), such as a painting. The necessity of icon for logical thought is that it 
provides the ‘object’ (which may either be physically or mentally present) which 
reasoning ‘observes’ and ‘experiments’ with in order to draw out conclusion. Thus 
“in contemplating a painting,” for example, “there is a moment when we lose the 
consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction of the real and the copy 
disappears” (CP 3.362). 
 Quantifiers belong to the third class of signs, “indices.” According to Peirce, 
“The index asserts nothing; it only says “There!” It takes hold of our eyes, as it were, 
and forcibly directs them to a particular object, and there it stops” (CP 3.361). 
Logical thought requires indices (examples of which include a pointing finger, 
pronouns, etc.) for denoting “the subject of discourse” (CP 3.363). 
[T]okens alone do not state what is the subject of discourse; and this can, in 
fact, not be described in general terms; it can only be indicated. The actual 
world cannot be distinguished from a world of imagination by any description. 
Hence the need of pronoun and indices, and the more complicated the subject 
the greater the need of them (CP 3.363). 
 Peirce attributes the credit of introducing indices into logic to his student O. H. 
Mitchell. 
The introduction of the indices into the algebra of logic is the greatest merit of 
Mr. Mitchell’s system. He writes F1 to mean that the proposition F is true of 
every object in the universe, and Fu to mean that the same is true of some 
object. This distinction can only be made in some such way as this (CP 
3.363).52 
Mitchell’s notations F1 and Fu correspond to universal and existential (or particular) 
quantifiers respectively. Peirce provided his own notations for quantifiers by 
adopting the mathematical signs for sum and product, namely sigma, Σ, and pi, Π, 
respectively. Peirce uses Σ for ‘some’ (existential quantifier) and Π for ‘all’ 
(universal quantifier) (CP 3.393). Combined with variables and indices, Peirce writes 
Σixi to mean “that x is true of some one of the individuals denoted by i,” and Πixi to 
mean “that x is true of all these individuals [denoted by i]” (CP 3.393). Here 
variables refer directly not to numbers, but to individual objects; and the signs Σ and 
                                                 
52 The symbolization of universal and particular quantification in modern logic follows Russell 
rather than Peirce, but they are essentially making the same kind of distinctions. 
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 Π designate not mathematical sums and products of numbers, or logical sums and 
products of classes, “but direct quantification over” individual objects.53 
 Thus quantification theory demonstrates for Peirce that his category of 
Secondness could be associated with individual objects. Whereas Peirce identifies 
the category of Secondness or relation in the ‘New List’ as a concept, with the 
discovery of quantification theory, he now identifies the category of Secondness with 
individual objects instead.54 
1.5 Theory of Categories and the Classification of the Sciences 
 Peirce was convinced that the sciences have to be organised systematically, and 
in the later years of his career he endeavoured to translate this conviction into effect. 
There are various factors responsible for Peirce’s conviction of the importance of 
system (e.g. his diverse knowledge and experience of many fields of inquiry — 
physical sciences, history of science, mathematics, philosophy, history of 
philosophy, etc. and the need for science to integrate these). However, it is the 
influence of Aristotle and Kant that is more important and should be identified. 
 In his article ‘The Architecture of Theories,’55 Peirce refers to Kant thus: “That 
systems ought to be constructed architectonically has been preached since Kant, but I 
do not think the full import of the maxim has by any means been apprehended” (CP 
6.9). Peirce continues: 
What I would recommend is that every person who wishes to form an opinion 
concerning fundamental problems should first of all make a complete survey of 
human knowledge, should take note of all the valuable ideas in each branch of 
science, should observe in just what respect each has been successful and 
where it has failed, in order that, in the light of the thorough acquaintance so 
attained of the available materials for a philosophical theory and of the nature 
and strength of each, he may proceed to the study of what the problem of 
philosophy consists in, and the proper way of solving it. … namely, to make a 
systematic study of the conceptions out of which a philosophical theory may be 
built, in order to ascertain what place each conception may fitly occupy in such 
a theory, and to what uses it is adapted (CP 6.9). 
 In about 1898, in a proposed work entitled ‘A Guess at the Riddle,’ Peirce set 
out to construct his system. “To erect a philosophical edifice,” Peirce says, “that shall 
outlast the vicissitudes of time, my care must be, not so much to set each brick with  
                                                 
53 W. V. Quine, ‘Peirce’s Logic,’ 1995, p.27. 
54 Murphey, 1993, p. 299. 
55 First published in The Monist, 1891. 
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 nicest accuracy, as to lay the foundations deep and massive” (CP 1.1). He goes on: 
The undertaking which this volume inaugurates is to make a philosophy like 
that of Aristotle, that is to say, to outline a theory so comprehensive that, for a 
long time to come, the entire work of human reason, in philosophy of every 
school and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, in physical science, in history, 
in sociology, and in whatever other department there may be, shall appear as 
the filling up of its details (CP 1.1). 
 These two passages taken together indicate the difficult and far-reaching 
project that Peirce set for himself, that is, to combine detailed, thorough-going 
investigation and general inquiry into the foundations or essence of things, to 
develop a coherent system of thought. Because Peirce was both a scientist and 
philosopher he was committed to bringing science and philosophy together (neither 
to override the other). More specifically, Peirce’s attempt was to build a system of 
philosophy upon ‘deep and massive’ foundations that would be the product of 
detailed investigation. As Peirce himself says of his philosophy (in a fragment of his 
dated c. 1897), “in brief, my philosophy may be described as the attempt of a 
physicist to make such conjecture as to the constitution of the universe as the 
methods of science may permit, with the aid of all that has been done by previous 
philosophers” (CP 1.7). 
1.5.1 Peirce’s Classification of the Sciences 
 It was clear to Peirce that achievement of his goal required a classification of 
the sciences that would exhibit the relations between the sciences. He specified his 
classification as concerned “not with all possible sciences, nor with so many 
branches of knowledge, but with sciences in their present condition” (CP 1.180). He 
acknowledged that his classification “borrows its idea from Comte’s classification; 
namely, the idea that one science depends upon another for fundamental principles, 
but does not furnish such principles to that other” (CP 1.180). Peirce closely follows 
this idea throughout his classification, which results in a strictly hierarchical system. 
 In Peirce’s classification of the sciences he considers philosophy a science. It 
should be noted, too, that Peirce understood his system of the sciences as a system of 
systems, as he often spoke of a science as a system, or, to use the word 
‘classification’, a classification of classifications. 
 In his conception of science Peirce rejects the view that science is simply a 
body of systematised knowledge. He defines science as “a living historic entity,” (CP 
1.44) or “living process” (CP 1.234). The essence of Peirce’s conception of science 
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 emphasises the dynamic, actual practice and pursuit of science, not the static, 
established body of facts that science provides for us. “Let us remember,” Peirce 
writes, “that science is a pursuit of living men, and that its most marked 
characteristic is that when it is genuine, it is in an incessant state of metabolism and 
growth” (CP 1.232). This conception of science is more compatible with what Peirce 
requires of his classification of the sciences, namely, a dynamic system that 
establishes the relations between the actual sciences rather than treating them as 
abstract or isolated units. 
 Peirce classified the sciences into three general divisions: Science of Discovery 
(or Theoretical Science), Science of Review, and Practical Science. He admitted that 
his classification was incomplete, leaving some parts of it underdeveloped (eg. 
practical sciences), and some were merely identified without any attempt to elaborate 
on detail (eg. science of review). But two things are very clear in his classification. 
First, that he had a definite purpose in his conducting a classification (already 
indicated earlier), and second, that the focus of his classification was on theoretical 
sciences. 
1.5.2 Sciences of Discovery (or Theoretical Sciences) 
 Peirce divided theoretical sciences into three main groups, starting from the 
most general and abstract of the sciences to the least general and abstract. Each of his 
divisions of the theoretical sciences is subdivided, then each subdivision is further 
subdivided, and this is then further subdivided, making four layers altogether. The 
outline of these layers will become clear in the course of our discussion. 
 Peirce considered what principles to employ in his classification of the 
sciences, for example: the purpose of a science, the problem a science addresses, the 
kinds of questions they are concerned with, the method of reasoning used in a 
science, the subject matter or object of inquiry, and the mode of observation 
employed by a science. The role played by these factors in the whole classification is 
not equally apparent. It largely depends on which part of the system is in question, 
and from what standpoint one conducts the observation, that some are more or less 
obvious than others. 
 Peirce calls the first division of science a branch — with the purpose of the 
science as its distinguishing factor. He “recognize[s] two branches of science: 
Theoretical, whose purpose is simply and solely knowledge of God’s truth; and 
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 Practical, for the uses of life” (CP 1.239). Next to the first division is what Peirce 
calls class, and under class is what he calls order. Peirce distinguishes three classes 
of science: mathematics, philosophy (also called coenoscopic science), and the 
special sciences (which he also calls idioscopic sciences, or idioscopy). All these 
sciences, Peirce argues, are observational “but … in very different senses” (CP 
1.239). 
 Mathematics is the most abstract of all the sciences. It “meddles with every 
other science without exception. There is no science whatever to which is not 
attached an application of mathematics” (CP 1.245). The observation of mathematics 
is peculiar to itself, for it is conducted in the imagination. 
[Mathematics] is observational, in so far as it makes constructions in the 
imagination according to abstract precepts, and then observes these imaginary 
objects, finding in them relations of parts not specified in the precept of 
construction. This is truly observation, yet certainly in a very peculiar sense 
(CP 1.240). 
Peirce’s view of ‘observation’ is a kind of metaphorical extension of observation as 
usually understood within the empirical sciences where the emphasis is placed on 
sense observation. 
 The purpose of mathematics is not to establish positive truths but to determine 
what is and is not logically possible. By that Peirce means the whole business of 
mathematics is concerned merely with tracing what consequences or conclusions 
necessarily follow from its hypotheses. The truth or falsity of the inferred 
conclusions is not a concern of mathematics. Hence Peirce also calls mathematics the 
science of necessary reasoning, or “science of the consequences of hypotheses” (CP 
1.247). 
 The relation between mathematics and philosophy is a one-directional 
dependence. Because mathematics is more abstract and therefore ranked higher than 
philosophy, it is independent of it. “[M]athematics,” Peirce insists, “is the only 
science which can be said to stand in no need of philosophy” (CP 1.249). On the 
other hand, philosophy is dependent on mathematics for its fundamental concepts 
such as space, numbers, continuity, possible relations, and so on. (See CP 6.26-31). 
 The task or purpose of the second class of science, philosophy, is to establish 
universal truths and phenomena in experience. Unlike mathematics, philosophy’s 
‘observation’ is restricted to normal, common experience. In arguing for the 
observational character of philosophy Peirce rejects the view that metaphysics has no 
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 meaning and is “beyond the reach of human cognition” (CP 6.2). The fact is, 
according to Peirce: 
the only reason that this [the observation of metaphysics] is not universally 
recognized is that it rests upon kinds of phenomena with which every man’s 
experience is so saturated that he usually pays no particular attention to them. 
The data of metaphysics are not less open to observation, but immeasurably 
more so, than the data, say, of the very highly developed science of astronomy 
(CP 6.2). 
Thus the observations of philosophy “escape the untrained eye precisely because 
they permeate our whole lives, just as a man who never takes off his blue spectacles 
soon ceases to see the blue tinge” (CP 1.241). 
 Third of the classes of science is the special sciences, such as physics, biology, 
chemistry, etc. The special sciences are concerned with finding out new facts from 
the same experience upon which philosophy operates in seeking universal 
phenomena. But unlike philosophy, the special sciences are more interested in 
minute details relating to the particulars of experience. They also differ from 
philosophy in terms of observation. Scientists have their own special kind of 
observation in which the senses are either subject to a special training, assisted with 
technological aids or apparatus like a microscope, or both. 
 In relation to dependency the special sciences appeal to philosophy for 
principles, but not vice versa. While special sciences each have a primary concern of 
their own, they often encounter certain problems in the pursuit of their specific 
subject matter which make them appeal to philosophy. (Eg. whether force is a 
product of unperceivable constraints, or to distinguish the validity of different types 
of explanation, etc.) 
1.5.2.1 Semiotic and Observation in Science of Discovery 
 There are two main things that stand out from the foregoing discussion. The 
first is Peirce’s claim that all mathematics, philosophy, and the special sciences are 
observational, and second, that they are all sciences of discovery. (Note that he uses 
both terms in a way that differs from common usage in the empirical sciences.) Both 
these claims represent a certain line of thought that is persistent in Peirce’s 
philosophy of science, namely, his interest in and concern for the concept of method. 
In making all sciences of discovery observational, Peirce appears to have taken the 
view that it is the method employed in science, and not the object a science studies 
that matters most. As I said earlier, Peirce was well aware of the differences between 
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 the objects studied in various theoretical sciences, and yet he still considered them all 
sciences of discovery. That is to say, for Peirce, sciences of discovery depend 
fundamentally on method rather than the object of their study. 
 This point can be illustrated using the table below (figure 5). The overall 
purpose of this table is simply to show how Peirce is here understood in the way just 
explained, that is, the nature of object of study does not disqualify theoretical 
sciences from being a science of discovery, and the consistency in their being 
observational constitutes the very basis of my claim that the issue of method is a key 
element reflected in Peirce’s classification of the sciences. 
 Figure 5: 
Is its object of study Science of Discovery Is it observational? 
abstract? concrete?
Mathematics YES YES NO 
Philosophy YES YES/NO NO/YES 
Special Sciences YES NO YES 
 
 Peirce’s insistence on observation as an essential element of all sciences of 
discovery is a direct result of assumptions underlying his semiotic. (The relation 
between semiotic and observation is discussed in detail in chapter 6.) In shifting the 
focus of his logical inquiry from classification of types of reasoning to treating them 
as stages of inquiry, Peirce encountered a problem with regard to mathematics. The 
problem was about how to make mathematics both a deductive science (purely 
analytic) and a science of discovery (synthetic in Kant’s sense). Peirce believed that 
he had resolved this problem by means of his semiotic. He wrote in his article ‘On 
the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution to the Philosophy of Notation’ in 1885: 
It has long been a puzzle how it could be that, on the one hand, mathematics is 
purely deductive in its nature, and draws its conclusion apodictically, while on 
the other hand, it presents as rich and apparently unending a series of surprising 
discoveries as any observational science. Various have been the attempts to 
solve the paradox by breaking down one or other of these assertions, but 
without success. The truth, however, appears to be that all deductive reasoning, 
even simple syllogism, involves an element of observation; namely, deduction 
consists in constructing an icon or diagram the relations of whose parts shall 
present a complete analogy with those of the parts of the object of reasoning, of 
experimenting upon this image in the imagination, and of observing the result 
so as to discover unnoticed and hidden relations among the parts (CP 3.363). 
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 1.5.3 Divisions of Philosophy 
 Because Peirce’s division of philosophy plays an important role in my 
discussion in the remaining chapters, where I will give a great deal of attention to it, I 
will only briefly outline it here. 
 The third division in Peirce’s classification of the sciences is the subdivision of 
a class which he calls order. Peirce divides philosophy into three orders: 
phenomenology, normative science, and metaphysics. Peirce states the tasks of the 
divisions of philosophy as follows. 
Phenomenology ascertains and studies the kinds of elements universally 
present in the phenomena; meaning by the phenomenon, whatever is present at 
any time to the mind in any way. Normative science distinguishes what ought 
to be from what ought not to be … Metaphysics seeks to give an account of the 
universe of mind and matter. Normative science rests largely on 
phenomenology and mathematics; metaphysics on phenomenology and on 
normative science (CP 1.186). 
The same principle operative in the divisions of class is also at work here. The more 
abstract order of philosophy supplies principles to the less abstract ones. Normative 
science is dependent on phenomenology only, whereas metaphysics is dependent on 
both normative science and phenomenology. 
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Chapter 2: 
 
PEIRCE’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO 
THE NATURE OF THE CATEGORIES 
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 2.1 Peirce’s Conception of Phenomenology 
2.1.1 Why does he call his approach ‘Phenomenology’? 
 As mentioned in chapter 1, Peirce takes inquiry into the categories as an affair 
of phenomenology as well, and not a business just of logic and metaphysics. My 
discussion of Peirce’s phenomenology requires that I give attention to two things. 
First, Peirce introduced his science of phenomenology,56 or “the Doctrine of 
Categories” (CP 1.280), into his philosophy in 1902, about thirty-five years after his 
first published exposition of his theory of categories in the ‘New List’. Secondly, his 
account of his phenomenology is remarkably straightforward, and perhaps simple in 
some ways. These two things have led to differences in understanding and 
interpretation among Peirce scholars57 as to the value and place of Peirce’s 
phenomenology in his philosophical system. Some of the questions that arise are: 
What difference does the introduction of phenomenology make to his theory of 
categories? Are the categories of phenomenology different from the ones he had 
previously discovered? and What prompted Peirce to introduce ‘phenomenology’ 
into his philosophy? 
 It is argued here that Peirce’s phenomenology is a consequence of his 
commitment to his theory of categories, which can be shown by considering the 
following issues. First, phenomenology is a part of a system of the sciences; second, 
as a science of the phenomenon, phenomenology not only reflects a denial of the idea 
of the “thing-in-itself”, but it also provides the platform for philosophy as an 
“observational” science and a “science of discovery”. This second issue relates to 
pragmatism. In its relation to pragmatism, phenomenology involves a 
methodological attitude that does not presuppose any preconceived theory, but rather 
attempts to observe and describe phenomena as they appear to us. 
 It is worth mentioning here that it was not until 1885 that Peirce began to draw 
a distinction between the formal and material aspects of his categories; a distinction 
                                                 
56 From 1905 onward Peirce began to use the terms “phaneroscopy” and “phaneron” in place of 
“phenomenology” and “phenomenon” respectively. 
57 For example, Freeman (1934, pp. 28-29) argues that phenomenology is not really a derivation of 
the categories, as Peirce thought, but it is just an illustration of the relevance of the categories to 
experience; whereas for Rosenthal (1994, pp. 77-95), Peirce’s phenomenology is really at work in 
deriving his categories. See also Fisch (1986, p. 437) for some interesting ideas on Freeman’s view of 
Peirce’s phenomenology. 
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 that was lacking in his earlier accounts of the categories.58 But since Peirce claims 
that the content of knowledge derives ultimately from experience, it remains for him 
to explain this connection. This requires Peirce to show that there must be an 
experiential or material aspect of the categories (see CP 1.452, c.1896). This concern 
for the material or experiential aspect of the categories gives rise to his 
phenomenological inquiry into the nature of the categories. In other words, if 
Peirce’s categories were merely a business of logic, he would have no need for the 
science of phenomenology. 
2.1.2 The Aim and Scope of ‘Phenomenology’ 
 Peirce conceives of his phenomenology as a science that treats the 
phenomenon as it is. “Phenomenology ascertains and studies the kinds of elements 
universally present in the phenomenon” (CP 1.186; 1903), and its aim is, 
to unravel the tangled skein [of] all that in any sense appears and wind it into 
distinct forms; or in other words, to make the ultimate analysis of all 
experiences the first task to which philosophy has to apply itself. (CP 1.280; 
1902) 
The business of phenomenology is to draw up a catalogue of categories and 
prove its sufficiency and freedom from redundancies, to make out the 
characteristics of each category, and to show the relations of each to the 
other. (CP 5.43; 1903) 
 In seeking to identify and study the most universal elements of experience, 
namely, the categories, phenomenology is not concerned with the reality or truth of 
phenomena. The concern of the phenomenologist is entirely with phenomena as 
such, regardless of whether they correspond to any real object in the universe or not 
(CP 5.122; 1903). Peirce considers that phenomenology is able to prove “beyond 
question … that a certain very short list comprises all of these broadest categories of 
phanerons there are” (CP 1.286). 
 What Peirce means by ‘the phenomenon’, the subject matter of 
phenomenology, leaves the science of phenomenology as a study of extremely broad 
scope. He defines ‘the phenomenon’ as “whatever is present at any time to the mind 
in any way” (CP 1.186; 1903), or “the collective total of all that is in any way or in 
any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real 
                                                 
58 Sandra B. Rosenthal, Charles Peirce’s Pragmatic Pluralism, (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1994), p. 83. 
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 thing or not” (CP 1.284; 1905). The question of truth or reality of phenomena is not 
raised at any time during the phenomenological inquiry. 
 Having understood his own phenomenology in the extended manner just 
explained, Peirce contrasts his phenomenology to that of Hegel’s, saying that: 
I will not restrict it [phenomenology] to the observation and analysis of 
experience but extend it to describing all the features that are common to 
whatever is experienced or might conceivably be experienced or become an 
object of study in any way direct or indirect.59 
What Peirce wants to do in this passage is to draw our attention to the distinction 
between “experience” itself and the “elements of experience”, and points out that his 
phenomenology is not only about experience itself, but about the elements of 
experience as well. It seems to Peirce that to restrict his phenomenology as a study 
merely of experience, understood as a mere encounter between a subject and an 
object, or the experienced, would render it subjective and psychological, in the sense 
that each individual subject would encounter an object differently. But this is far 
from what Peirce considered his phenomenology to be. His conception of 
phenomenology is concerned with an objective description of the elements of 
experience, which could be revealed through the process of experience. That is, the 
phenomenologist is studying experience that has both a structure, or form, and a 
content. 
 To emphasise the difference between his understanding of what a phenomenon 
is and what some philosophers take the word “idea” to mean, Peirce writes: 
English philosophers have quite commonly used the word idea in a sense 
approaching to that which I give to phaneron. But in various ways they have 
restricted the meaning of it too much to cover my conception (if conception it 
can be called), besides giving a psychological connotation to their word which 
I am careful to exclude. The fact that they have the habit of saying that “there 
is no such idea” as this or that, in the very same breath in which they definitely 
describe the phaneron in question, renders their term fatally inapt for my 
purpose (CP 1.285; c. 1904). 
Peirce does not identify the “various ways” in which the English philosophers have 
restricted their meaning of ‘idea’. However, the most striking and important aspect of 
his criticisms of Hegel’s conception of phenomenology and the English 
                                                 
59 Charles Sanders Peirce, Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 
Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, ed. Patricia Ann Turrisi, (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1997), p. 120. 
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 philosophers’ meaning of ‘idea’ is that Peirce thinks of both of them as too limited to 
cover what he means by phenomenology. 
 The limitation of Hegel’s phenomenology, in Peirce’s view, is due to Hegel’s 
failure to consider seriously the category of Secondness. He says of Hegel, 
The capital error of Hegel which permeates his whole system in every part of it 
is that he almost altogether ignores the Outward Clash. Besides the lower 
consciousness of feeling and the higher consciousness of nutrition, this direct 
consciousness of hitting and getting hit enters into all cognition and serves to 
make it mean something real. (CP 8.41; 1885). 
The “Outward Clash” to which Peirce refers in the above passage means the category 
of Secondness. In his ‘A Guess at the Riddle,’ Peirce speaks of Hegel in the same 
critical vein, saying that: “He [Hegel] has usually overlooked external Secondness, 
altogether. In other words, he has committed the trifling oversight of forgetting that 
there is a real world with real actions and reactions” (CP 1.368; c. 1890). 
 As to the limitation of the English philosophers’ notion of idea, Peirce has the 
view that “There is nothing quite so directly open to observation as phanerons” (CP 
1.286; c. 1904). Thus ‘phenomena’ cannot be identified with the ‘ideas’ of the 
English empiricist philosophers. Whereas one can say “‘there is no such idea’ as this 
or that” in which a truth claim is meant to be made, the phenomenologist is not 
supposed to make any truth claims at all. For phenomenology, according to Peirce, 
does not presuppose any theory; it is a pre-logical, pre-scientific inquiry into the 
phenomenon as such, hence it is not a part of the task of phenomenology to ascertain 
the truth or reality of phenomena. Thus Peirce argues, 
This science of Phenomenology is in my view the most primal of all the 
positive sciences. That is, it is not based, as to its principles, upon any other 
positive science. By a positive science I mean an inquiry which seeks for 
positive knowledge; that is, for such knowledge as may conveniently be 
expressed in a categorical proposition (CP 5.39).60 
The reason why Peirce considers phenomenology as “the most primal of all the 
positive sciences” is obvious from this passage: namely, the principles of 
phenomenology are derived not from any positive science. Notice that Peirce does  
                                                 
60 Being aware that what he defines and classifies as the normative sciences (logic, ethics, and 
aesthetics) may be argued against as not positive sciences, Peirce makes the following reply. “Logic 
and the other normative sciences, although they ask, not what is but what ought to be, nevertheless are 
positive sciences since it is by asserting positive, categorical truth that they are able to show that what 
they call good really is so; and the right reason, right effort, and right being, of which they treat, 
derive that character from positive categorical fact” (CP 5.39). 
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 not mean that phenomenology has no principles. The principles of phenomenology, 
Peirce claims, are derived from mathematics, which for him is a science whose 
concern has nothing to do with acquiring positive knowledge about the actual world. 
“Mathematics is the study of what is true of hypothetical states of things.” (CP 4.233; 
1902). 
 Furthermore, since mathematics, from which phenomenology derives its 
principles, does not make any truth claims about the world, and since 
phenomenology is a “primal” kind of study, in that it does not impose any logical or 
scientific theory on the phenomenon it studies, then it follows that phenomenology 
cannot make any truth claims concerning the world or reality. 
 The particular account Peirce gives of phenomenology and its subject matter is 
consistent with some of the moves he made in modifying the categories of the ‘New 
List,’ and enables us to understand why he excludes the conceptions of substance and 
being from his list of categories. Substance and being, as they appear in the ‘New 
List,’ are seen to have an ontological status that places them outside the realm of 
phenomena. Peirce considers that to bring the question of the ontological status of 
phenomena into phenomenology would be harmful to phenomenology itself, since 
(1) the question of the ontological status of phenomena belongs to metaphysics, and 
(2) to allow phenomenology to make ontological claims would result in confusing 
metaphysics with phenomenology. It follows, then, that even if substance and being 
were not excluded from the list of the categories his phenomenology would 
definitely demand that exclusion. This is not to say that Peirce denies the reality of 
his categories. In fact, he considers his categories as real universals. However, he 
does not want to restrict the task of phenomenology to confirming the reality of 
phenomena. 
2.1.3 The Methods of Phenomenology 
 In order to carry out its pure or “honest, single-minded observation of the 
appearances” (CP 1.287; c. 1904), phenomenology requires three faculties or 
capabilities, according to Peirce.  
 He identifies the first faculty as “the artist’s observational power” (CP 5.42; 
emphasis added). The characteristic feature of this faculty or power, according to 
Peirce, is that it observes the phenomenon as such without making any judgment in 
relation to some idea or theory. Peirce draws his idea of identifying this first faculty 
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 with “the artist’s observational power,” as the phrase itself indicates, from his 
observation of what an artist (a painter in this case) is like. 
This is the faculty of the artist who sees for example the apparent colors of 
nature as they appear. When the ground is covered by snow on which the sun 
shines brightly except where shadows fall, if you ask any ordinary man what its 
color appears to be, he will tell you white, pure white, whiter in the sunlight, a 
little greyish in the shadow. But that is not what is before his eyes that he is 
describing; it is his theory of what ought to be seen. The artist will tell him that 
the shadows are not grey but a dull blue and that the snow in the sunshine is of 
a rich yellow (CP 5.42). 
Having acquired the observational power of the artist, the phenomenologist is able to 
get to the ‘purity’ of the phenomenon as it appears to us unaffected by any theory or 
idea. 
 Peirce calls the second required faculty in phenomenology a “resolute 
discrimination” (CP 5.42; my emphasis). What characterises this faculty is that it 
enables the phenomenologist to focus his attention determinedly on the particular 
phenomenon (whatever it may be) that is under observation. Peirce says, “resolute 
discrimination which fastens itself like a bulldog upon the particular feature that we 
are studying, follows it wherever it may lurk, and detects it beneath all its disguises” 
(CP 5.42). Because of the focus and attentive observation the phenomenology would 
be able to detect the appearance or phenomenon in question in all its various 
manifestations. 
 The third faculty essential for phenomenological inquiry, according to Peirce, 
is “the generalizing power of the mathematician” (CP 5.42; my emphasis), which is 
required to make generalisation out of the information gathered by means of 
“resolute discrimination.” Such generalisation is “the abstract formula that 
comprehends the very essence of the feature under examination” (CP 5.42). In all the 
stages of the application of the three faculties to the phenomenological inquiry, no 
question is raised as to the truth or reality of its findings. For phenomenological 
inquiry, Peirce says, “simply scrutinizes the direct appearances, and endeavours to 
combine minute accuracy with the broadest possible generalization” (CP 1.287). 
2.2 The Categories as Phenomenologically Described 
 Through the three faculties discussed above, Peirce identified his three 
categories (or modes of being) of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. These 
categories are indecomposable elements of phenomena, meaning that they are 
irreducible to one another. 
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  One major task of phenomenology, for Peirce, is to describe the characteristic 
features of each category that make them distinct from one another. 
2.2.1 The Category of ‘Firstness’ 
 Peirce describes the category of Firstness as “presentness” or “quality of 
feeling.” By that he means the very first “thing” or “feeling” that is noted by the 
mind when some thing or phenomenon appears to it. This event occurs before we 
have time to think about it. In a draft of his second lecture on pragmatism delivered 
at Harvard in 1903, Peirce says: 
The present is just what it is regardless of the absent, regardless of past and 
future. It is such as it is, utterly ignoring anything else. … The present, being 
such as it is while utterly ignoring everything else, is positively such as it is (CP 
5.44). 
He then goes on inviting his listeners: 
Imagine, if you please, a consciousness in which there is no comparison, no 
relation, no recognized multiplicity (since parts would be other than the 
whole), no change, no imagination of any modification of what is positively 
there, no reflexion — nothing but a simple positive character. Such a 
consciousness might be just an odour, say a smell of attar; or it might be one 
infinite dead ache … (CP 5.44). 
 The category of Firstness also involves some element of ‘newness’, which 
further involves ‘growth’ in one’s experience. Consider, for example, a person who 
tastes pineapple for the first time. Firstness, in this case, is the quality of taste or 
feeling of pineapple that first occurs to this person in tasting the pineapple, but also 
this ‘feeling’, which is new to this person, is an addition to this person’s 
experience.61 
 The category of Firstness, as Hookway observes, “is the hardest of the three 
[categories] to focus on clearly.”62 Peirce himself was aware of the complexity of the 
matter. He says, “It [the category of Firstness] cannot be articulately thought: assert 
it, and it has already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a 
denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown!” (CP 1.357). What 
Peirce is saying is that we can still give a description of the category of Firstness, but 
                                                 
61 Catherine Wendy Legg, “Modes of Being: A Comparison of the Realism Question in Charles 
Peirce and Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, (Ph.D thesis, Australian National University, 1999), 
pp. 17-18. Note because there is a slight error in pagination in the electronic copy of Legg’s thesis on 
which my reference relies, the page numbers cited here may not be identical with page numbers in the 
original she submitted to ANU. 
62 Christopher Hookway, Peirce, 1985, p. 106. 
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 “remember that every description of it must be false to it” (CP 1.357). This seems a 
self-contradictory view of the category of Firstness, since the word “description” 
normally carries with it the assumption that something true is said of the object 
described. But it should be remembered that phenomenology does not purport to be 
concerned with the subject-independent truth or falsity of its descriptions, but merely 
to describe phenomena as they appear to consciousness. 
 The essence of what Peirce wants to say about the category of Firstness is 
summed up most satisfactorily in the following passage. 
The idea of absolutely first must be entirely separated from all conception of or 
reference to anything else; for what involves a second is itself a second to that 
second. The first must therefore be present and immediate, so as not to be 
second to a representation. It must be fresh and new, for if old it is second to its 
former state. It must be initiative, original, spontaneous, and free; otherwise it 
is second to a determining cause. It is also something vivid and conscious; so 
only it avoids being the object of some sensation. It precedes all synthesis and 
all differentiation; it has no unity and no parts (CP 1.357). 
 The significance of this passage lies not only in describing the characteristic 
features of the category of Firstness, but also explaining why it is called “Firstness.” 
All the characters of Firstness are justified to the extent that it is a real first, in that it 
is not a consequent of some antecedent, nor does it depend on something else for its 
occurrence. 
 Peirce is careful enough not to reduce his category of Firstness to a completely 
subjective level where it might be understood to mean that whatever an individual 
feels is a Firstness. He explains the category of Firstness as most appropriately 
exemplified by “second” qualities “such as the color of magenta, the odor of attar, 
the sound of a railway whistle” (CP 1.304), and so on. But Peirce saves his view 
from collapsing into subjectivism when he continues the same passage to specify his 
position thus: 
I do not mean the sense of actually experiencing these feelings, whether 
primarily or in any memory or imagination. That is something that involves 
these qualities as an element of it. But I mean the qualities themselves which, 
in themselves, are mere may-bes, not necessarily realized (CP 1.304). 
 Peirce maintains that the category of Firstness “is predominant in feeling” (CP 
1.302). This understanding of the category of Firstness broadens Peirce’s categorical 
system to the extent that the domain of feeling, which is normally regarded as a 
subjective state of affairs, is given some kind of objectivity. 
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 2.2.2 The Category of ‘Secondness’ 
 The category of Secondness Peirce refers to as “struggle.” He says, “The 
second category that I find, the next simplest feature common to all that comes 
before the mind, is the element of struggle” (CP 1.322). Secondness is characterised 
as being purely dyadic in nature. Peirce defines what he means by “struggle” as 
follows. 
By struggle I must explain that I mean mutual action between two things 
regardless of any sort of third or medium, and in particular regardless of any 
law of action (CP 1.322). 
Action or struggle of Secondness, as Peirce clearly explains, does not involve any 
third term. It simply consists of two things or subjects without any law or reason 
involved. Any force or effort involved in the dyadic relation of action or struggle of 
Secondness is “blind” or “brute”, according to Peirce, meaning that there is no 
involvement of reason or law (CP 1.328, 427). Rather, what is involved in such 
action or struggle is reaction or resistance. 
Imagine yourself making a strong muscular effort, say that of pressing with all 
your might against a half-open door. Obviously, there is a sense of resistance. 
There could not be effort without equal resistance any more than there could be 
a resistance without an equal effort that it resists (CP 5.45). 
Associated with struggle or action, in the sense above, is “surprise”, which is another 
characteristic of Secondness. Surprise normally occurs as a result of experiencing 
something unexpectedly. Further, this element of unexpectedness of surprise always 
goes together with some sense of shock. As often happens in our daily experience (at 
work or in other forms of experience), when we are surprised by something, it is hard 
to avoid the sense of shock that comes with it. Admittedly, we often do not realise it 
immediately, for it happens so instantaneously before we have a chance to think 
about it. 
 These (phenomenological) features of Secondness demonstrate for Peirce the 
actual process of how we learn from experience, which he claims “is our only 
teacher.” 
Experience is our only teacher. … But precisely how does this action of 
experience take place? It takes place by a series of surprises. There is no need 
of going into details. At one time a ship is sailing along in the trades over a 
smooth sea, the navigator having no more positive expectation than that of the 
usual monotony of such a voyage, when suddenly she strikes upon a rock (CP 
5. 50-51). 
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 What Peirce demonstrates by means of this scenario is that struggle, together with its 
elements of surprise and shock (which are hardly separable, if they are at all, in the 
category of Secondness) are definitive in the event of discovery. He explains: 
The majority of discoveries … have been the result of experimentation. Now 
no man makes an experiment without being more or less inclined to think that 
an interesting result will ensue; for experiments are much too costly of physical 
and psychical energy to be undertaken at random and aimlessly. And naturally 
can possibly be learned from an experiment that turns out just as was 
anticipated. It is by surprises that experience teaches all she designs to teach us 
(CP 5. 51). 
Thus the importance of phenomenology is not confined to identifying and describing 
the categories. It also provides an experiential ground for the view that philosophy is 
a “science of discovery,” in the sense discussed above. 
2.2.3 The Category of ‘Thirdness’ 
 The category of Thirdness is most prominently illustrated by terms like law, 
thought, prediction, representation, meaning, generality, continuity, mediation, and 
so on. Just as the categories of Firstness and Secondness are found in the domains of 
qualities of phenomena and actual facts respectively, the category of Thirdness is 
found in any province of phenomena that is intelligible and meaningful to an 
interpretant. For Peirce “every genuine triadic relation involves thought or meaning” 
(CP 1.345). Consider one of Peirce’s favourite examples, “the relation of giving,” 
which he gives to illustrate this statement. 
A gives B to C. This does not consist in A’s throwing B away and its 
accidentally hitting C … If that were all, it would not be a genuine triadic 
relation, but merely one dyadic relation followed by another. There need be no 
motion of the thing given. Giving is a transfer of the right of property. Now 
right is a matter of law, and law is a matter of thought and meaning (CP 1.345). 
 The meaning of the triadic relation “A gives B to C” lies in the fact that 
“giving” has a meaning recognised by both parties, that is, it is defined by the law of 
right of property, which is ultimately a product of thought. If “giving” is simply a 
fact without any definition attached to it by a law, the whole triadic relation “A gives 
B to C” could not have any meaning, let alone the impossibility to form a triadic 
relation out of a meaningless or lawless idea. It is in this sense, however, that Peirce 
speaks of Thirdness as the category of laws (CP 1.420). 
 Another example Peirce uses to illustrate Thirdness is prediction. He 
distinguishes between two kinds of regularity or uniformity in the course of events. 
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 On the one hand, there is regularity based on “some active general principle” (CP 
5.100). It is this kind of regularity that makes our prediction possible and reasonable. 
Now for Thirdness. Five minutes of our waking life will hardly pass without 
our making some kind of prediction; and in the majority of cases these 
predictions are fulfilled in the event. Yet a prediction is essentially of a general 
nature, and cannot ever be completely fulfilled. To say that a prediction has a 
decided tendency to be fulfilled, is to say that the future events are in a measure 
really governed by a law. … [That is] it must be that future events have a 
tendency to conform to a general rule. … A rule to which future events have a 
tendency to conform is ipso facto an important thing, an important element in 
the happening of those events. This mode of being which consists … in the fact 
that future facts of Secondness will take on a determinate general character, I 
call a Thirdness (CP 1.26). 
 Prediction, moreover, is not possible in the other kind of regularity, which is 
due to pure chance only. Peirce illustrates: 
If a pair of dice turns up sixes five times running, that is a mere uniformity. 
The dice might happen fortuitously to turn up sixes a thousand times running. 
But that would not afford the slightest security for a prediction that they would 
turn up sixes the next time (CP 1.26). 
Thus Thirdness is an important mode of being. It shows that both prediction and its 
basis, namely, “some active general principle,” rule, or law (which itself is an 
instance of Thirdness) are essential elements of life. That is, we generally cannot 
help making prediction. As Peirce noted, “Five minutes of our waking life will hardly 
pass without our making some kind of prediction” (CP 1.26; my emphasis). 
2.3 Phenomenology as Part of a System of the Sciences 
 Peirce incorporated phenomenology into his philosophical system while 
working on his project of the classification of the sciences. As noted in chapter 1, 
Peirce places phenomenology as the first science in the order of the branches of 
philosophy, and second to mathematics within the order of the sciences as a whole. 
His classification of the sciences is strictly hierarchical, in that each science derives 
its principles from the science above it, whereas each science gets it data from the 
science below it, and not vice versa. 
 Two things should be pointed out here. First, phenomenology is not identical 
with or equal to philosophy, and, second, philosophy is not reducible to 
phenomenology. Phenomenology for Peirce is just one division of philosophy, yet it 
is an indispensable part of philosophy. 
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 2.3.1 An Argument for Peirce’s Phenomenology as Part of Philosophy 
 I argue that Peirce’s phenomenology is more than just an approach to his 
categories; that is, more than just a science that simply observes the phenomenon as 
such in order to identify its most universal elements (the categories). 
 Peirce claims that phenomenology is “the first task to which philosophy has to 
apply itself” (CP 1.280; 1902). But what does this mean, and what consequences 
follow from making phenomenology the first task of philosophy? 
 Joseph Ransdell rightly observes in ‘Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?’ that 
without any “assumptions, presuppositions, or assertions” phenomenology is able to 
allow for a development of a semiotic (or logic in the broad sense) that makes no 
metaphysical claims. 
[W]hat “phenomenology” primarily meant to [Peirce] was the idea that the 
objects of phenomenological study as such are not studied with any implicit or 
explicit assumptions, presuppositions, or assertions as to their reality status, 
which made it possible to develop semiotic or logic (in the broad sense) in a 
way that presupposes no metaphysical framework, and therefore involves no a 
priori assumptions about, say, the mental or physical status of the phenomenal 
entities.63 
However, Ransdell does not explain how this is possible. His assertion in the passage 
just quoted is not sufficient to show that it is the case that phenomenology can yield a 
semiotic without metaphysical presuppositions. For Peirce claims that philosophy is 
not only an observational science, but its inquiry starts with making observations 
about the nature of phenomena themselves. 
 What Ransdell is saying applies to Peirce’s phenomenology as a single 
discipline, noting what significance phenomenology has to semiotic. Although 
Ransdell’s remark is illuminating with regard to Peirce’s phenomenology, it could be 
problematic if it is accepted without sufficient caution. It could lead us to assume that 
phenomenology is nothing else but semiotic (if not reducible to it). 
 If we examine what Ransdell says in the following passage, the difficulties and 
limitations of his view of Peirce’s phenomenology begin to emerge. 
Now let us turn to Peirce’s phenomenology proper. As I remarked earlier, the 
essence of it is found in the 1867 paper on the categories [‘On a New List of 
Categories’], and I should perhaps remark before proceeding that if Peirce is to 
be regarded as a phenomenologist it should be understood that most of Peirce’s 
                                                 
63 Joseph Ransdell, ‘Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?’ 
http://www.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/phenom.htm. Downloaded 2nd February, 
2000, paragraph 24. 
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 analyses should be looked for under the heading of semiotic. For his 
phenomenology proper is really quite simple: the paper in question is quite 
short, and there is not a whole lot more to be done in phenomenology proper 
than what he does therein, though the line of argument certainly could be - and 
I believe should be - developed at much greater length and in much greater 
detail. Let me hasten to say that I do not mean to trivialize the matter by 
stressing the relative simplicity of it. The point is simply that the way Peirce 
conceives phenomenology [it] leaves most of the work to be done under other 
headings, and most of what Peirce himself did along these lines would properly 
be regarded as a part of semiotic.64 
 Ransdell’s account clearly and correctly traces the link between Peirce’s 
phenomenology and the ‘New List.’65 However, what is lacking in Ransdell’s 
account is that it does not include in its consideration the fact that Peirce never thinks 
that one can do philosophy by means of phenomenology alone. For Peirce 
philosophy is more than phenomenology, and that phenomenology is only one 
essential stage of the process of philosophical inquiry. 
 Had Ransdell examined the relation between phenomenology and philosophy 
within Peirce’s system as a whole, this could have led him to a different conclusion, 
and by focusing simply on the relationship of Peirce’s phenomenology to semiotic 
his approach runs the risk of being too limited and thus does not do justice to Peirce. 
I do not dispute that Peirce’s phenomenology can be studied in its own right as an 
independent part of his philosophy. However it is incorrect and unjust to draw final 
conclusions about Peirce’s phenomenology from this perspective alone. 
 Another difficulty with drawing a conclusion about Peirce’s phenomenology 
from the sort of limited perspective embodied in Ransdell’s account is that we tend 
to think of it as a “simple” approach to the study of the most universal elements of 
experience. On the contrary, Peirce does not consider phenomenology an easy 
inquiry. In c. 1894, Peirce wrote the following about the observational aspect of 
philosophy (the aspect that he came to call ‘phenomenology’ about eight years later): 
 To assume, however, that the observational part of philosophy, because it is 
not particularly laborious, is therefore easy, is a dreadful mistake, into which 
the student is very apt to fall, and which gives the death-blow to any possibility 
of this success in this study. It is, on the contrary, extremely difficult to bring 
our attention to elements of experience which are continually present. For we 
have nothing in experience with which to contrast them; and without contrast, 
                                                 
64 Ibid., paragraph 22. 
65 The ‘New List’ is widely known among the Peircean community at least for its foundational role 
not only in Peirce’s theory of categories, semiotic, phenomenology, and pragmatism, but also his 
whole philosophy. 
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 they cannot excite our attention. We can only contrast them with imaginary 
states of things; but even what we imagine is but a crazy-quilt of bits snipped 
off from actual experiences. The result is that round-about devices have to be 
resorted to, in order to enable us to perceive what stares us in the face with a 
glare that, once noticed, becomes almost oppressive with its insistency. This 
circumstance alone would be sufficient to render philosophical observation 
difficult (CP 1.134). 
 Furthermore, Peirce considers the division of philosophy into phenomenology, 
normative science, and metaphysics an important aspect of his philosophical system. 
It is not my concern here to defend Peirce’s division of philosophy, but rather to 
emphasise that to restrict our inquiry to Peirce’s phenomenology in isolation fails to 
do justice to Peirce’s division of philosophy and his commitment to his theory of 
categories. It is important to recognise that for Peirce phenomenology is just one 
aspect of philosophy, and is not synonymous with philosophy as a whole. Being clear 
about this distinction is an important step towards the realisation that the relationship 
of phenomenology to semiotic, and the general significance of phenomenology to 
philosophy are different questions. 
 Distinguishing these two questions enables us to have a clearer understanding 
of the distinction between the “categories” and “signs”, and hence the distinction 
between the theory of categories and the theory of signs, or semiotic.66 This in turn 
enables us to focus on the broader contribution of phenomenology (and 
phenomenological method) to Peirce’s overall system of philosophy rather than its 
contribution to his semiotic alone. In adopting this approach one also can avoid the 
risk of treating phenomenology as a “simple” approach to the fundamental categories 
of experience. (The nature and scope of semiotic will be discussed in chapter 6, and 
the relations between the categories and signs in chapter 7.) 
 While Ransdell argues that phenomenology “made it possible to develop 
semiotic or logic (in the broad sense) in a way that presupposes no metaphysical 
framework, and therefore involves no a priori assumptions about, say, the mental or 
physical status of the phenomenal entities,” he does not explain what would have 
happened if Peirce had not employed phenomenological method in developing his 
semiotic. It is hard to see why Ransdell does not see that phenomenology for Peirce 
is more than just a means for developing a semiotic that presupposes no metaphysical 
                                                 
66 Given the central claim of this thesis, that Peirce’s theory of categories is the ultimate basis of 
his pragmatism, it is important to my argument to maintain the distinction between the theory of 
categories and the theory of signs, or semiotic. 
 73
 principles. The only possible reason I can make out is that because Ransdell’s 
discussion focussed mainly on the ‘New List’ (in which Peirce’s derivation of the 
categories is a mixture of logical and phenomenological analysis) his account of 
phenomenology is bound to be largely based on the similarity between 
phenomenology and semiotic. (Note in my discussion in chapter 1 I explained how 
Peirce’s semiotic originated in the ‘New List’.) But as indicated above, the problem 
with the account given there is that it leaves out of the picture the wider significance 
of Peirce’s phenomenology to his philosophy in general. 
 From the wider perspective of this chapter, it should be clear that Peirce’s 
phenomenology functions to ground not only a semiotic that presupposes no 
metaphysical principles, but also serves to provide a basis for philosophy that is 
observational and experiential without endorsing either logicism or psychologism. 
Peirce’s move to provide an observational, experiential basis for his philosophy 
emerges in his application of phenomenological method to his description of the 
categories. The categories Peirce derived in his ‘New List’ are the result of an 
analysis of the material conditions for propositions to be propositions about 
something or other. (See discussion of the ‘New List’ in chapter 1.) When Peirce 
introduced his phenomenology, his aim was to give an experiential description of the 
categories; a description that is not confined merely to the structure of the 
proposition (such as he employed in the ‘New List’). Here he seeks to demonstrate 
that his conclusions are based on what the phenomenologist discovers from his 
careful, attentive observation of the phenomenon. 
 Now, given the architectonic nature of Peirce’s philosophy, in building a 
philosophical system, in which his categories are to be the foundation, his 
phenomenology seeks to provide not only an experiential description of the 
categories themselves, but also an experiential basis for his philosophy as well. 
Given his earlier quoted criticism of Hegel: “[H]e has committed the trifling 
oversight of forgetting that there is a real world with real actions and reactions” (CP 
1.368; c. 1890), one can say that Peirce introduced phenomenology into his system to 
show that there is a real world and that he did not forget that there is one. From his 
phenomenology a methodical message emerges, about how to identify the categories: 
That to conduct this process of categorical identification, one needs first of all to 
allow for the broadest scope of the object to be identified. 
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 2.3.2 Phenomenology as Considered from the Point of View of Categories 
 Peirce bases his divisions of philosophy on his theory of categories. In his 1903 
Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, Peirce states: 
 So then the division of Philosophy into these three grand departments 
[Phenomenology, Normative Science, and Metaphysics] … turns out to be a 
division according to Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, and is thus one of 
the very numerous phenomena I have met with which confirm this list of 
categories. … 
 Phenomenology treats of the universal Qualities of Phenomena in their 
immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as phenomena. It, thus, treats 
of Phenomena in their Firstness. … 
 Normative Science treats of the laws of the relation of phenomena to ends; 
that is, it treats of Phenomena in their Secondness. … 
 Metaphysics … treats of Phenomena in their Thirdness (CP 5.121-124). 
 The irreducibility of philosophy to phenomenology is demanded by the 
irreducibility of the categories themselves. Thus Ransdell’s approach (discussed 
above) fails to recognise the irreducibility of the categories upon which Peirce’s 
division of philosophy is based. Of course, there is a phenomenological aspect in 
both the normative science (of which semiotic is a part) and metaphysics, since they 
derive their principles from phenomenology. But that is not to say that 
phenomenology could be a part of either semiotic or metaphysics. 
2.3.3 The Importance of Peirce’s Phenomenology to his Philosophy 
 The introduction of phenomenology prevents Peirce’s philosophy from 
collapsing into psychologism. Before Peirce introduced his phenomenology, he had 
attempted a psychological explanation of the categories. In 1885, in a manuscript 
entitled ‘One, Two, Three: Fundamental Categories of Thought and of Nature,’ 
Peirce claims that 
the whole organism of logic may be mentally evolved from the three 
conceptions of first, second, and third, or more precisely, An, Other, Medium. 
 But if these three conceptions enter as we find they do as elements of all 
conceptions connected with reasoning, they must be virtually in the mind 
when reasoning first commences. In that sense, at least, they must be innate 
ideas; and consequently they must be capable of explanation, psychologically 
(W 5:245). 
 At the time, Peirce further claims that the categories are capable of 
psychological explanation by saying that the categories have some origin in 
psychology. In ‘A Guess at the Riddle,’ c. 1890, Peirce attempts to figure out, among 
other things, why the conceptions of first, second, and third are so “forced upon us in 
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 logic, and really cannot be dispensed with” (CP 1.374) showing that the question of 
the origin of these conceptions becomes an important one for him. He attempts to 
answer the question by offering the following line of argument. 
We find the ideas of first, second, third, constant ingredients of our knowledge. 
It must then either be that they are continually given to us in the presentations 
of the sense, or that it is the peculiar nature of the mind to mix them with our 
thoughts. Now we certainly cannot think that these ideas are given in sense. 
First, second, and third are not sensations. They can only be given in sense by 
things appearing labelled as first, second, and third, and such labels things do 
not usually bear. They ought therefore to have a psychological origin (CP 1. 
374; my emphasis). 
After claiming the psychological origin of the ideas of first, second, and third, Peirce 
then proceeds to clarify his position by saying, 
The noticeable thing is that I do not rest here, but seek to put the conclusion to 
the test by an independent examination of the facts of psychology, to see 
whether we can find any traces of the existence of three parts or faculties of the 
soul or modes of consciousness, which might confirm the result just reached 
(CP 1.374). 
 It seems that Peirce’s attempt at a psychological explanation of the categories 
is intended to provide an experiential justification of the categories derived by logic. 
However, when he came to follow his architectonic plan in classification of the 
sciences, it occurred to him that his whole philosophical system would then have to 
conform to psychology, thus committing him to a psychology-based philosophy. 
When he became aware that his philosophy might fall into psychologism, Peirce 
moved to clarify the distinction between psychology and phenomenology. In a letter 
written to William James on October 3, 1904, Peirce wrote: “[phenomenology] is a 
branch of philosophy I am most deeply interested in and which I have worked upon 
almost as much as I have upon logic. It has nothing to do with psychology” (CP 
8.295; my emphasis). Peirce continues in the same letter: 
… phenomenology is one science and psychology a very different one. … The 
standards of certainty must be different in different sciences, the principles to 
which one science appeals altogether different from those of the other. From 
the point of view of logic and methodical development the distinctions are of 
the greatest concern. Phenomenology has no right to appeal to logic, except to 
deductive logic. On the contrary, logic must be founded on phenomenology. 
Psychology, you may say, observes the same facts as phenomenology does. 
No. It does not observe the same facts. It looks upon the same world; - the 
same world that the astronomer looks at. But what it observes in that world is 
different. Psychology of all sciences stands most in need of the discoveries of 
the logician, which he makes by the aid of the phenomenologist (CP 8.297). 
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 2.3.3.1 Philosophy as an “Observational” Science and a “Science of Discovery” 
 One of the most distinctive features of Peirce’s conception of philosophy is that 
he sees it as a “science of discovery”. To describe philosophy as a “science of 
discovery” may seem an odd idea, given the current trend in analytic philosophy 
where it is held to be simply the activity of meaning-clarification and not concerned 
in any way with discovering the truth. 
 But what does Peirce mean by ‘philosophy’? In his 1903 Harvard Lectures on 
Pragmatism, Peirce expresses his understanding of philosophy as follows: 
[B]y Philosophy I mean that department of Positive Science, or Science of 
Fact, which does not busy itself with gathering facts, but merely with learning 
what can be learned from that experience which presses in upon every one of 
us daily and hourly. It does not gather new facts, because it does not need 
them, and also because new general facts cannot be firmly established without 
the assumption of a metaphysical doctrine; and this, in turn, requires the 
cooperation of every department of philosophy; so that such new facts, 
however striking they may be, afford weaker support to philosophy by far than 
that common experience which nobody doubts or can doubt, and which nobody 
ever even pretended to doubt except as a consequence of belief in that 
experience so entire and perfect that it failed to be conscious of itself (CP 
5.120). 
For Peirce the subject matter of philosophy is “common experience,” by that he 
means the common structure of all experience, and not the particular, individual 
experience. From this it is obvious how important his categories are for Peirce’s view 
of philosophy, for not only are his categories universal conceptions or elements, but 
they are also experiential. 
 Peirce’s view of philosophy then, as a science of discovery, owes many of its 
fundamental ideas to his conception of phenomenology. Phenomenology, for Peirce, 
provides an experiential description of the categories, and thus enables philosophy to 
claim common experience as its subject matter. Without his phenomenology and its 
experiential description of the categories, Peirce would have found it difficult to 
claim that common experience is the subject matter of philosophy, since the 
categories would have remained too abstract to be part of common experience. This 
in turn connects with Peirce’s claim that in the last resort pragmatism has to appeal to 
phenomenology to provide it with an adequate foundation in the form of our 
common experience. These issues lead us on to the next section. 
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 2.3.3.2 The Object of Discovery 
 The term ‘discovery’ is not a univocal term in philosophy, and it could cause 
unwanted confusion if not handled with sufficient caution. In one sense, ‘discovery’ 
stands for the finding of some new facts or things by some investigator/s. A 
botanist’s discovery of a new species of plant, for example, would be listed under 
this type of discovery. This is normally the appropriate meaning of the word when 
used to describe findings of the special sciences. Discovery in this sense does not 
apply to philosophy, since philosophy is not concerned with collecting new facts. 
 Another sense of discovery relates not so much to the finding of new facts as to 
finding or developing new ways of explaining “old” facts (or facts already known to 
us that can now be explained in a more detailed or effective fashion). For example, 
the discovery in physics that ‘light travels in straight lines’ is a new way of 
explaining the same familiar phenomena relating to the behaviour of light, which 
(before the discovery) used to be explained differently.67 This sense of discovery also 
does not usually apply to philosophy. 
 In what sense then is philosophy a “science of discovery”? The kind of 
discovery Peirce attached to philosophy is based on his phenomenology and its 
description of the categories. I discussed in section 2.2.2 that ‘discovery’ comes 
about in the context of our experience, our actual living our life; and it is marked by 
the ‘newness’ of a phenomenon to our individual experience and the surprise that 
results from the unexpectedness of facts to us. The kind of discovery Peirce 
associated with philosophy has more to do with the growth in understanding of, or 
development of one’s experience and knowledge. It may be said then that philosophy 
for Peirce is concerned not only with meaning clarification, but also with the growth 
of understanding by human beings of the nature and structure common to our 
experience and knowledge. 
 
                                                 
67 Stephen Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science: An Introduction, Hutchinson University Library 
edition, (London: Hutchinson, 1967), pp. 16-21. 
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Chapter 3: 
 
THE ORIGIN, PURPOSE, AND PRESUPPOSITIONS OF 
PEIRCE’S PRAGMATISM 
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 3.1 ‘Pragmatism’ as a Theory of Inquiry for Meaning Clarification 
 What came to be called ‘pragmatism’68 refers to Peirce’s fundamental concern 
to discover the basic elements or principles essential in the process of inquiry, rather 
than to formulate a criterion of truth by means of which the results of inquiry are to 
be judged for their truth value. 
 Peirce first publicly formulated the basic principles of his pragmatism in two 
earlier articles: ‘The Fixation of Belief’ (1877) and ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’ 
(1878), both of which were published in a series of papers entitled: ‘Illustrations of 
the Logic of Science.’69 While attention has been focused on the second paper: ‘How 
to Make Our Ideas Clear,’70 some of the arguments leading on to Peirce’s expression 
of the principle of pragmatism were already developed in ‘The Fixation of Belief’71 
(1877), the first paper of the ‘Illustrations’ series. Thus a more complete 
understanding of Peirce’s original account of pragmatism requires some 
acquaintance with his paper: ‘The Fixation of Belief.’ 
3.1.1 The Object of Reasoning and Guiding Principle 
 ‘The Fixation of Belief’ is an essay on the logic of scientific inquiry. It focuses 
on two major issues: (1) what inquiry is, and (2) what the appropriate method of 
settling belief is. 
 Peirce begins ‘The Fixation of Belief’ with some brief remarks on logic, or the 
“art of reasoning,” stating that “The object of reasoning is to find out, from the 
consideration of what we already know, something else which we do not know. 
Consequently, reasoning is good if it be such as to give a true conclusion from true 
premises, and not otherwise” (W 3: 244). What determines us, in the process of 
reasoning, to draw a certain conclusion from given premises, Peirce argues, is a kind  
                                                 
68 In 1905 Peirce coined the term ‘pragmaticism’ in order to distinguish his position from those of 
other pragmatists (e.g. William James and F. C. S. Schiller). “… while to observe the precise purpose 
of expressing the original definition, he begs to announce the birth of the word “pragmaticism,” which 
is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers” (CP 5. 414). However, since Peirce himself is not 
consistent with his use of ‘pragmaticism’, the term ‘pragmatism’ is used consistently throughout this 
thesis, except where Peirce chooses to use its variant ‘pragmaticism’. As to the inconsistency of 
Peirce’s use of ‘pragmaticism’, see Fisch, 1986, p. 374n1. 
69 Henceforth ‘Illustrations.’ 
70 Peirce did not use the term “pragmatism” in this paper, but the principle which came to be 
referred to as “pragmatism” first appeared in its published form in this 1878 paper, which was first 
published in the journal Popular Science Monthly, vol. 12, pp. 286-302 (1878). 
71 Peirce later referred to ‘The Fixation of Belief’ and ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’ as two parts 
of the same essay. 
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 of “habit of mind”: “The particular habit of mind which governs this or that inference 
may be formulated in a proposition whose truth depends on the validity of the 
inferences which the habit determines; and such a formula is called a guiding 
principle of inference” (W 3: 245). 
 Peirce gives an example of what he means by the “guiding principle” involved 
in the process of reasoning. 
Suppose, for example, that we observe that a rotating disk of copper quickly 
comes to rest when placed between the poles of a magnet, and we infer that this 
will happen with every disk of copper. The guiding principle is, that what is 
true of one piece of copper is true of another. Such a guiding principle with 
regard to copper would be much safer than with regard to many other 
substances - brass, for example (W 3: 245). 
 Since any fact could be a guiding principle, Peirce specifies what kind of 
guiding principle he is concerned with by making the observation that there are two 
classes of facts. One class of facts is those implied when one asks the “logical 
question”: “whether a certain conclusion follows from certain premises” (W 3: 246). 
The other class consists of facts which are not implied in asking the logical question 
but are those given in experience. The class of facts implied in asking the logical 
question, according to Peirce, “are absolutely essential as guiding principles” (W 3: 
246); and it is these facts that occupy Peirce’s interest. 
3.1.2 Doubt, Belief, and Inquiry 
 Since Peirce strongly opposed the psychologistic notion of logic — the view 
that logic is a study of mental processes — it is natural that we should be curious to 
know how psychological facts such as doubt and belief enter into Peirce’s theory of 
inquiry, and thereby into the formation of his pragmatic maxim. For pragmatism is a 
logical maxim, according to Peirce. Doubt and belief as psychological facts are well 
known to Peirce and he always speaks of them as such. 
 The way Peirce sees doubt and belief as the essential parts of inquiry is based 
on logical considerations. He claims that in the process of asking the logical 
question, “It is implied … that there are such states of mind as doubt and belief — 
that a passage from one to the other is possible, the object of thought remaining the 
same, and that this transition is subject to some rules which all minds are alike bound 
by” (W 3: 246). After having established doubt and belief as states of mind implied 
in the logical question, Peirce proceeds to explain the differences between them. 
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  He enumerates three differences between doubt and belief. The first difference 
lies in doubt being expressed in the logical form of a question, whereas belief is 
expressed in the logical form of a judgment. The second difference is a practical 
one: “Our beliefs,” says Peirce, “guide our desires and shape our actions” (W 3: 
247), while doubt does not have that effect. The third difference between doubt and 
belief is most obviously psychological in nature. Peirce writes, “Doubt is an uneasy 
and dissatisfied state [of mind] from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass 
into the state of belief; while the latter is a calm and satisfactory state which we do 
not wish to avoid, or to change to a belief in anything else” (W 3: 247). 
 With these characteristic differences between doubt and belief, Peirce proceeds 
to explain his notion of inquiry. He argues that the immediate cause of inquiry is 
doubt, and its sole purpose is to settle doubt by bringing about the state of belief. 
“The irritation of doubt,” argues Peirce, “causes a struggle to attain a belief. I shall 
term this struggle inquiry” (W 3: 247). Because doubt is a state of mind that is 
uneasy, dissatisfied, and indecisive, it commits our mind to struggle to settle itself in 
to a state of belief, which is calm, satisfactory, and decisive. Peirce’s notion of 
inquiry, then, is about a structure professed to be common to all types of inquiry. 
 What Peirce calls ‘inquiry’ in ‘The Fixation of Belief’ does not refer to any 
particular sort of inquiry, as the word usually refers to a formal process such as 
‘scientific inquiry’, ‘police inquiry’, etc. His notion of inquiry is rather a universal or 
generalised one that covers all sorts of inquiry. 
 Doubt and belief enter into Peirce’s notion of inquiry via the “gate” of logic, 
and only after they are logically approved of as essential parts of inquiry, does Peirce 
reflect on their nature and characteristic features or seek to locate them logically 
within the process of inquiry. So, any concern as to whether or not Peirce’s theory of 
inquiry just presented is tenable, because of its psychological aspect, has to take into 
account the logical perspective from which Peirce admits doubt and belief into 
“inquiry”. My position is that it is tenable, and it will become evident as I continue 
my discussion in sections 3.2 to 3.2.3. 
 For now I will discuss the particular way in which doubt and belief come to 
feature in Peirce’s theory of inquiry, and to consider two consequences of his 
approach — one may be said as positive, and the other negative. 
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 3.1.2.1 “Belief”: Its Impacts on Pragmatism 
 Leading up to his formulation of the ‘pragmatic maxim’, Peirce, in Section II 
of ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear,’ refers to ‘The Fixation of Belief’ thus: 
The principles set forth in the first of these papers [namely, ‘The Fixation of 
Belief’] lead, at once, to a method of reaching a clearness of thought of a far 
higher grade than the “distinctness” of the logicians. We have there found that 
the action of thought is excited by the irritation of doubt, and ceases when 
belief is attained; so that the production of belief is the sole function of thought 
(W3: 261). 
It is clear from this passage that the doubt-belief theory of inquiry provides the basis 
of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim. Specifically, it is his analysis of belief and its 
characteristic features that leads Peirce to the maxim. Consider this critical passage 
on the doctrine of transubstantiation where Peirce derives deductively the pragmatic 
maxim from his analysis of belief. 
But we can have no conception of wine except what may enter into a belief, 
either - 
  1. That this, that, or the other, is wine; or 
  2. That wine possesses certain properties. 
Such beliefs are nothing but self-notifications that we should, upon occasion, 
act in regard to such things as we believe to be wine according to the qualities 
which we believe wine to possess. The occasion of such action would be 
some sensible perception, the motive of it to produce some sensible result. 
Thus our action has exclusive reference to what affects the senses, our habit 
has the same bearing as our action, our belief the same as our habit, our 
conception the same as our belief; and we can consequently mean nothing by 
wine but what has certain effects, direct or indirect, upon our senses (W 3: 
265-6). 
The deductive process involved in Peirce’s analysis can be more explicit if one 
adopts some symbols to stand for the key ideas in this passage, and then take each 
proposition (in the symbolic form to be used here) and put it in to a syllogistic form 
of argument. I use these symbols: A = action, E = practical/sensible effects, H = 
habit, B = belief, and C = conception (of whatever object under discussion). Note 
that the symbol “=” is used here less strictly than in the mathematical sense of 
equality to which the symbol is usually applied. Following the procedure just 
suggested I then have three syllogistic arguments.  
(1).   A = E   (2).  B = H   (3).  H = E 
H = A    C = B    C = H 
  H = E    C = H    C = E 
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 The conclusions of arguments (1) and (2) become the premises of argument (3) from 
which follows the pragmatic maxim, C = E. In the next paragraph after the passage 
just quoted above Peirce draws the conclusion, stating the pragmatic maxim. He 
says, “It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of 
apprehension is as follows” (W 3: 266): 
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these 
effects is the whole of our conception of the object (W 3: 266).72 
 The distinguishing feature of Peirce’s analysis of belief, in his pragmatism, is 
his inclusion of human action and habit as inseparable elements in the meaning of 
belief. According to Peirce, the meaning of a concept involves action that follows 
from accepting that concept. “The essence of belief,” says Peirce, “is the 
establishment of a habit, and different beliefs are distinguished by the different 
modes of action to which they give rise” (W 3: 263-4). So, action, in Peirce’s view, 
is a defining property of belief. To eliminate action from the meaning of a concept is 
like having that concept “stripped” of its meaning. Peirce emphasises “It is absurd to 
say thought has any meaning unrelated to its only function” (W 3: 266), which is to 
settle belief, or establish a rule of action. 
3.1.2.2 The “Misfortune” of “Sensible Effects” 
 By means of his analysis of belief Peirce is led to formulate his pragmatic 
maxim in a way that is similar to the verification principle of Logical Positivism.73 
The main thesis of the verification principle is that the meaning of a statement is 
determined by the method of its verification in sense experience. When Peirce 
contends that the whole of our conception of the practical effects of an object is the 
meaning of that object, he makes sense experience, in effect, the “method” or 
criterion for determining the meaning of an object. By “practical bearings” or effects 
Peirce means “sensible effects”. A further resemblance of the pragmatic maxim to 
the Verification Principle appears when Peirce restricts the meaning of an object (or 
concept) to sensible effects, maintaining that there is no room for something other 
                                                 
72 This is the very principle that was first publicly baptised with the name ‘pragmatism’ by 
William James in a public address at The University of California in Berkeley, 1898. Fisch, 1986, p. 
283. 
73 My attention was first drawn to the resemblance of the pragmatic maxim to the Verification 
Principle by H. O. Mounce, 1997, ch 3. However the point made about its implications for Peirce’s 
account of belief is mine. 
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 than sensible effects. The restriction of meaning to sensible effects is clearly 
illustrated when Peirce says, “It is foolish for Catholics and Protestants to fancy 
themselves in disagreement about the elements of the sacrament, if they agree in 
regard to all their sensible effects, here or after” (W 3: 266). 
 Just as the classic formulation of the Verification Principle commits logical 
positivism to a rejection of metaphysics, the original version of Peirce’s pragmatic 
maxim imposes a restriction on his theory of meaning, leading him to reject any 
supposed meaning with no sensible effects as absurd. In later years, however, Peirce 
realised the restriction the pragmatic maxim placed on his theory of meaning and 
found it problematic. 
 In ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear,’ after formulating the pragmatic maxim, 
Peirce proceeds to illustrate the maxim by examples. He applies it to various 
concepts. The first of these is the idea “hard”. 
Let us ask what we mean by calling a thing hard. Evidently that it will not be 
scratched by many other substances. The whole conception of this quality, as 
of every other, lies in its conceived effects. There is absolutely no difference 
between a hard thing and a soft thing so long as they are not brought to the test. 
Suppose, then, that a diamond could be crystallized in the midst of a cushion of 
soft cotton, and should remain there until it was finally burned up. Would it be 
false to say that that diamond was soft? … We may, in the present case, modify 
our question, and ask what prevents us from saying that all hard bodies remain 
perfectly soft until they are touched, when their hardness increases with the 
pressure until they are scratched. Reflection will show that the reply is this: 
there would be no falsity in such modes of speech. They would involve a 
modification of our present usage of speech with regard to the words hard and 
soft, but not of their meanings. For they represent no fact to be different from 
what it is; only they involve arrangements of facts which would be exceedingly 
maladroit. This leads us to remark that the question of what would occur under 
circumstances which do not actually arise is not a question of fact, but only of 
the most perspicuous arrangement of them (W 3: 266-7). 
Here Peirce is committed to some form of nominalism when he emphasises that until 
an object we consider to be hard is put to test, that is, in this case, until we press or 
scratch it, we can say it is soft. In general, nominalism is the doctrine that the only 
real things are the individual particulars; it claims that universals or generals are not 
real but are ‘creations’ of the mind. However, the nominalistic aspect of this 
(original) version of pragmatism is that it restricts the meaning of the idea “hard” to 
the particular diamond under consideration. If the particular diamond is not tested 
yet, hence no sensible effect(s) is identified, it is just a difference in “modes of 
speech” to claim that the diamond is hard or that it is soft. 
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  In his ‘Issues of Pragmatism,’ the second article of the series published in The 
Monist (1905), Peirce redefined pragmatism as follows: 
The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general 
modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different 
circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol (CP 
5.438). 
This is not just a redefinition of the pragmatic maxim. More importantly, it marks a 
change in Peirce’s point of view from a partly nominalistic doctrine to a more realist 
one. By 1905 Peirce’s realism, the doctrine that there are real generals, had 
developed to accept that there are real possibilities. (The relation between 
pragmatism and realism is discussed further in chapter 4.) Peirce thus specifies that 
“it is the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist 
upon” (CP 5.453). Because he now incorporates the reality of possibilities into his 
pragmatism and understands that there is a difference between this version of 
pragmatism and the original account Peirce revisits the example of “hardness” of a 
diamond. 
Let us now take up the case of that diamond which, having been crystallized 
upon a cushion of jeweler’s cotton, was accidentally consumed by fire before 
the crystal of corundum that had been sent for had had time to arrive, and 
indeed without being subjected to any other pressure than that of the 
atmosphere and its own weight. The question is, was that diamond really hard? 
It is certain that no discernible actual fact determined it to be so. But is its 
hardness not, nevertheless, a real fact? To say, as the article of January 1878 
[‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’] seems to intend, that it is just as an arbitrary 
“usage of speech” chooses to arrange its thoughts, is as much as to decide 
against the reality of the property, since the real is that which is such as it is 
regardless of how it is, at any time, thought to be (CP 5. 457). 
What Peirce seeks to address here is the nominalistic consequences that follow from 
his original formulation of the ‘pragmatic maxim’ and his account of the actual 
“sensible effects” of concepts. According to the original account, differences in 
linguistic expressions, or symbols, which have no corresponding differences in 
sensible effects are simply unreal. In ‘Issues of Pragmatism’ Peirce remarks on the 
original account of the pragmatic maxim as committing “the abominable falsehood in 
… implying that symbols are unreal” (CP 5.453). This nominalism, however, is 
shaken when Peirce considers it a real issue when there is a possibility of difference 
in linguistic expressions, or signs, used to express differences in sensible effects, thus 
admitting that symbols correspond with something real. 
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  A shift in his pragmatism from a nominalistic to a more realist approach is 
most especially evident in a letter Peirce wrote in c. 1905 to the Italian pragmatist 
Signor Calderoni.74 He writes: 
I myself went too far in the direction of nominalism when I said that it was a 
mere question of the convenience of speech whether we say that a diamond is 
hard when it is not pressed upon, or whether we say that it is soft until it is 
pressed upon. I now say that experiment will prove that the diamond is hard, as 
a positive fact. That is, it is a real fact that it would resist pressure, which 
amounts to extreme scholastic realism (CP 8.208). 
The shift towards a more realistic description of the relation of antecedent to 
consequent, results in a shift in emphasis in his formulation of the pragmatic maxim 
from examples of indicative to contrafactual conditionals.75 The indicative 
conditional of the original form of pragmatic maxim reads the meaning of “hardness” 
of a diamond as follows. “If you press a diamond, then it is not scratched.” Now as 
the pragmatic maxim is reformulated in terms of contrafactual conditionals, the 
meaning of “hardness” of a diamond then reads thus: “If you were to press a 
diamond, then it would resist the pressure.” So, the meaning consists not in what 
follows from “the actual employment of the experiential method,”76 to use 
Almeder’s phrase, but what would happen if the experiential method were to be 
employed. 
 Thus, Peirce gives his pragmatism a broader base on which it is able to free 
itself from the restriction of “sensible effects” and its nominalistic and verificationist 
consequences. Because “sensible effects” occupy the centre of attention in the 
original account of the pragmatic maxim, this means that what the individual person 
(or inquirer) actually experiences is what counts the most. The problem that arises is 
how to explain the communal dimension of meaning and our participation in a 
common universe of discourse. In the original account the communal aspect of 
language has to be based on the claim that every inquirer will come to the same 
conclusion in the end if inquirers pursue their inquiry far enough. Thus pragmatism 
in its original form makes communal meaning secondary and dependent on the 
                                                 
74 The editor of CP vol. 8, Arthur W. Burks, claims that “The intended recipient [of the letter] was 
probably Mario Calderoni, an Italian pragmatist.” See CP, vol. 8, footnote 1, p. 165. 
75 Richard S. Robin, ‘Classical Pragmatism and Pragmatism’s Proof,’ The Rule of Reason: The 
Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Jacqueline Brunning and Paul Forster (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1997), p. 141. 
76 Robert Almeder, ‘Peirce on Meaning,’ The Relevance of Charles Peirce, ed. Eugene Freeman 
(La Salle, Illinois: The Hegeler Institute, 1983), p. 345, 3n. 
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 authority of “sensible effects”. With the reformulation of his pragmatic maxim Peirce 
takes on a ‘full-blown’ communal, or public, view of meaning in contrast to the 
semi-communal position of the original account of pragmatism. The later version of 
pragmatism makes the communal basis of meaning a primary platform or principle 
independently of the authority of the particular “sensible effects” that the inquirers 
may experience. 
3.2 Psychological Doubt and Its Limitation in Inquiry 
 In the first period77 (1851-1870) of Peirce’s philosophical inquiry he was 
heavily involved in a critique of Cartesian philosophy. His attack on the Cartesian 
method of doubt is based on his rejection of subjective states as a sufficient basis for, 
or criterion of meaning for, a sound method of inquiry. He rejects the universal doubt 
of Descartes saying that it is “a mere self-deception, and not real doubt … Let us not 
pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts” (CP 5.265). To 
deliberately force ourselves into a state of doubt in order to conduct an inquiry does 
not make it operative. As Peirce puts it, “the mere putting of a proposition into the 
interrogative form does not stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief. There 
must be a real and living doubt, and without this all discussion is idle” (W 3: 248). 
 Susan Haack criticises Peirce’s attack on Descartes’ method of doubt, arguing 
that Peirce misrepresents Descartes. Haack defends Descartes’ method of doubt 
along the following lines: 
Descartes’ project is this: The aim is to discover which, if any, of the things he 
believes is certain … . The method [of Descartes] is to begin with beliefs one 
actually holds and submit them to a severe test, retaining only those which pass 
the test … . Beliefs which fail the test, which are not certain, are to be 
suspended … . The place at which doubt enters the procedure is in the test to 
which Descartes proposes that beliefs be submitted: he will suspend belief in 
anything which is dubitable, anything it is possible to doubt.78 
Haack further analyses that when a proposition is said to be dubitable we: 
might mean either of two things: that it is psychologically possible that 
someone should actually doubt it; or that it is possible that there should be a 
reason for doubting it. (I’ll call these, respectively, the descriptive and 
                                                 
77 From a chronological division of Peirce’s philosophical activity into three periods: (1851-1870), 
(1870-187), (1887-1914), by Gérard Deledalle, quoted in Nathan Houser, ‘Introduction’ to The 
Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, vol. 1, ed. Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel 
(Bloomington and Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. xxiv. 
78 Susan Haack, ‘Descartes, Peirce and the Cognitive Community,’ The Relevance of Charles 
Peirce, ed. Eugene Freeman (La Salle, Illinois: The Hegeler Institute, 1983), pp. 244-5.  
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 normative interpretations of ‘dubitable’.) I think it is clear that Descartes is 
concerned with dubitability in the normative sense.79 
 Haack’s criticism seems to miss the essence of Peirce’s doubt-belief theory of 
inquiry and his rejection of the Cartesian method of doubt. What Peirce tries to do in 
his doubt-belief theory of inquiry is to locate the proper place of doubt in inquiry, 
and then proceed to identify the most reliable method (as far as the truth of our belief 
is concerned) for fixing our belief, i.e. settling our doubts into belief. The main point 
of his rejection of the Cartesian doubt is twofold. First, doubt is a psychological state 
of mind, and therefore it cannot be employed as a method for conducting scientific 
inquiry. Secondly, doubt by nature is not something we can force ourselves into, as 
Descartes thought; rather, it is a state of mind that happens to us as a result of our 
belief being contradicted by our surrounding environment — whether physical or 
otherwise. 
3.2.1 Two Purposes of Inquiry 
 There are two kinds of purpose traced in Peirce’s notion of inquiry. One might 
be called ‘psychological purpose’, and the other ‘differential purpose’. The 
psychological footing of Peirce’s notion of inquiry makes belief in general the sole 
purpose of inquiry, whatever sort of inquiry; and hence its ‘psychological purpose’. 
‘Differential purpose’ is whatever particular purpose Peirce recognises in each type 
of inquiry. For example, truth is the differential purpose of science, and power is the 
differential purpose of politics. Note that truth can be said to be the differential 
purpose of other types of inquiry such as legal inquiry, police inquiry, etc. Also, note 
it is arguable that the purpose of science is power, to master the world; and of politics 
to arrive at the truth about human nature so as to build a just and happy society. 
While these arguments could be justifiable, I should emphasise that they are beside 
the point of what Peirce is concerned with in his ‘The Fixation of Belief.’ Peirce is 
denying not that truth and true belief can be used for maintaining power; what he is 
denying is that power is a reliable method for obtaining true beliefs. 
 The idea of purpose in Peirce’s notion of inquiry determines to a certain extent 
his view on method. Consideration of the proper method to be used in any given 
inquiry must begin with recognition of the differential purpose of that inquiry. As a 
scientist, Peirce has no objection to use of methods other than those of science in 
                                                 
79 Ibid., p. 245. 
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 other domains, relative to their differential purposes. Yet, these methods are not 
suitable if our purpose is to arrive at truth, settled belief. That is, the method 
appropriate to any inquiry must be compatible with its differential purpose, whatever 
it is. It must have characteristics by virtue of which its goals could be reached. 
3.2.2 Methods of Fixing Belief 
 Peirce’s preference for scientific method is based on the fundamental 
assumptions about the nature of inquiry articulated in ‘The Fixation of Belief.’ Thus, 
Peirce’s concept of method has to be understood within the context of his notion of 
inquiry. While various methods attracted Peirce’s attention in one way or the other, 
he singled out the method of science. His preference for the method of science over 
other methods is based upon his general classification of methods into two divisions: 
(1) those which are employed in activities and inquiries other than science, and (2) 
the method employed in science itself. 
 Because of the common nature of inquiry, as struggle initiated by doubt and 
aiming at belief, Peirce assumes that every person has engaged in inquiry, no matter 
to what degree each person has experienced it; hence, every person may be regarded 
as an “inquirer”. But although every person is brought into inquiry by the 
psychological motivation of doubt, there are two points of difference between 
‘inquirers’. First, they may differ in purpose, and second, in the methods they use in 
inquiry. 
 Peirce identifies four different methods of fixing belief; they are the method of 
tenacity, method of authority, the a priori method, and the method of science. The 
first three methods, Peirce enunciates, each have certain merits of their own.  
 The method of tenacity has the advantage of simplicity. A person using this 
method simply resorts to his or her own fancy in resolving a particular doubt, without 
making much effort in deciding what to believe. On another level, appeal to 
authority constitutes a common method of fixing belief; and this is, in Peirce’s 
account, the method mostly practised in religious and political institutions. Whatever 
the authority dictates determines what its subjects have to believe, or, at least, are 
expected to believe. Peirce explains this method of authority is mostly distinguished 
in its success in preserving and controlling religious and political dogmas. The a 
priori method, which Peirce claims has a central position in philosophies of 
metaphysicians, operates under the guidance of instinct. Philosophers of this method 
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 build up their doctrines on what they are inclined to accept as true, or, differently put, 
on what they think the most agreeable to reason. The advantage of a priori method, 
for Peirce, lies in the fact that it allows philosophers to draw out conclusions which 
their instinct finds comfortable. 
 Peirce argues that beliefs attained through the use of these methods — method 
of tenacity, method of authority, a priori method — are not sufficiently well secured. 
That in finding other people’s beliefs to be as good as one’s own belief, though very 
different from theirs, will cause some feeling of uneasiness and dissatisfaction in that 
person about his or her belief. So, the method of tenacity fails to withstand the 
challenges of what Peirce terms “The social impulse …” (W 3: 250). As to the 
method of authority its failure to secure belief from becoming doubtful is as 
inevitable as that of the method of tenacity. Once the subjects of an authority find out 
that beliefs followed in other countries and centuries are different from theirs, they 
start to question whether their beliefs are more or less reliable than those of the 
others’. Thus, beliefs become doubtful. In the a priori method, its practice is unable 
to bring inquirers to a common agreement. Because it bases inquiry on what the 
philosopher’s instinct finds ‘agreeable to reason’, which is for Peirce “similar to the 
development of taste” (W 3: 253), it makes only certain beliefs fashionable at certain 
times. At other times, beliefs of another instinct become more fashionable, leaving 
the former ones out of fashion. This allows beliefs as conclusions of one instinct to 
remain in disharmony with those of other instincts. 
 Having disclosed difficulties with these methods, Peirce proposes that “To 
satisfy our doubts ... it is necessary that a method should be found by which our 
beliefs may be caused by nothing human, but by some external permanency — by 
something upon which our thinking has no effect” (W 3: 253). He takes scientific 
method to be the only successful method whereby opinions can be settled 
permanently. Since scientific method works with objective facts and principles, there 
is no room (in science) for beliefs derived from tenacity, authority, or instinct, to 
make any claim against its conclusions. For that reason scientific method affords the 
inquirers with certainty and hope that they will all come, at the end, to the same 
conclusion. But the inquirers, Peirce adds, have to conduct their inquiry far enough 
so that they can attain the ultimate opinion, which is not a result of any particular 
individual or authority but of “something which affects, or might affect, every man” 
(W 3: 253). 
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 3.2.3 The Ideas of “Purpose” and “Method” Connected 
 Peirce’s central point is that differences and disagreement in beliefs, or 
opinions, on any particular subject are fundamentally to be settled by attention to the 
question of method. It is a matter of how one settles his or her belief. Only on the 
basis of scientific method can we meet both the purposes of inquiry (psychological 
and differential) . To put the same point in form of a table, one may set out Peirce’s 
argument in summary form as follows (with letters F = failed, and S = Successful): 
Method Psychological Purpose Differential Purpose 
Method of Tenacity F S 
Method of Authority F S 
A priori Method F S 
Method of Science S S 
 
 The table above shows the extent to which Peirce’s notion of inquiry is 
psychological, and how his preference for the method of science stems from a 
psychological standpoint. The method of science is the only method that passes the 
“psychological test”, that is capable of achieving the psychological purpose as well 
as the differential purpose of inquiry. 
 It should be emphasised, however, that it is incorrect to say that Peirce’s 
preference for the method of science is based entirely on a psychological principle. 
For his trust in the method of science is due to his conviction that this is the only 
method with an objective standard, i.e. standard pertaining to objects, that can be 
appealed to settle a subjective, psychological uncertainty. 
 But why does Peirce prefer objectivity (the method of science) to subjectivity 
(as in the method of tenacity, the method of authority, a priori method)? Peirce takes 
the view that objectivity, as in the method of science, has the potential of providing 
security for a belief not to be overturned by doubt. Subjectivity, as implied to various 
degrees in the other three methods, does not have this potential, according to Peirce. 
He holds that in the employment of subjective criteria for fixing belief the inquirer is 
locked in an “unsecured cell” so far as his or her belief is concerned. For once a 
belief so acquired is confronted with the external reality, it is very likely that it would 
readily be overturned by experience and become doubtful. So only by means of 
appealing to objects themselves can the inquirer be provided with security for his or 
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 her belief against the possible contradictions of belief arising from recognition of 
surrounding conditions. 
3.3 Pragmatism and the Categories 
 After his first formulation of pragmatism in ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear,’ 
1878, Peirce never wrote anything further on the subject until the 1900s.80 In 1902 
Peirce wrote an article entitled ‘Pragmatic and Pragmatism’ for the Dictionary of 
Philosophy and Psychology.81 He was provoked into clarifying and defending his 
own form of pragmatism in order to distinguish it from the popularised version of 
William James (CP 5.3). He accused James of taking pragmatism too far in assuming 
“that the end of man is action” (CP 5.3). In 1903 Peirce was invited to deliver a 
series of lectures on pragmatism at Harvard University in 1903. These lectures 
contained Peirce’s first thoroughly systematic presentation of his pragmatism, and 
the development of it I refer to in this thesis as ‘the later version’ of his pragmatism. 
 It should be pointed out, however, that between 1878 and the 1900s, Peirce had 
not ignored the subject altogether in the sense that the results of his research during 
this period formed the basis of the 1903 Harvard lectures. The differences between 
the earlier (or original) and later versions of his pragmatism indicate that Peirce’s 
philosophy underwent significant development over the period. 
 There is a whole range of differences between the two versions of pragmatism, 
but one difference is specially significant and is worth noting here. In the early 
version, as expressed in ‘The Fixation of Belief’ and ‘How to Make Our Ideas 
Clear,’ there is neither mention of the categories nor of his theory of signs. In the 
later version both the categories and his theory of signs take on a central position. 
This does not imply that Peirce thought out his pragmatism in its early form without 
the framework of his theories of categories and signs. On the contrary, there are 
reasons to believe that Peirce’s theories of categories and signs play a part in the 
original account he gives of pragmatism and in his formulation of the pragmatic 
maxim, especially those aspects related to “sensible effects” and psychological 
doubt. 
 
                                                 
80 Fisch (1986, p. 293) reports that Peirce first used the term ‘pragmatism’ in 1900. 
81 Edited by J. M. Baldwiw, The Macmillan, New York; vol. 2, pp. 321-322 (1902). CP 5.1, 
editors’ footnote. 
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  His writings (related to and) on pragmatism produced during the period from 
the 1890s to the end of his philosophical career address issues that Peirce wanted to 
settle in favour of his pragmatism. Firstly, Peirce re-formulated the 1878 statement of 
the pragmatic principle so as to avoid the psychologistic interpretation of it that had 
been taken up by other ‘pragmatists’. Secondly, he sought to demonstrate 
pragmatism as a coherent principle applicable to other branches of his philosophy. 
And, thirdly, he sought to provide a (philosophical) justification of pragmatism. 
 In the first lecture of the 1903 lecture series Peirce argues that although 
pragmatism is an efficient method for solving various problems, “it does not at all 
follow from that that it is true.”82 He understands that the sufficiency of pragmatism 
as a method and its truth are two distinct questions, and he recognises that he is 
required to provide a proof of pragmatism. In this lecture Peirce acknowledges the 
need for a proof of pragmatism and explains how it was dealt with in the original 
account of pragmatism. He says: 
 What is the proof that the possible practical consequences of a concept 
constitute the sum total of the concept? The argument upon which I rested the 
maxim in my original paper was that belief consists mainly in being 
deliberately prepared to adopt the formula believed in as the guide to action. If 
this be in truth the nature of belief, then undoubtedly the proposition believed 
in can itself be nothing but a maxim of conduct. That I believe is quite evident. 
 But how do we know that belief is nothing but the deliberate preparedness to 
act according to the formula believed? 
 My original article carried this back to a psychological principle. The 
conception of truth according to me was developed out of an original impulse 
to act consistently, to have a definite intention. But in the first place, this was 
not very clearly made out, and in the second place, I do not think it 
satisfactory to reduce such fundamental things to facts of psychology.83 
3.3.1 The Categories as Constitutive Principles for Pragmatism 
 Because Peirce conceives pragmatism to be a theory of meaning, it follows that 
pragmatism, in one way or the other, should have connections with both the theory of 
categories and the theory of signs. Basically, the categorical and semiotic 
presuppositions of Peirce’s philosophical system have two implications for his theory 
of meaning. First, the meaning of an object or concept is constituted by the category  
                                                 
82 Charles Sanders Peirce, Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 
Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, ed. Patricia Ann Turrisi (Albany, New York: State University of 
New York Press, 1997), p. 115. 
83 Ibid., p. 116. 
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 of Thirdness, which involves both the categories of Firstness and Secondness; and, 
secondly, every thought is itself a sign, and thinking is conducted in signs. Because 
of these two fundamental contentions, pragmatism is bound to result in categorical-
semiotic thinking, where not only all the three categories are involved, but also a 
three-way representation is implied:- (1) it (a sign) represents something to us, (2) it 
represents us to something or someone, and (3) it is, or can be, represented by us to 
someone else. The question remains, however, whether or not Peirce follows these 
principles in formulating his pragmatism. 
 Because there is no direct reference to the theory of categories in the original 
account of pragmatism the issue of the connection between pragmatism and his 
theory of categories cannot easily be settled by any direct evidence. Nevertheless, 
there is room for tracing the connection. There are two reasons for this: One factor is 
that there are remarkably striking resemblances to the categories in both ‘The 
Fixation of Belief’ and ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear.’ As Fisch remarks, “The 
categories are the key to the analysis of belief, doubt, and inquiry in the first paper 
[‘The Fixation of Belief’], and to the distinction of the three grades of clarity in the 
second paper [‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’].”84 
 Doubt, inquiry, and belief correspond to the categories of Firstness, 
Secondness, and Thirdness respectively. The various names Peirce uses to call his 
three categories show the correspondence between the two sets. 
 Doubt (Firstness) Inquiry (Secondness) Belief (Thirdness) 
 Feeling  Reaction  Thought 
 Quality  Reaction  Mediation 
 The other factor is that in the later version of pragmatism, as expressed in the 
1903 lectures, Peirce attempted an explanation of the link between pragmatism and 
his phenomenology and the doctrine of categories. In these lectures there is no 
suggestion that the “link” Peirce explains here is being introduced for the first time. 
What is new in the explanation of the 1903 Harvard lectures is that the link between 
pragmatism and the categories is now addressed in a manner that is predominantly 
phenomenological, both in content and expression. In other words, the explanation 
about the link between pragmatism and the categories offered in the later years is  
                                                 
84 Max H. Fisch, 1986, p. 327. 
 96
 simply another version of an already existing link that can be traced back to the 
1877-78 papers. 
 It is characteristic of the later version of pragmatism that Peirce is clear about 
his views on the relation between pragmatism and his theory of signs. In c.1904 he 
confirmed the relation between pragmatism and his theory of signs as follows. “This 
maxim [of pragmatism] is put forth neither as a handy tool to serve so far as it may 
be found serviceable, nor as a self-evident truth, but as a far-reaching theorem solidly 
grounded upon an elaborate study of the nature of signs” (CP 8.191). 
 What is clear in Peirce’s arguments about the relation between pragmatism and 
the categories is that he takes the categories as necessary for understanding 
pragmatism. In a letter to William James in 1902 Peirce wrote: 
[M]y three categories, which in their psychological aspect, appear as Feeling, 
Reaction, Thought. … I have advanced my understanding of these categories 
… and can now put them in a much clearer light and more convincingly. The 
true nature of pragmatism cannot be understood without them (CP 8.256). 
Peirce continues in the letter to James: 
It does not, as I seem to have thought at first, take Reaction as the be-all, but it 
takes the end-all as the be-all, and the End is something that gives it sanction to 
action. It is of the third category. Only one must not take a nominalistic view of 
Thought as if it were something that a man had in his consciousness. 
Consciousness may mean any one of the three categories. But if it is to mean 
Thought it is more without us than within. It is we that are in it, rather than it in 
any of us (CP 8.256). 
What Peirce says in this passage makes it reasonable to argue that his pragmatism 
was built upon his theory of categories. He wants to emphasise the category of 
Thirdness, i.e. thought, as playing a central role in pragmatism. This reinforces the 
position that pragmatism is a theory of meaning, for it is only in the domain of the 
category of Thirdness that meaning is possible. Moreover, the category of Thirdness 
insures the generality that pragmatism requires in order to escape the psychologism 
Peirce wants to erase from the original formulation of the principle of pragmatism. In 
other words, Peirce comes to realise that pragmatism, as a logical and not a 
psychological principle, has to be grounded within his theory of categories with a full 
recognition of the category of Thirdness. 
 The 1902 letter to James indicates that the advance in Peirce’s understanding of 
his categories took place after 1890. It is his article ‘The Architecture of Theories,’ 
1891, that Peirce set out to explain the relation between the categories and 
psychology. There he calls the psychological manifestations of the categories as 
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 “feeling”, “reaction”, and “general conception, or mediation” (CP 6.32) 
corresponding to Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness respectively.85 This means 
that the later version of pragmatism would differ from the early version since the 
categories were not so fully developed in the early version. 
 The content of Peirce’s 1902 letter to James is consistent with Fisch’s 
observation about the categories as “the key to the analysis of belief, doubt, and 
inquiry … and to the distinction of the three grades of clarity.” It is important to note 
that although Peirce formulated pragmatism in its original form within the 
framework of the categories, he does not appear to have applied the categories 
vigorously enough. As a result, the original version of pragmatism fails to avoid the 
psychologism which Peirce later wanted to remove. 
 Moreover, when Peirce redefined pragmatism in the 1903 lectures a great deal 
of space in this series of seven lectures was devoted to the subject of 
phenomenology, or “the doctrine of categories”. What is important here is that 
wherever Peirce thoroughly explicates and defends his pragmatism the categories are 
seen to be applied vigorously. This suggests not only that Peirce founded his 
pragmatism on his categorical system, but, more importantly, he considered the 
earlier version to be inadequate because he had not made the connection with the 
categories explicit. 
3.3.2 Categories and the Scientific Method 
 There are two principal ideas of Peirce’s pragmatism on which he is 
particularly insistent. He claims first, that pragmatism is a maxim of logic, and, 
second, that it is closely connected with scientific method and experimentation. 
These two claims are so related for Peirce that considering one would necessarily 
involve consideration of the other. This is partly shown by the phrase “the logic of 
science” which is the subject of the ‘Illustrations’ series. The phrase signifies the 
basic principle, or particular mode of thinking, practised in doing science, namely 
induction in particular. The logic, however, points to certain characteristic features of 
the method of science: it relies very much on observation of instances of experience, 
it is determined by an “external permanency”, the conclusion at which it aims is an 
ideal that is general in character. Note that these three features correspond to Peirce’s 
                                                 
85 Max H. Fisch (1986, p. 265) reports that this is when Peirce “began calling his three categories 
Quality, Reaction and Mediation.” 
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 three universal categories. “External permanency” corresponds to the category of 
quality of feeling, observation of phenomena of experience to the category of 
relation, and the general ideal state or law to the category of representation. 
3.3.3 The Question of the Proof of Pragmatism 
 Peirce considers providing a proof of pragmatism an important task and he 
committed himself to investigating the subject. Peirce attempts a “proof” of 
pragmatism not only as an essential requirement of scientific and philosophical 
inquiry, but also because he feels that it is required in order to draw the distinction 
between his pragmatism and that of other philosophers who in the eyes of Peirce 
have used the term too loosely. The subject became an increasingly important issue 
for Peirce in his writings on pragmatism after 1900. 
 Nevertheless, Peirce had already attempted a proof of pragmatism in his early 
papers: ‘The Fixation of Belief’ and ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear.’ There, his 
proof rests on the theory of inquiry developed in these two articles. As I have 
indicated, for Peirce inquiry is a process initiated by the feeling of doubt and it 
comes to an end when the process of inquiry achieves a state of belief, that is, when 
the initiating doubt is settled. By 1903, however, Peirce considered it unsatisfactory 
because of its psychological aspect (CP 5.28). 
 Peirce argues that to construct a philosophical theory one has to follow a 
certain route of investigation. On the one hand, he rejects the mere speculation of 
some philosophers, and on the other hand he maintains a constant belief that 
philosophy should adopt a detailed, scientific form of inquiry. In his ‘The 
Architecture of Theories’ (1891) Peirce recommends that to construct a philosophical 
theory, one has: 
to make a systematic study of the conceptions out of which a philosophical 
theory may be built, in order to ascertain what place each conception may fitly 
occupy in such a theory, and to what uses it is adapted (CP 6.9). 
 There is uncertainty among scholars whether or not Peirce was successful in 
providing a proof of pragmatism.86 Part of the problem lies with Peirce himself. As 
with some of his views on other subjects Peirce almost never pursued a definite line 
of thinking without changing his mind. As a result his readers are left with views 
which in some respects are in conflict, and in other respects are not fully developed. 
                                                 
86 Ibid., p. 373-374. 
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  In this thesis I argue that a significant part of the problem could have been 
resolved if Peirce had resorted earlier to his theory of categories for a proof of 
pragmatism. Some of his writings indicate that Peirce realised the categories should 
form part of the proof, but he never pursued that point far enough so that he could 
see the deeper significance or value of the theory to his system as a whole.  
In c. 1905, Peirce wrote: 
Pragmatism … had been designed and constructed … architectonically. … in 
constructing the doctrine of pragmatism the properties of all indecomposable 
concepts were examined and the ways in which they could be compounded. 
Then the purpose of the proposed doctrine having been analyzed, it was 
constructed out of the appropriate concepts so as to fulfil that purpose. In this 
way, the proof of it was proved. There are other subsidiary confirmations of 
its truth; but it is believed that there is no other independent way of strictly 
proving it (CP 5.5). 
3.3.4 Pragmatism and the Principle of Abduction 
 Peirce’s pragmatism went through a process of change and development since 
its first formulation in 1878. However, it is noteworthy that in 1903 Peirce identified 
pragmatism with abduction. 
the question of pragmatism … is nothing else than the question of the logic of 
abduction. That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must 
render needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as 
hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful 
suggestions; and … this is all that the maxim of pragmatism really pretends to 
do … . For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical 
effect or import differing from that of a second conception except so far as … 
it might conceivably modify our practical conduct differently from that second 
conception. Now it is indisputable that no rule of abduction would be admitted 
by any philosopher which should prohibit on any formalistic grounds any 
inquiry as to how we ought in consistency to shape our practical conduct. 
Therefore, a maxim which looks only to possibly practical considerations will 
not need any supplement in order to exclude any hypotheses as inadmissible. 
… Thus, the maxim of pragmatism … fully covers the entire logic of abduction 
(CP 5.196). 
 In finally identifying pragmatism with abduction Peirce is then involved in 
seeking to establish a common method for inquiry. Pragmatism as formulated in 
1878 still retains its purpose as a principle or method for clarifying meaning, but as 
evident in the passage above it is now incorporated into a wider method with a 
broader application, in which it recognises the ‘future’ mode of being. Peirce says, 
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 “Deduction proves that something must be, Induction shows that something actually 
is operative, Abduction merely suggests that something may be.87 
 
                                                 
87 Charles Sanders Peirce, Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 
Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, ed. Patricia Ann Turrisi, (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1997), p. 230. 
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 4.1 Peirce on Nominalism-Realism Controversy 
4.1.1 Introduction 
 Peirce considered realism an essential component of his pragmatism, and he 
consistently argued for it throughout his career.88 It will become clear in the 
following discussion that Peirce’s realism was not defined once and for all, but it 
went through stages of development, with associated developments in his 
pragmatism. The two major formulations (which I referred to in chapter 3 as the 
“early” and “later” formulations or versions) of his pragmatism were conducted (as I 
have shown) within the framework of his realist theory of categories. As a result, 
Peirce was forced to extend the scope of his pragmatism from being merely a logical 
maxim for clarifying the meaning of concepts to one which includes a metaphysical 
aspect, which Peirce describes thus. 
Now whoever cares to know what pragmaticism is should understand that on 
its metaphysical side it is an attempt to solve the problem: In what way can a 
general be unaffected by any thought about it? (CP 5.503). 
 It becomes apparent that his pragmatism is founded upon a form of 
metaphysical realism, insofar as it must answer the question how a general be 
unaffected by any thought about it. In a word, pragmatism becomes an argument for 
a metaphysical position. 
4.1.2 What does Realism mean for Peirce? 
 By ‘realism’ Peirce understands the doctrine that there are real universals (or 
‘generals,’ or ‘laws’ as he later more often called them), and realism is to be 
distinguished from ‘nominalism’, the doctrine which maintains that only individual 
particulars have reality, whereas universals are only figments of the mind. There are 
numerous references to the nominalism-realism controversy scattered throughout his 
writings, and it is clear that for Peirce the fundamental issue between nominalism 
and realism is about the reality of universals: “Are universals real?” (W 2: 467), 
rather than simply the meaning of universals. 
                                                 
88 In noticing the force of Peirce’s demand for a realist basis for his pragmatism, Thomas S. Knight 
remarks that “No aspect of Peirce’s philosophy depends more upon realism than Pragmatism.” 
Thomas S. Knight, Charles Peirce (New York: Washington Square Press, 1965), p. 65. 
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  Peirce became seriously engaged with the controversy early in his career89 as a 
result of his study of the scholastic philosophers. He believed the importance of 
nominalism-realism controversy was not limited to theoretical, intellectual discourse; 
but “its branches reach about our life.” He continues, 
But although the question of nominalism and realism has its roots in the 
technicalities of logic, its branches reach about our life. The question whether 
genus homo has any existence except as individuals, is the question whether 
there is anything of any more dignity, worth, and importance than individual 
happiness, individual aspirations, and individual life. Whether men really have 
anything in common, so that the community is to be considered as an end in 
itself, and if so, what the relative value of the two factors is, is the most 
fundamental practical question in regard to every public institution the 
constitution of which we have it in our power to influence (W 2: 487). 
 It is noteworthy that this was written in 1871 — before he formulated his 
pragmatism. What is important here is that the view he expresses in this passage 
about the nominalism-realism controversy — as having some application to practical 
questions of life — is potentially pragmatic, given that his pragmatism emphasises 
the practical effects of belief. Further, he shows that he is committed to realism as an 
essential foundation for his pragmatism because he rejects the wider consequences of 
nominalism for our communal life as human beings. 
 Although Peirce recognises some important ideas in the works of other 
scholastic philosophers, he had special interest in the philosophy of Duns Scotus. 
And this is because Peirce believes that: 
If his [Scotus’] logic and metaphysics, [is] not slavishly worshipped, but torn 
away from its medievalism, … it will go far toward supplying the philosophy 
which is best to harmonize with physical science (CP 1.6). 
Peirce does not elaborate what he means by this statement. Fortunately, however, one 
can easily gather the meaning of his statement from what he says about Scotus in 
other parts of his writings. Consider, for example, what he says in the following 
passage: 
The logical upshot of the doctrine of Scotus is that real problems cannot be 
solved by metaphysics, but must be decided according to the evidence. As he 
was a theologian, that evidence was, for him, the dicta of the church. But the 
same system in the hands of a scientific man will lead to his insisting upon 
submitting everything to the test of observation (CP 4.28). 
                                                 
89 According to Max H. Fisch, 1986, p. 188, “The years 1868 and 1869 were those of Peirce’s 
most intensive study of the schoolmen.” 
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 In the light of this passage the “medievalism” from which Scotus’ philosophy must 
be liberated is its dependence on “the dicta of the church.”90 The particular aspect of 
Scotus’ philosophy which, for Peirce, could “harmonize with physical science” is his 
insistence “that real problems … must be decided according to the evidence.” 
4.1.3 From Nominalism to Realism: Accepting that External Reality Exists 
 Early in his career Peirce first held a nominalist view of the reality of 
universals before he declared for realism. The nominalistic stand of his theory of 
universals admits of the reality of universals only within the domain of thought. He 
claims that there is nothing universal, or general, that is outside the sign processes of 
thought. Peirce made this claim upon the basis of his theory of cognition, the 
fundamental thesis of which was that our reasoning is inferential in character, and it 
operates by means of signs. In a draft of his first article of the cognition series, 
‘Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man,’ 1868, Peirce makes the 
following remarks: 
For the real is an object of an absolutely true proposition. Thus, we obtain a 
theory of reality which, while it is nominalistic, inasmuch as it bases universals 
upon signs, is yet quite opposed to that individualism which is often supposed 
to be coextensive with nominalism. … it is not merely the case … that 
universals have reality on this theory, but also that there are nothing but 
universals which have an immediate reality. … Now the nominalistic element 
of my theory is certainly an admission that nothing out of cognition and 
signification generally, has any generality; and therefore this seems to imply 
that we are not affected by a real external world. … Our principle, indeed, is 
simply that realities, all realities, are nominal, significative, cognitive. This is 
simply the pure doctrine of idealism (W 2: 175, 180, 181). 
 The nominalism for which Peirce declared in this passage is an idealistic 
nominalism, in that it restricts reality to thought. “In short,” Peirce continues in the 
same draft, “thought and being appear to be in their widest sense synonymous terms” 
(W 2: 175). Peirce’s identification of being with thought is a result of his denial of 
any ultimate premise, or first principle, that is claimed to exist but is unknowable. 
Moreover, it is important to note that at this time such identification seemed to Peirce 
to be the most appropriate theory on which to base his signs theory of cognition. 
Peirce seemed to think that allowing the existence of particulars in the external world 
would require an external starting point for thought, in which case thought would 
                                                 
90 Peirce calls this kind of reasoning where the evidence is “the dicta of the church” or power of 
any political organisation “the method of authority.” 
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 appear then to have a first premise or principle that is non-inferential in character. To 
claim that there is non-inferential basis to thought is contrary to what Peirce wants to 
argue for he insists that thought is inferential. As a result Peirce makes the reality of 
universals to consist entirely in thought, thus committing himself to a form of 
idealism. 
 Despite his claim that “universals have reality on this theory,” the reality of 
universals is confined to a realm of thought where nothing is universal but the signs. 
This leads Peirce to the conclusion that the real is that which is significative and 
cognitive, thus identifying thought with being. However, it did not take long before 
Peirce declared for realism by arguing for the external and independent reality of 
universals. 
4.2 Pragmatism within the Framework of Realism 
 The development of Peirce’s realism was determined by his changing views on 
the ontological status or reality of his categories. In his survey of the development of 
Peirce’s realism Max H. Fisch argues that Peirce’s realism developed progressively 
as he accepted the reality of each of his categories and moved from “one-category” 
to “two-category,” and finally to “three-category” realism.91 He argues that this 
points directly to the fact that the universals, or generals, with whose reality Peirce is 
concerned, are nothing more or less than the categories themselves. For Peirce there 
are only three kinds of universals, namely, Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. 
Hence, his realism as a doctrine of the reality of universals is a doctrine of the reality 
of his categories. 
4.2.1 One-Category Realism 
 Later in the same year, 1868, in which he formulated his nominalistic view of 
universals, Peirce first declared for realism in his paper ‘Some Consequences of Four 
Incapacities,’ the second article of the cognition series. Here Peirce argues that “We 
have no conception of the absolutely incognizable” (W 2: 213):  
 At any moment we are in possession of certain information, that is, of 
cognitions which have been logically derived by induction and hypothesis from 
previous cognitions which are less general, less distinct, and of which we have 
                                                 
91 My attention was first clearly focussed on the connection between the development (in 
chronological order) of Peirce’s realism and the question about the reality of his categories by reading 
Max H. Fisch, 1986, ch. 10; and Nathan Houser, ‘Introduction,’ The Essential Peirce: Selected 
Philosophical Writings, vol. 1, ed. Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1992). 
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 a less lively consciousness. These in their turn have been derived from others 
still less general, less distinct, and less vivid; and so on back to the ideal first, 
which is quite singular, and quite out of consciousness. This ideal first is the 
particular thing-in-itself. It does not exist as such. That is, there is no thing 
which is in-itself in the sense of not being relative to the mind, though things 
which are relative to the mind doubtless are, apart from that relation (W 2: 238-
9). 
He argues that our cognition is always at any moment the product of an inference 
from some previous cognitions, which themselves are derived from some further 
previous cognitions; and so on infinitely. To trace a cognition, according to Peirce, 
would lead back to what he calls an “ideal first.” “This ideal first,” says Peirce, “is 
the particular thing-in-itself” (W 2: 238).92 Peirce’s usage of the word “ideal” (in his 
calling “the particular thing-in-itself” an “ideal first”) serves to distinguish between 
what he affirms and what he denies in relation to particulars. It is a distinction, 
moreover, which leaves Peirce with no option but a “one-category” realism in which 
the only reality he recognises is that of representation, or the category of Thirdness. 
 What Peirce denies in the idea of a “particular thing-in-itself” is the claim that 
it is a thing in itself bearing no relation whatsoever to the mind — a position he 
associates with nominalism. If there is such a thing, Peirce argues, it is something of 
which we have no knowledge; and to claim the existence of something which we 
know nothing about is a self-contradiction. Does that mean, then, that there is for 
Peirce a “particular thing-in-itself,” but one that exists relative to the mind? Though 
this question may seem perplexing, it is a question worth considering since it helps 
clarify what is implicit in Peirce’s argument. 
 In ‘Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,’ the categories of being and 
substance of the ‘New List’ have been excluded and Peirce works only with the three 
intermediate categories of quality, relation and representation. As I discussed in 
chapter 1 Peirce does not explain why he excludes the categories of substance and 
being from his list of categories. The most plausible guess one can make of this is 
that these two categories, substance and being, seem to Peirce to be an obstacle to the 
theory of cognition that he was developing in ‘Some Consequences of Four 
Incapacities.’ For if our cognition is always an inference with no absolute beginning 
and end, it follows that the categories of substance and being, which he defined 
                                                 
92 In the footnote, W 2:238, Peirce says, “By an ideal, I mean the limit which the possible cannot 
attain.” 
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 initially as the beginning and end of conception respectively, have to be dropped 
from his list of categories. 
 Now working with only the categories of quality, relation, and representation 
means that Peirce, instead of searching for an absolutely first principle by which 
reality is to be defined, is led to look at the process of cognition itself. He concludes 
that the cognitions we arrive at by means of inference (induction and hypothesis) 
“are of two kinds, true and the untrue, or cognitions whose objects are real and those 
whose objects are unreal” (W 2: 239). Peirce then asks, “what do we mean by the 
real?” to which he answers, 
It is a conception which we must first have had when we discovered that there 
was an unreal, an illusion; that is, when we first corrected ourselves (W 2: 
239). 
But since it is from our experience as individuals that our cognition makes its 
inference, Peirce thinks it necessary to distinguish “between an ens relative to private 
inward determinations, to the negations belonging to idiosyncrasy, and an ens such 
as would stand in the long run” (W 2: 239). Peirce introduces this distinction mainly 
to argue his point that the real is relative to the mind in being cognised, yet at the 
same time it is independent of that relation. 
He then defines reality thus: 
The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would 
finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of you and 
me (W 2: 239). 
 By denying any particular thing in itself as absolutely incognisable, and 
claiming that our cognition is essentially inferential without any absolute beginning, 
Peirce draws the conclusion that there are real generals. And it is in this connection 
that he makes his first declaration for realism. He writes: 
 But it follows that since no cognition of ours is absolutely determinate, 
generals must have a real existence. Now this scholastic realism is usually set 
down as a belief in metaphysical fictions. But, in fact, a realist is simply one 
who knows no more recondite reality than that which is represented in a true 
representation. Since, therefore, the word “man” is true of something, that 
which “man” means is real. The nominalist must admit that man is truly 
applicable to something; but he believes that there is beneath this a thing in 
itself, an incognizable reality. His is the metaphysical figment. Modern 
nominalists are mostly superficial men, who do not know, as the more 
thorough Roscellinus and Occam did, that a reality which has no representation 
is one which has no relation and no quality. The great argument for nominalism 
is that there is no man unless there is some particular man. That, however, does 
not affect the realism of Scotus; for although there is no man of whom all 
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 further determination can be denied, yet there is a man, abstraction being made 
of all further determination. There is a real difference between man irrespective 
of what the other determinations may be, and man with this or that particular 
series of determinations, although undoubtedly this difference is only relative 
to the mind and not in re. Such is the position of Scotus. Occam’s great 
objection is, there can be no real distinction which is not in re, in the thing-in-
itself; but this begs the question, for it is itself based only on the notion that 
reality is something independent of representative relation (W 2: 239-240). 
 It should be noted that it is the realism of Duns Scotus for which Peirce 
declared. Here it is evident that Peirce brings in his theory of categories to play a role 
in his argument for realism. He criticises the modern nominalists for not realising 
“that a reality which has no representation is one which has no relation and no 
quality.” Actually, Peirce’s newly adopted realism is limited to admitting the reality 
of representation, or thought, alone. 
 At this stage Peirce argues for realism from the standpoint of his category of 
Thirdness or representation, whereas the nominalism which Peirce opposes argues 
from particulars as things in themselves. In Peirce’s view, because nominalism 
denies the reality of representation, which is the only mode of knowing things, it 
commits an error of asserting the reality of something that is unknowable. If 
nominalism is to be consistent in maintaining that we have some knowledge of the 
entities it claims, then, it must admit the reality of representation, or universals. In 
further developing his realism, in his review of Fraser’s The Works of George 
Berkeley, 1871, Peirce says quite clearly that: 
The nominalist, by isolating his reality so entirely from mental influence as he has 
done, has made it something which the mind cannot conceive (W 2: 481).93 In this 
article he declared for realism for the second time, and discussed the nominalism-
realism controversy in more detail. Central to this discussion is the notion of 
‘reality’, which Peirce defines thus: 
The real is that which is not whatever we happen to think it, but is unaffected 
by what we may think of it (W 2: 467). 
He contrasts two points of view from which one can define reality: the nominalistic 
and the realistic points of view. The nominalist, according to Peirce, construes reality 
in a way that does not allow for the possibility of different things having something 
in common, a common nature. 
                                                 
93 From now on I will refer to this article as Berkeley review. 
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 the exact sense being that the realities external to the mind produce sensations 
which may be embraced under one conception, yet it can by no means be 
admitted that the two real men have really anything in common, for to say that 
they are both men is only to say that the one mental term or thought-sign 
“man” stands indifferently for either of the sensible objects caused by the two 
external realities; so that not even the two sensations have in themselves 
anything in common, and far less is it to be inferred that the two external 
realities have (W 2: 468). 
 The error of the nominalistic view, for Peirce, is its insistence on the reality of 
things external to the mind at the expense of the reality of their common nature, or of 
universals. The realist does not deny the externality of things to the mind, but goes 
further by arguing for the reality of universals and the possible common nature which 
may be shared by a group of different particulars. Thus the nominalistic and the 
realistic views of reality, Peirce thinks, are ultimately reconcilable, despite the vast 
difference between their fundamental principles. 
In a manuscript titled ‘On Reality,’94 written in 1872, Peirce says: 
I do not think that the two views [the nominalistic and the realistic views] are 
absolutely irreconcilable, although they are taken from very widely separated 
standpoints. The realistic view emphasizes particularly the permanence and 
fixity of reality; the nominalistic view emphasizes its externality. But the 
realists need not, and should not deny, that the reality exists externally to the 
mind (W 3: 29). 
 Now Peirce’s shift from nominalism to realism, is further underlined in his 
second article of the cognition series, the Berkeley review, and ‘On Reality.’ The 
position he develops results in an acceptance of the reality of external things, which 
he had previously maintained in 1868 was confined to thought. Thus Peirce, by his 
acceptance of realism, was able to escape the restrictions of the idealism and 
nominalism he maintained in 1868. 
 Peirce thus adopts a notion of reality that not only insists on the inevitable 
relation of reality to the mind, but also recognises the externality of real things. But 
how is it possible for things to be real independently of the mind, and yet essentially 
relative to it? Peirce already attempted to handle this question in 1868 in his ‘Some 
Consequences of Four Incapacities.’ He writes, 
there is no thing which is in-itself in the sense of not being relative to the mind, 
though things which are relative to the mind doubtless are, apart from that 
relation (W 2: 238-9). 
                                                 
94 The title ‘On Reality’ was supplied by the editors of Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A 
Chronological Edition, vol. 3, ed. Christian J. W. Kloesel, Max H. Fisch, et al. (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1986). 
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 He defines a theory of reality in which he distinguishes “between an ens relative to 
private inward determinations … and an ens such as would stand in the long run” (W 
2: 239). Peirce then goes on, 
The real … is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would 
finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and 
you (W 2: 239). 
The theory of reality Peirce advances here asserts the relativity of reality to the mind 
without allowing individualism. Reality is not determined by what John, for 
example, thinks it to be; but, rather, it is that which John in his reasoning would 
finally come up against, provided that John pursued his reasoning far enough to 
ensure that he would arrive at it. Thus reality is relative to the mind in the sense that 
the mind is tending towards it. 
 By accepting the externality of real things, and reality as something towards 
which thought tends, Peirce introduces ‘objectivity’ as an essential element of his 
realism. He says, “The realist will, therefore, believe in the objectivity of all 
necessary conceptions, space, time, relation, cause, and the like” (W 2: 471). This is 
because, Peirce argues, 
The realist will hold that the very same objects which are immediately present 
in our minds in experience really exist just as they are experienced out of the 
mind; that is, he will maintain a doctrine of immediate perception. He will not, 
therefore, sunder existence out of the mind and being in the mind as two 
wholly improportionable modes. When a thing is in such relation to the 
individual mind that that mind cognizes it, it is in the mind; and its being so in 
the mind will not in the least diminish its external existence. For he does not 
think of the mind as a receptacle, which if a thing is in, it ceases to be out of. 
To make a distinction between the true conception of a thing and the thing 
itself is, he will say, only to regard one and the same thing from two different 
points of view; for the immediate object of thought in a true judgment is the 
reality (W 2: 471). 
 Characteristic of Peirce’s realist notion of reality is an attempt to bring into 
harmony the externality of real things and the inevitable relation of the real things to 
the mind. Peirce explains why his theory of reality is realistic as follows: 
It is plain that this view of reality is inevitably realistic; because general 
conceptions enter into all judgments, and therefore into true opinions. 
Consequently a thing in the general is as real as in the concrete. It is perfectly 
true that all white things have whiteness in them, for that is only saying, in 
another form of words, that all white things are white; but since it is true that 
real things possess whiteness, whiteness is real. It is a real which only exists by 
virtue of an act of thought knowing it, but that thought is not an arbitrary or 
accidental one dependent on any idiosyncrasies, but one which will hold in the 
final opinion (W 2: 470). 
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  Following this passage Peirce adds another aspect to his theory of reality. He 
claims that it involves the phenomenalism of Kant, which, in Peirce’s words, “was to 
regard the reality as the normal product of mental action, and not as the incognizable 
cause of it” (W 2: 471). The adoption of these aspects of phenomenalism by Peirce 
brings out a number of points he had already identified in his realism. It reinforces 
Peirce’s denial of any unknowable thing-in-itself. In regarding reality as the “normal 
product of mental action” phenomenalism emphasises the idea that the mind is 
active, not passive. Furthermore, it harmonises with the view that reality is that 
towards which the mind is tending. For only if the mind is active can it tend towards 
something. That is to say, if the mind is something passive, then, there is no way it 
could properly be held to be capable of tending towards reality. For tending implies 
action or activity. 
4.2.1.1 The Early Formulation of Pragmatism 
 Having developed his argument on realism thus far, Peirce was in a position to 
formulate the maxim of his pragmatism. This was possible due mainly to the 
following propositions on which his “one-category realism” was based: (1) There is 
no absolutely unknowable thing in itself. (2) Reality is both independent of and 
relative to the mind, but not confined to the private, inward experience of 
individuals. (3) Because reality does not depend on individuals and their private 
experiences, the idea of reality bears a future or forward reference. All these claims 
figure in the early formulation of Peirce’s pragmatism, which he expresses as follows 
in his paper, ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’: 
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these 
effects is the whole of our conception of the object (W 3: 266). 
The idea of “practical bearings,” or “effects,” (by which Peirce means sensible 
effects) plays a key role in this formulation of his pragmatism, and it confirms his 
commitment to realism in two ways: Firstly, it indicates the role of “immediate 
perception” that is required by his realism. And, secondly, it defines the totality of 
the object of a conception, thus leaving no room for any “existing but unknowable” 
object. 
 Peirce applies his pragmatic maxim to the idea of reality and claims that “The 
only effect which real things have is to cause belief, for all the sensations which they 
excite emerge into consciousness in the form of beliefs” (W 3: 271-2). Peirce was 
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 aware that this claim needs to deal with the objection: “how is true belief (or belief in 
the real) distinguished from false belief (or belief in fiction)”? (W 3: 272). He 
addresses this question by defining truth and reality in terms of the realism he had 
advanced in his cognition papers and Berkeley review. In ‘How to Make Our Ideas 
Clear,’ the paper that carries the early formulation of pragmatism, Peirce gives the 
following definition of reality: 
The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is 
what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the 
real. That is the way I would explain reality” (W 3: 273). 
From this it should be clear how the propositions or requirements of his realism 
figure in his formulation of pragmatism. 
 Peirce’s own pragmatic definition of reality, however, reveals the limitation of 
his one-category realism, in that it recognises only the reality of the category of 
representation. The categories of Firstness and Secondness as such, since they are 
neither representations nor representative, are not real. If they are real at all, their 
reality is implied in the category of representation. This shows only a degree of 
universality and reality embodied in Peirce’s categories. The categories of Firstness 
and Secondness are known only as elements or members of a representation; thus 
their reality is dependent on their being members of representation. 
 Peirce’s initial formulation of pragmatism was projected within the framework 
of a realism of the category of Thirdness alone. As discussed in chapter 3, he defined 
the concept “hard” as “that it will not be scratched by many other substances” (W 3: 
266). And continued, “There is absolutely no difference between a hard thing and a 
soft thing so long as they are not brought to the test” (W 3: 266). The meaning of the 
belief that a diamond is hard consists in the habit of action arising from that belief. 
 Given that the “categories” for Peirce are universal conceptions, and that 
realism is concerned with the reality of universals, it would appear that there are 
some changes Peirce would have to make to his view of the reality of the categories 
of Firstness and Secondness. What we do not know is whether Peirce’s discovery of 
the logic of relations influenced his early formulation of pragmatism. However, what 
is certain is that Peirce made his discovery of the logic of relations in 1870, before 
his initial formulation of pragmatism. It would appear that if Peirce based his early 
version of pragmatism on his theory of categories, it was the theory of categories of 
the ‘New List.’ 
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 4.2.2 Two-Category Realism 
 It took about twelve years after the initial formulation of pragmatism in 1878 
before Peirce accepted the reality of the category of Secondness. This occurred in 
about 1890 when Peirce adopted Duns Scotus’ principle of haecceity.95 It is a 
principle which postulates pure individuals where each individual has its own 
uniqueness that is not shared by any other. Peirce approves of Scotus’ haecceity, 
saying “What Scotus calls haecceities of things, the hereness and nowness of them, 
are indeed ultimate” (CP 1. 405). Now Peirce treats the haecceity of Scotus as 
Secondness as consisting of facts that are not “calling for and not capable of 
explanation” (CP 1.405). These facts of haecceity or Secondness are individual facts, 
not general facts. Although individual facts are not capable of explanation, they are 
essential to our experience. This is because the individual facts, i.e. Secondness, 
ensure the independence of external objects96 from our private, subjective wants and 
interests, according to Peirce. 
 Given the fact that Peirce claims that Secondness is not capable of explanation, 
and that he always denies any unknowable thing in itself, the question is: how can he 
accept the reality of Secondness? Peirce explains that Secondness as such is not 
capable of explanation as Thirdness is, but, still, it can be experienced in the form of 
“hefting its insistency then and there” (CP 6.318). 
 Before accepting the reality of Secondness, Peirce had already realised the 
importance of actuality for thinking. This was due to his discovery of quantification 
theory (which I discussed in chapter 1). The main thesis of the discovery is that all 
the three principal kinds of signs (icons, indices, and tokens or symbols) are essential 
for reasoning. In particular the discovery of quantification theory shows that indices 
are as essential to reasoning as icons and tokens. An index is required in reasoning 
for denoting the subject of judgement or discourse. 
 Thus Peirce criticises Josiah Royce for thinking 
that the real subject of a proposition can be denoted by a general term of the 
proposition; that is, that precisely what it is that you are talking about can be 
distinguished from other things by giving a general description of it (CP 8.41). 
                                                 
95 For some useful explanation of the meaning of “haecceity,” see John F. Boler, Charles Peirce 
and Scholastic Realism: A Study of Peirce’s Relation to John Duns Scotus (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1963). 
96 See Robert Almeder, 1980, p. 168, for a lengthy discussion of this point. Almeder’s point is that 
Secondness is Peirce’s criterion for the existence of the external world. 
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 But it is clear from Peirce’s view on the indispensability of all the three kinds of 
signs for reasoning that Royce’s idea is unacceptable. For “the index … alone,” 
Peirce argues, “can designate the subject of a proposition, designates it without 
implying any characters at all” (CP 8.41). The main problem with the view that it is 
general terms rather than indices that designate the subject of a proposition, 
according to Peirce, is that it commits what Peirce calls “The capital error of Hegel” 
(CP 8.41). By that Peirce means an error of ignoring the “Outward Clash”, or 
“reaction”, or “opposition”, which is the characteristic feature of experience, that is, 
of the category of Secondness. 
4.2.3 Three-Category Realism 
 Peirce did not become a “three-category realist” until 1897 when he accepted 
the reality of the category of Firstness, i.e. of possibility, in addition to his then 
acceptance of the reality of the categories of Thirdness and Secondness. He 
renounced the nominalistic view of possibility he held in 1896, just a year before he 
declared for a realistic view of it in 1897. His nominalistic view of possibility entails 
“that possibility may be understood in many senses; but they may all be embraced 
under the definition that that is possible which, in a certain state of information, is 
not known to be false” (CP 3.442). The next year, 1897, Peirce renounced this 
definition of possibility, saying: 
I formerly defined the possible as that which in a given state of information 
(real or feigned) we do not know not to be true. But this definition today seems 
to me only a twisted phrase which, by means of two negatives, conceals an 
anacoluthon [a sentence or construction that lacks a proper grammatical 
sequence] (CP 3.527).97 
 Peirce accepts the reality of possibility, i.e. Firstness, by claiming that 
possibility exists independently of the actual, the Secondness. He writes, 
                                                 
97 See also CP 8.308. 
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 a realist fully admits that a sense-quality is only a possibility of sensation; but 
he thinks a possibility remains possible when it is not actual. The sensation is 
requisite for its apprehension; but no sensation nor sense-faculty is requisite for 
the possibility which is the being of the quality. Let us not put the cart before 
the horse, nor the evolved actuality before the possibility as if the latter 
involved what it only evolves (CP 1.422). 
Peirce then goes on to argue why the nominalistic approach of reducing possibility to 
actuality, and its general claim that only actual facts exist, is problematic. For Peirce 
the main problem with the nominalist reduction of possibility to actuality is that it 
treats laws as fictitious. But this is opposite to what Peirce wants to argue for, 
namely, that laws are real. 
 By accepting the reality of all of his three categories Peirce arrives at an 
“extreme” form of realism. He now criticises Duns Scotus as too nominalistic in 
reducing universals to particulars. Peirce says, 
Even Duns Scotus is too nominalistic when he says that universals are 
contracted to the mode of individuality in singulars, meaning, as he does, by 
singulars, ordinary existing things (CP 8.208). 
It seems that for Peirce there is no option, as far as his pragmatism is concerned, but 
to declare for an “extreme” realism in which he can consistently maintain the reality 
of possibility without reducing it to actual existing particulars. He writes, 
The pragmaticist cannot admit that. I myself went too far in the direction of 
nominalism when I said that it was a mere question of the convenience of 
speech whether we say that a diamond is hard when it is not pressed upon, or 
whether we say that it is soft until it is pressed upon. I now say that experiment 
will prove that the diamond is hard, as a positive fact. That is, it is a real fact 
that it would resist pressure, which amounts to extreme scholastic realism (CP 
8.208). 
Another consequence of Peirce’s declaration for extreme realism is that it now 
recognises, in the sense that it takes seriously, any difference in the modes of speech, 
or signs, used in expressing a state of affairs. The early form of pragmatism, as 
Peirce indicates in the passage above, ignored this as having nothing to do with the 
fact expressed. From the point of view of his extreme realism, the early form of 
pragmatism in dismissing different modes of speech as “a mere question of the 
convenience of speech” fails to realise the reality of it. 
 116
 4.2.3.1 The Later Formulation of Pragmatism 
 Since he now accepts that all of his three categories are real, Peirce feels that 
he has to demonstrate their reality. And this becomes a key task of the fourth lecture 
of his ‘1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism.’ 
 The series consisted of seven lectures altogether. Given all the refinements that 
took place in Peirce’s realism, it is clear that the pragmatism set forth in the 1903 
series would be significantly different from its earlier form. By the time Peirce 
returned to this later defence of his pragmatism, he had already accepted the reality 
of all three of his categories. The question, that arises, is what aspect of the early 
pragmatism does Peirce now find unsatisfactory, and how does his final formulation 
of pragmatism capture the reality of all these three categories? 
 In Lecture One of the Harvard lectures Peirce refers to his early formulation of 
pragmatism, commenting on what he now finds unsatisfactory in it. 
 What is the proof that the possible practical consequences of a concept 
constitute the sum total of the concept? The argument upon which I rested the 
maxim in my original paper was that belief consists mainly in being 
deliberately prepared to adopt the formula believed in as the guide to action. 
If this be in truth the nature of belief, then undoubtedly the proposition 
believed in can itself be nothing but a maxim of conduct. That I believe is 
quite evident. 
 But how do we know that belief is nothing but the deliberate preparedness to 
act according to the formula believed?  
 My original article [‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’] carried this back to a 
psychological principle. The conception of truth according to me was 
developed out of an original impulse to act consistently, to have a definite 
intention. But in the first place, this was not very clearly made out, and in the 
second place, I do not think it satisfactory to reduce such fundamental things 
to facts of psychology.98 
The most unsatisfactory element of his early version of pragmatism, according to 
Peirce, is that it reduces “apprehending the meaning of a proposition” to assertion (or 
judgment). He holds that these two things are totally different from one another. He 
analyses the difference between them and concludes that this lies in different species 
of practicality, or practical difference. One is about difference in words or modes of 
expressions, and the other about the practical difference in things expressed. The  
                                                 
98 Charles S. Peirce, Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard 
Lectures on Pragmatism, ed. Patricia Ann Turrisi (Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York 
Press, 1997), p. 116. 
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 kind of practical difference that pragmatism is concerned with, argues Peirce, is that 
of the things expressed, and not the practical difference in the expressions of the 
expressed. 
 Peirce attempted to resolve the problem of “reductionism” in his early 
pragmatism by insisting on the distinction between believing a proposition and the 
meaning of that proposition. As a matter of fact, the distinction is one between 
psychological and logical facts. 
 In 1905, Peirce asserted that his pragmatism committed him to a form of 
‘scholastic realism’ which he explained thus: 
It is plain that pragmaticism involves scholastic realism, since it makes all 
intellectual purport, and therefore, the meaning of reality itself, to consist in 
what would be, under conceivable conditions most of which can never be 
actualized. It thus involves making real being to include more than existence. 
Now that is precisely the point in dispute between Realists and Nominalists. ‘A 
real possibility,’ says the nominalist, ‘is nonsense. For that is possible which 
we do not know is not true.’ The realist says that there is, besides, a real 
possibility and real necessity (not mere compulsion, but rational necessity, as 
in the laws of nature).99 
4.3 Is Peirce’s Realism a Presupposition or Consequence of his Pragmatism? 
 Peirce consistently insists that pragmatism necessarily involves realism. At 
times his statements about this involvement seem to point in two different directions. 
In some Peirce claims that his pragmatism presupposes his realism. 
pragmaticism could hardly have entered a head that was not already convinced 
that there are real generals (CP 5.503). 
In other statements, Peirce takes realism as an “essential consequence” of 
pragmatism (CP 5.453). The question here is: how can realism be both a 
presupposition and consequence of pragmatism at the same time? 
 William Paul Haas raises this question in his The Conception of Law and the 
Unity of Peirce’s Philosophy and remarks that how this could happen “is not clearly 
explained by Peirce.”100 Haas does not pursue this question any further but simply 
emphasises “that the important point here is that Peirce does admit that both 
historically and theoretically realism in some way precedes pragmaticism.” Haas also 
points out only briefly that “Peirce was trying to make pragmaticism support his 
realism while fitting it into a general theory of philosophy conceived as part of a 
                                                 
99 Quoted in Max H. Fisch, 1986, p. 199n24. This passage is omitted at the end of CP 6.501. 
100 William Paul Haas, 1964, p. 9. 
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 unified scientific pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, rather than conceived as an 
instrument subordinated to merely practical ends.”101 While Haas does not resolve 
the issue, the question needs to be addressed in Peirce’s own terms. 
 Peirce’s statements (CP 5.503; 5.453) to which Haas refers were both written 
during the same year, 1905. Peirce clearly stated, as Haas points out, that he adopted 
scholastic realism before he first formulated his pragmatism. But it should be pointed 
out that Peirce made this statement while he was talking of his realism as a 
consequence of his pragmatism. 
Another doctrine which is involved in Pragmaticism as an essential 
consequence of it, but which the writer defended before he had formulated, 
even in his own mind, the principle of pragmaticism, is the scholastic doctrine 
of realism (CP 5.453). 
 Peirce clarifies what he means when he explains scholastic realism as: “the 
opinion that there are real objects that are general.” Then, he adds, 
But the belief in this can hardly escape being accompanied by the 
acknowledgment that there are, besides, real vagues, and especially real 
possibilities. For possibility being the denial of a necessity, which is a kind of 
generality, is vague like any other contradiction of a general. Indeed, it is the 
reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist upon 
(CP 5.453). 
By insisting on the reality of possibilities, Peirce’s pragmatism is now bound to 
differ from its early formulation. According to the early formulation of pragmatism, 
the meaning of the concept “hardness,” say, of a diamond relies on, or is determined 
by, the experimental test under which the diamond will be subjected to find out 
whether it is really hard or not. So, the question whether a diamond is hard even if it 
has not been tested, or has disappeared before it is tested, was ruled out by 
pragmatism in its early form as merely playing with words and expressions rather 
than dealing with facts themselves. Now, accepting the reality of possibility leads 
Peirce to review the question of the hardness of a diamond. This time ‘experiment’ is 
interpreted as referring to a possible future event rather than past event:  
the question [of pragmatism] is, not what did happen, but whether it would 
have been well to engage in any line of conduct whose successful issue 
depended upon whether that diamond would resist an attempt to scratch it 
(CP 5.453). 
 Peirce clearly admits that he “defended [the doctrine of realism] before he had 
formulated, even in his own mind, the principle of pragmatism” (CP 5.453). The 
                                                 
101 Ibid. 
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 question about whether realism is a presupposition or consequence of pragmatism 
indicates two different, but not unrelated, issues which pragmatism is now concerned 
with, thus marking his ‘pragmaticism’ (the later version of his pragmatism) as having 
a broader scope than his early ‘pragmatism’. In the first place, pragmaticism 
presupposes the reality of things that are general. In the second place, pragmaticism 
holds that the “generals”, or meaning, it attains are real generals. 
4.3.1 The Specific Sense of Realism as a Consequence of Pragmatism 
 There is one thing common to the early and the later formulations of 
pragmatism; they both treat the meaning of a concept to consist in the habits or 
conducts (or Thirdness) it involves. Instead of defining the meaning of a concept by 
looking for a static, qualitative essence assumed to be found in that concept, the 
pragmatist seeks to identify the dynamic process of habit or conduct resulting from 
believing in that concept. What is usually meant by “essence,” i.e., as a qualitative 
entity or existent, is a representation or habit, according to Peirce’s pragmatism. 
Now, in defining the meaning of concepts in terms of habits or conducts, Peirce 
explains how concepts do have meaning, which for Peirce is general. Thus the ability 
of pragmatism to demonstrate that there is meaning implies that there is a real 
general, which is the very essence of Peirce’s realism. In this sense Peirce’s realism 
is a consequence of his pragmatism. 
 Peirce’s pragmatic theory of meaning in defining a concept in terms of the 
habits it causes in a person, rather than in terms of a qualitative essence of that 
concept, shows his theory of categories ultimately provides the framework in which 
he constructed his ‘pragmaticism’. Robert Almeder sees both Peirce’s logic of 
relations and his pragmatism as having something to do with his view of universals 
construed not as essences, but as habits. Almeder is right that both the logic of 
relations and pragmatism agree that quality follows from relation and not the other 
way round. But Almeder’s argument confirms that Peirce’s theory of categories was 
developed before Peirce’s discovery of the logic of relations, but also that the 
categories are the source of Peirce’s pragmatic theory of meaning. Almeder also does 
not always make clear which version of Peirce’s pragmatism he is talking about. 
Almeder’s observation applies only to the later version of Peirce’s pragmatism. For it 
is only in this version of pragmatism that Peirce employed the logic of relations to 
argue the case that quality follows from relations. In the early version of pragmatism, 
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 there is no evidence that Peirce used his logic of relations at all to argue for the view 
that relations presuppose qualities and not vice versa. So, Peirce got the idea of 
relations presupposing qualities, as manifested in the early version of his 
pragmatism, from his theory of categories. 
4.4 Conclusion 
 Peirce’s realism first developed from accepting the externality of the reality of 
the category of Thirdness alone (one-category realism). Later, it accepted the reality 
of Secondness (two-category realism), and then finally that of Firstness (three-
category realism). Within the development of his realism two levels of irreducibility 
in his categories have been noticed. First, his categories are irreducible to one 
another internally, with their interconnections being summed up in the category of 
representation, or Thirdness. As a result, Peirce ends up first with a one-category 
realism, where only the reality of representation is recognised. Secondly, his 
categories are irreducible externally for their interconnections are not slotted into the 
category of representation alone, but hold between three separate but interdependent 
categories. The first step toward recognising the “external irreducibility” of his 
categories occurred in developing his two-category realism, which finally developed 
into his three-category realism. 
 Moreover, the “internal irreducibility” of Peirce’s categories figures most 
prominently in the early version of his pragmatism where the primary, if not virtually 
the sole, concern is an epistemic search for definition and clarification of the 
meaning of concepts. But his pragmatism became extended in its task to include the 
metaphysical question of how “can a general be unaffected by any thought about it?” 
when his categories became not only internally but externally irreducible as well. In 
this version Peirce’s categories are absolutely irreducible and they are claimed to be 
“operative in nature.” 
 Finally, the three-category realism of Peirce serves his pragmatism in affirming 
that the categories upon which it is based are real generals, but his pragmatism is left 
with the task of defining the meaning of these generals as unaffected by any thought 
about them. The interaction between Peirce’s realism and his pragmatism leads him 
to make statements that are seemingly, but not actually, paradoxical: that his realism 
is a presupposition as well as a consequence of his pragmatism. In other words, the 
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 interaction between his realism and his pragmatism is no more or less than the 
contention that the real is meaningful, and the meaningful is real. 
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Chapter 5: 
 
PRAGMATISM AND METAPHYSICS 
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  In this chapter, I will be concerned primarily with the relation between 
pragmatism and metaphysics. I will first discuss R. G. Collingwood’s notion of 
“absolute presupposition” with the aim of providing the groundwork for considering 
the absolute presupposition of Peirce’s pragmatism, namely, the claim that there are 
real generals, and how this requires the idea of a ‘community of inquirers’ and the 
adoption of a common-sense position. I will then discuss Peirce’s criticism of the 
positivist view of metaphysics, as providing the basis for Peirce’s own view of 
metaphysics. My concern is to show that underlying Peirce’s view of metaphysics is 
a doctrine of ‘continuity’ (which Peirce calls “synechism”), which requires that 
metaphysics must be directed towards the ‘future’ element of reality (or of 
‘Thirdness,’ in the language of Peirce’s theory of categories). He maintains this 
position for two reasons: first, it is only in determining the future course of events 
that we can have some rational control, and, second, Thirdness is the only all-
embracing element of reality in terms of which the process of meaning clarification 
is possible. 
5.1 Collingwood’s Notion of “Absolute Presupposition” 
 R. G. Collingwood’s notion of “absolute presupposition”102 stems from his 
attempt both to do justice to metaphysics, and to reject as nonsensical the logical 
positivist attack on metaphysics as a pseudo-science. The logical positivists, A. J. 
Ayer for example, argue that metaphysical statements are meaningless for they fail to 
satisfy the ‘Verification Principle’ namely, that ‘every meaningful proposition is 
either analytic or empirically verifiable.103 
 Collingwood begins by analysing the process involved when someone states a 
thought in words, that is, making a statement or proposing a proposition. He seeks to 
demonstrate the logical priority of questions to propositions, and of presuppositions 
to propositions. He first observes two things: (1) That “Every statement that anybody 
ever makes is made is answer to a question,”104 and (2) “Every question involves a 
presupposition.”105 Here Collingwood wants to emphasise the point that a statement 
or proposition is made not in vacuo, but within a context comprised of a question and  
                                                 
102 R. G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: At The Clarendon Press, 1962), 
especially ch 4. 
103 A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, reprint (England: Penguin Books, 1987), pp. 7-21. 
104 Collingwood, 1962, p. 23; emphasis in the original. 
105 Ibid., p. 25; emphasis in the original. 
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 an implicit or explicit presupposition. For example, when someone makes the 
statement “That inscription means something” s/he is both presupposing (even 
without realising it sometimes) that “Inscriptions have meaning,” and that this 
presupposition provides the context in which the question “What does it mean?” 
could arise. In this example, the statement “That inscription means something” is a 
proposition based on the presupposition that “Inscriptions have meaning” which at 
the same time serves as a presupposition of the question “What does it mean?” 
 The logical distinction between propositions and presuppositions, according to 
Collingwood, lies in the fact that while propositions by definition must be either true 
or false, it does not make sense to ask whether a presupposition is true or false. This 
is because, Collingwood argues, the significance of a presupposition consists not in 
its truth-value, but in what he calls its “logical efficacy,” that is, its function or power 
to cause a certain question to arise.106 He says, “The logical efficacy of a supposition 
does not depend upon the truth of what is supposed, or even on its being thought 
true, but on its being supposed.”107 
 Collingwood draws another logical distinction between what he calls the 
“relative” and “absolute” presuppositions of thought. “A presupposition,” he says, “is 
either relative or absolute.”108 The distinction between relative and absolute 
presuppositions is based on how a presupposition functions in the logical hierarchy 
of particular thoughts or inquiry. Collingwood defines the former as follows: “By a 
relative presupposition I mean one which stands relatively to one question as its 
presupposition and relatively to another as its answer.”109 So, the statement 
“Inscriptions mean something” is a relative presupposition because it is presupposed 
by the question “What does that inscription mean?” and at the same time an answer 
to the question “Does that inscription mean anything?” Moreover, since a relative 
presupposition functions as an answer to a question, it may be expressed as a 
proposition. 
 Absolute presuppositions, on the other hand, are different from relative 
presuppositions. The question of truth and falsehood simply does not arise in relation 
to absolute presuppositions because, Collingwood argues, “An absolute 
                                                 
106 Ibid., p. 27. 
107 Ibid., p. 28; emphasis in the original. 
108 Ibid., p. 29; emphasis in the original. 
109 Ibid.; emphasis in the original. 
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 presupposition is one which stands, relatively to all questions to which it is related, 
as a presupposition, never as an answer.”110 The proposition “Every event has a 
cause,”111 for example, is the absolute presupposition of the proposition “The cause 
of event A is B” (and every other statement of this type). The absolute presupposition 
— “Every event has a cause” — is simply taken for granted in all scientific thinking 
and inquiry based on causal explanation of phenomena. Thus it is absurd, according 
to Collingwood, for someone to try to verify an absolute presupposition. So, if 
someone speaks of verifying a presupposition s/he is assuming that the 
presupposition in question is a relative one. 
 Collingwood by means of his analysis of presuppositions is able to demonstrate 
that the logical positivist attack on metaphysics is based on a logical mistake. 
According to logical positivism’s ‘Verification Principle,’ which is the basis of its 
attack on metaphysics, ‘Every meaningful proposition is either analytic or 
empirically verifiable.’112 However, Collingwood argues that the problem here is that 
one cannot prove the truth of Verification Principle without circularity. For the 
statement of the Verification Principle to be meaningful, it must be either analytic or 
empirically verifiable. If it is an analytic statement, then it is just a formal definition 
without any real meaning; but if it is empirically verifiable, then it is just a 
generalisation without any universal truth, in which case it cannot be taken as a 
universal working principle. Collingwood, in his criticism of the logical positivist 
attack on metaphysics, is saying that the Verification Principle of logical positivism 
cannot satisfy its own criterion of meaning without the paradox of vicious circularity. 
What the logical positivist does not realise, Collingwood argues, is that the principle 
of verification is an absolute presupposition of its metaphysics. He insists that while 
we cannot prove the truth of absolute presuppositions, they nevertheless can have 
logical efficacy, and therefore are very important in scientific and philosophical 
inquiry because they raise important questions and suggest new lines of inquiry. 
 There are two important points of parallel between Collingwood and Peirce. 
First, both Collingwood and Peirce focus their account of the logic of scientific and 
                                                 
110 Ibid., p. 31; emphasis in the original. 
111 Since this is an absolute presupposition, Collingwood would prefer to call it a “supposition” 
because, he would argue, it is not an answer to a question and, therefore, it is not a proposition. 
112 This is sometimes stated alternatively as “the meaning of a proposition is its method of 
verification.” A. J. Ayer, ‘Editor’s Introduction,’ Logical Positivism, ed. A. J. Ayer (New York: The 
Free Press, 1959), p. 13. 
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 metaphysical discourse on the process of inquiry or thought, rather than seeking to 
identify the criterion or criteria by which to judge the meaningfulness of 
propositions. As a result, Collingwood comes up with his “question-answer” logic of 
thought. He insists on “questioning activity” as the first general stage of the 
procedure of scientific inquiry,113 which seeks to find answer(s) to our questions. 
Peirce’s doubt-belief theory of inquiry (discussed in chapter 3) is generally about the 
same thing; inquiry starts off with doubt, which is in the form of a question, and 
seeks to settle that doubt by arriving at belief, i.e. when an answer to the question is 
attained. 
 Secondly, they both dismiss the positivist view of metaphysics on the ground 
that the logic on which it is based is problematic. Collingwood says: 
 … it was rash of the positivists to maintain that every notion is a class of 
observable … facts. This amounted to saying, what in fact positivists have 
always tried more or less consistently to say, that scientific thought has no 
presuppositions. 
 … If they [the positivists] had recognized that all thinking involves absolute 
presuppositions, they would have been eager to find out what, on this or that 
kind of occasion, was being thus presupposed. But owing to their too hasty 
analysis of scientific thought they failed to recognize the logical function of 
suppositions in general, and never discovered that there were such things as 
absolute presuppositions at all.114 
Compare this with what Peirce has to say of positivist metaphysics: 
… I object to its [the positivist] logical doctrine that no theory is to be admitted 
except so far as it asserts or denies something with respect to possible 
impressions of sense or their sensible relations (W 2: 128). 
For Peirce the problem with positivism is that its logic is too narrow to be able to 
give an adequate account of reality; and thus he concludes: “The logical rule, 
therefore, which is the whole basis of positivism appears to me to be entirely false” 
(W 2: 130). Both Collingwood and Peirce observe that the problem with metaphysics 
is that it is in an unsatisfactory state — due not to its subject matter, but to the 
inadequacy of the logic employed by its critics to explain the nature of 
metaphysics.115 
                                                 
113 See Collingwood, 1962, pp. 277-8. 
114 Ibid., pp. 146-7. 
115Note that Collingwood replaces the traditional subject matter of metaphysics, namely, pure 
being, with absolute presuppositions. However, the point is that Collingwood argues that the theory of 
metaphysics has been “in an unsatisfactory condition” because the logicians have neglected the theory 
of presuppositions upon which the theory of metaphysics is based. Ibid., p. 23. 
 127
  Collingwood’s notion of “absolute presupposition” helps clarify the relation 
between the absolute presupposition of pragmatism, the claim that there are real 
generals, and the pragmatic formulation of the metaphysical question “In what way 
can a general be unaffected by any thought about it” (CP 5.503). It shows that asking 
“In what way can a general be unaffected by any thought about it” presupposes that 
there are real generals; and, moreover, the meaningfulness of this question rests on 
its absolute presupposition. 
 I should emphasise, however, that the comparison between Collingwood’s 
notion of “absolute presupposition” and the absolute presupposition of Peirce’s 
pragmatism cannot be taken too far. First of all Peirce does not go so far as to deny 
the applicability of the question of verification to the absolute presupposition of 
pragmatism. To prove or verify that there are real generals, according to Peirce, 
requires not a scheme of static objects corresponding to them (as Collingwood 
assumed), but a method of determining how real generals are unaffected by our 
thinking about them; and that is what his pragmatism sets out to do. 
 Secondly, Collingwood rejects the traditional view of metaphysics as the study 
of “pure being” or reality and argues that “metaphysics is the science of absolute 
presuppositions.”116 He adopts Aristotle’s formal definition of metaphysics that it is a 
science concerned with the underlying presuppositions of any and every science, but 
rejects its substantive content on the ground that it has no “definite subject-matter to 
think about.”117 Collingwood thus ends up with a formalist view of metaphysics that 
concentrates on the form and logic of the language of metaphysics with the aim of 
detecting absolute presuppositions. His view of metaphysics, in other words, is a 
meta-analysis of the language of science, i.e. a science of sciences. He says, “all 
analysis is metaphysical analysis; and, since analysis is what gives its scientific 
character to science, science and metaphysics are inextricably united, and stand or 
fall together. The birth of science, in other words the establishment of orderly 
thinking, is also the birth of metaphysics.”118 In the final analysis, Collingwood 
maintains a form of idealism in his view of metaphysics. Because he insists both on 
absolute presuppositions as the subject matter of metaphysics, and that the 
significance of absolute presuppositions consists entirely on their being supposed, 
                                                 
116 Ibid., p. 41. 
117 Ibid., p. 14. 
118 Ibid., pp. 40-41. 
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 Collingwood confines metaphysics to the realm of thought or the logical order 
involved in thinking or stating a thought. 
 Peirce, unlike Collingwood, maintains a realist and traditional view of 
metaphysics as the science of reality. He begins by arguing from given reality, or 
experience, to general laws. Peirce in following his realism maintains that 
metaphysics is more than just a logical analysis of the language of science and 
detection of absolute presuppositions of all thought. Metaphysics, Peirce argues, is 
also concerned with showing that there is a real connection between the categories 
and the structure of being or reality. (I introduced the connection between the 
categories and the structure of being or reality in chapter 1, and discussed it further 
both in the context of Peirce’s phenomenology, in chapter 2, and that of his semiotic 
in chapters 6 and 7.) 
 The general objective of Peirce’s pragmatist view of metaphysics is to purge 
traditional metaphysics of its over-speculative nature, or what may be considered the 
negative influence of speculation in metaphysics, and to adopt instead the rigour and 
clarity of logical and scientific thinking. Speculation is a form of reasoning based on 
the assumption that there is a cognition that is not “determined by a previous 
cognition” (CP 5.213n)119. The problem with speculation, according to Peirce, lies 
not in the question of its validity as a mode of inference, but rather in the question of 
its tendency to undermine the necessity of ‘continuity’ — for example, when it 
assumes an absolutely undetermined cognition, or first principle, that bears no 
(direct) relation to reality. 
 However, metaphysics need not be completely free of speculation. Peirce’s 
pragmatist approach shows that metaphysics does involve speculation — as a 
hypothesis-formation process converging on the truth of whatever is in question — 
but not an end in itself. Peirce’s recognition of the place of speculation in 
metaphysics (and inquiry in general) culminates in a mode of inference he calls 
“abduction”. “Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis” (CP 
5.171), and it is “the only kind of argument which starts a new idea” (CP 2.96),120 
according to Peirce. As an essential element in pragmatism, abduction provides room 
                                                 
119 In this context, Peirce means by the word “speculation” something similar to “intuition,” (CP 
5.213n). 
120 See also CP 5.196, 197. 
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 for the metaphysician to be creatively speculative by employing his imagination (CP 
5.196). 
5.2 The Absolute Presupposition of Pragmatism 
 When Peirce strongly insists that pragmatism is merely a logical maxim for 
meaning clarification, he seems to hold the view that his epistemology can stand on 
its own and apart from any metaphysical considerations. I argue on the contrary that 
in order to have a coherent view of reality, one must embrace both metaphysical and 
epistemological realism — that is, that things must be both real and knowable. I 
believe Peirce fully recognises the need for the pragmatist to be both an 
epistemological and metaphysical realist. Consider what he had to say in the early 
formulation of his pragmatism where he argues that pragmatism must be based on 
scientific method, and that this is its “fundamental hypothesis”: 
Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis … is this: There are 
Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about 
them (CP 5.384; my emphasis). 
This fundamental hypothesis not only is a metaphysical claim, but it is absolutely 
presupposed in Peirce’s pragmatism. I emphasise that it is an absolute 
presupposition, precisely because it does not function as an answer to any particular 
case of meaning clarification, but is taken for granted in every case of meaning 
clarification.121 
 As I have shown in chapter 3, the clarification of the meaning of our concepts 
is a central part of the agenda of pragmatism. The meaning of a concept, according to 
pragmatism, is determined by the “conceivable effects” or the “habit of action” that 
would follow from believing in that concept. This is a consequence of the pragmatist 
claim that “The only effect which real things have is to cause belief, for all the 
sensations which they excite emerge into consciousness in the form of beliefs” (CP 
5.406), and “The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit” (CP 5.398) or 
“rule of action” (CP 5.397). The absolute presupposition of pragmatism thus 
provides the framework within which the notion of the “conceivable effects” of 
concepts, as the basis for determining their meaning, must operate. In presupposing 
that the concepts with which the pragmatist is concerned must be real, Peirce appeals 
                                                 
121 Cf. Collingwood, 1962, p. 31. 
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 to the notion of “conceivable effects” as grounded in systematic or scientific 
thinking.122 
 Pragmatism is thus an attempt to understand reality by way of considering what 
effect it has on us; and this, according to Peirce is a constitutive principle of any 
sound metaphysics. An objection to this account of pragmatism might be that the 
pragmatist is therefore unable to deal with reality directly. In answer to this 
objection, Peirce would argue that the issue with which pragmatism is concerned is 
not whether we can deal with reality directly or indirectly. For Kant the 
unknowability of the noumenon results from adoption of a detached speculative point 
of view whereby reality is assumed to function as a cause of our sensation, and yet 
remains unknowable to us. In contrast, Peirce argues that reality must be knowable, 
because what we call ‘reality’ participates in a dynamic and developing interaction 
with human beings, and human beings with reality. 
5.2.1 The ‘Community of Inquirers’ 
 The dynamic relationship between human beings and reality is fundamental to 
pragmatism. It is in this way that Peirce seeks to maintain the objectivity of 
knowledge which is essential to his understanding of scientific inquiry, and the only 
means to avoid the subjectivism that results from making the experience of the 
individual inquirer the basis from which we start. 
 Peirce seeks to ground the objectivity of knowledge in the social nature of 
inquiry and thus emphasises the role played by the ‘community of inquirers’. The 
individual inquirer is always understood to be a member of an actual or possible 
community of inquirers that has a set of standards or established norms and 
principles. Although an individual inquirer may be conducting research on his own 
(such as a physicist experimenting alone in a laboratory at home), he and the results 
of his research are always required to conform to the norms and principles pertaining 
to the relevant community of inquirers (otherwise they would lack meaning or 
                                                 
122 Ryszard Wojcicki has indicated a similar function of what I call the absolute presupposition of 
pragmatism, in relation to Peirce’s view of truth: “his [Peirce’s] conception of truth is hardly 
intelligible without the hypothesis regarding the existence of objective reality.” ‘Peircean vs. 
Aristotelian Conception of Truth,’ Living Doubt: Essays Concerning the Epistemology of Charles 
Sanders Peirce, ed. Guy Debrock and Menno Hulswit (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1994), p. 133. See R. G. Collingwood, 1962, pp. 169-171, for a useful discussion of the relation 
between the idea of absolute presupposition and scientific thinking. 
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 significance). Objectivity is thus maintained by way of conformity of science to the 
norms and principles of the relevant ‘community of inquirers’. 
 Moreover, the concept of a ‘community of inquirers’ must relate to what reality 
is: “That is real which has such and such characters, whether anybody thinks it to 
have those characters or not” (CP 5.430). This understanding of reality denies 
significance to any attempt to conduct inquiry in complete isolation from the 
community of inquirers and its principles, for the truth of a belief resulting from such 
an attempt would be purely a matter of subjective judgement. The concept of a 
community of inquirers serves to emphasise not only the independent existence of 
reality, but accounts for reality as something publicly accessible to all (at least in 
principle). 
5.2.2 The Common-sense Position of Pragmatism 
 Peirce associated his pragmatism with a doctrine he calls his “Critical 
Common-sensism.” The most fundamental idea of critical common-sensim is the 
claim that there are indubitable propositions, that is, propositions that are “acritical” 
(CP 5.440) and “uncriticized” (CP 5.442). This may seem a strange position for 
Peirce to hold, given his strong opposition to the Cartesian method of doubt as a 
means to arrive at indubitable propositions.123 There is an important difference, 
however, between the Peircean and the Cartesian conception of ‘indubitable’. 
Whereas for Descartes ‘the indubitable’ is that which is absolutely immune from any 
further doubt, and it is achieved through methodical investigation, Peirce rules out as 
unsound any claim for a proposition to be absolutely indubitable. 
 The critical common-sensist maintains that ‘the indubitable’ is relative to our 
present state of knowledge, and it is best understood within the context of Peirce’s 
doubt-belief theory of inquiry. It is relative in the sense that there is no guarantee that 
what is now thought of as indubitable will continue to remain indubitable in the 
future. Thus the critical common-sensist, according to Peirce, “fully acknowledges 
that even then it may be that some of his indubitable beliefs may be proved false” 
(CP 5.451). This brings to mind the common place saying in the judicial system to 
view the accused as “innocent until proven guilty.” In a similar vein, the pragmatist 
                                                 
123 See discussion in chapter 3. 
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 regards ‘the indubitable’ as really so until it is proven to the contrary by some facts 
encountered in the course of experience and inquiry. 
 This raises the question: “Should we refer to a proposition that never has been 
contradicted by any experience, and very unlikely it will ever be contradicted in the 
future, as absolutely indubitable?” This is a fair question, but, as I have pointed out, 
it has to be understood within the context of what is meant by inquiry — for two 
reasons. First, as already shown above, for Peirce we can talk meaningfully about the 
indubitable as both relative and absolute. Secondly, ‘the indubitable’ is absolute in 
the sense that when an inquirer has settled his belief and is unable to doubt it any 
further, the specific inquiry, of which the now settled belief is a result, comes to end. 
As Peirce puts it, “If you absolutely cannot doubt a proposition - cannot bring 
yourself, upon deliberation, to entertain the least suspicion of the truth of it, it is plain 
that there is no room to desire anything more” (CP 6.498). 
 The indubitable considered as both relative and absolute in the senses 
discussed above is an essential element of Peirce’s doctrine of fallibilism, which 
claims that we “cannot attain absolute certainty concerning questions of fact” (CP 
1.149). Fallibilism, as a doctrine, is not so much about denying the possibility of 
“absolute certainty”, as it is concerned to emphasise that there is always room to 
further or advance our knowledge. Fallibilism maintains that while the inquirer will 
attain some true knowledge, such knowledge is always open to further determination 
and advancement — precisely because “our knowledge is never absolute but always 
swims, as it were, in a continuum of uncertainty and of indeterminacy” (CP 1.171). 
 Peirce identifies two features of indeterminacy that are of great importance for 
his critical common-sensist position. They are generality and vagueness. 
A sign (under which designation I place every kind of thought, and not alone 
external signs), that is in any respect objectively indeterminate (i.e., whose 
object is undetermined by the sign itself) is objectively general in so far as it 
extends to the interpreter the privilege of carrying its determination further. … 
A sign that is objectively indeterminate in any respect is objectively vague in 
so far as it reserves further determination to be made in some other conceivable 
sign (CP 5.447). 
For example, the sign “Man is mortal” is general because an interpreter has the right 
to choose whatever man or men they please. The sign “This month a great event is to 
happen” is vague since its determination lies in both possible sign and experience, 
that is, we have to wait and see before we can find out “what great event” this vague 
sign stands for (CP 5.505). The triadic relationship of signs and their functions in 
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 pragmatism is stated here both in terms of generality (by the inclusion of the 
interpreter as having the “privilege” of making further determination of the object of 
a sign), and in terms of vagueness (by leaving the further determination of the object 
of a sign “to be made in some other conceivable sign”). 
 Peirce describes the relation between pragmatism and common sense in the 
following terms: 
Pragmatism … is only an endeavor to give the philosophy of common sense a 
more exact development, especially by emphasizing the point that there is no 
intellectual value in mere feeling per se, but that the whole function of thinking 
consists in the regulation of conduct (CP 8.199). 
Peirce’s characterisation of pragmatism as a development of the philosophy of 
common sense shows that the pragmatist program begins with the concreteness of 
reality as shown by its attempt to first identify what effects reality has on us, which 
is, as Peirce explains, the fixation of belief. The value of a belief as an entity of 
inquiry consists in its potential of becoming the “common property” of a community 
of inquirers, depending on whether or not that belief would remain undoubtable. 
Given a ‘community of inquirers’ an individual inquirer would introduce his belief to 
see if it is consistent with the standard principles of the community of inquirers. This 
would involve not only comparing his belief with the established principles, but also 
comparing his belief with other inquirers’ belief(s), especially those relating to the 
same subject matter. The objectivity required by science (and by the community of 
inquirers) is thus achieved by means of inter-subjectivity. 
 The established norms and principles of the community of inquirers are both 
constitutive of and regulative for inquiry. As constitutive of inquiry, they provide the 
“system” within which inquiry is practised; as regulative, they provide directions for 
the inquirer to follow in his inquiry. Here again an analogy can be drawn between 
inquiry and the way a legal system operates. In a legal system, laws are not only 
constitutive in the sense they are the building blocks of the legal system, but they are 
also regulative for the conduct of people of the society in question. 
5.3 Peirce’s Critique of the Positivist View of Metaphysics 
 Peirce criticises positivism by saying that its rejection of metaphysics is based 
on a mistake, namely, the claim that the subject matter of metaphysics is beyond 
observation. For Peirce the true problem with metaphysics is that it is a science in an 
“unsatisfactory state” (W2: 128), meaning “its fundamental conceptions were vague 
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 and consequently its doctrines utterly unsettled” (W2: 127). Thus for Peirce the task 
confronting philosophy is to develop a method appropriate for clarifying the 
fundamental conceptions of metaphysics, which would result in sound metaphysical 
theories. The positivist’s method, he observes, consists in the “logical doctrine that 
no theory is to be admitted except so far as it asserts or denies something with 
respect to possible impressions of sense or their sensible relations” (W2: 128). In 
relying on the senses and sense impressions as the ultimate criteria for judging the 
validity of inquiry, positivism is then drawn to the conclusion that the only 
scientifically valid domain of inquiry is one where its subject matter involves 
“observable facts.” Thus positivism sees no other option but to reject metaphysics. 
 Although both positivism and pragmatism consider the question of method to 
be central to philosophy,124 there is a significant difference between their approaches. 
One difference relates to the idea of “system,” as reflected in the phrases 
“philosophical system,” and “system-building.” Logical positivism substitutes the 
question of method (or methodology) for ‘system building’ and dismisses the latter 
as of any relevance to philosophy. The logical positivists tended to restrict their use 
of the term ‘system’ to formal systems — e.g. formal logic or systems of linguistic 
syntax — their value as consisting mainly in providing models for rigorous analysis 
of concepts. This position is reflected in the following remarks of Moritz Schlick, 
one of the leading figures in the Vienna Circle: 
For I am convinced that we now find ourselves at an altogether decisive 
turning point in philosophy, and that we are objectively justified in considering 
that an end has come to the fruitless conflict of systems. We are already at the 
present time, in my opinion, in possession of methods which make every such 
conflict in principle unnecessary. What is now required is their resolute 
application.125 
 Peirce argues, however, that positivism is too limited in its approach, and 
proposes a broader basis from which to approach metaphysics. Let us turn to what he 
calls “the love of life” to clarify nature of the broader approach he advocates. 
                                                 
124 The position of logical positivism, is summed up in its slogan “the meaning of a proposition is 
its method of verification.” A. J. Ayer, ‘Editor’s Introduction,’ Logical Positivism, ed. A. J. Ayer 
(New York: The Free Press, 1959), p. 13. 
125 ‘The Turning Point in Philosophy,’ Logical Positivism, ed. A. J. Ayer (New York: The Free 
Press, 1959), p. 54. 
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 5.3.1 “The Love of Life” 
 “The love of life” is a phrase Peirce uses to designate a whole range of 
passions he believes to be all closely connected in our nature as human beings. It is 
“one of the most original, strongest, and ineradicable” impulses we have (W2: 124):  
If some man says he does not love life, other evidence rather bears down his 
testimony, and if he really does not he is only an unhappy exception, a 
miserable abortion, which is not to set aside the result of all experience. 
 This passion has for its object firstly and primarily ourselves, in a less 
strong degree our friends, then our blood, then our country, then our race, and 
finally it is still a deep and lively emotion even in its reference to intellect in 
general. It may be objected that the love of life of our family, for example, is 
not the same passion as the love of our own life. But all I say is, that we have 
a desire for the continued life of all these objects, and that these desires have 
this in common that they are all love of life in some form, all are lively 
emotions, all seem to spring from our original nature and all are in the great 
body of mankind incapable of being rooted out without shattering the heart 
almost entirely (W2: 124). 
Central to “the love of life” is the idea that human life persists fundamentally in 
optimism, which shows not only that it involves a desire for some form of 
“continuity,” but also that it looks beyond even what the senses can apprehend. As 
Peirce emphasises, “The love of life is more than a love of sensuous life” (W2: 124). 
 For Peirce, “the love of life” helps to explain why scientists appear to be driven 
to engage in inquiry in the hope that they will reach the truth of the subject matter 
they are investigating. The hope of the scientist, however, is not just a mere feeling 
confined to the individual scientist (though it does have an element of feeling), but it 
anticipates a “future” mode of being (or, the category of Thirdness), an 
understanding of which could not be attained by employing a method based on 
immediate sense experience alone. On the basis of the category of Thirdness, Peirce 
undertakes to illustrate that science is not restricted to the “present” and to 
immediately “observable facts,” as insisted on by the positivist, but it is a process of 
inquiry concerned with the future (and future possibilities) as well. 
 Now … theories have this in common, they are inferences of the unobserved 
from the observed - from the present in experience to the future in experience. 
Now who does not see that the future is not observable except when the present 
is not, so that we either reason to conclusions which are absolutely 
unobservable or from facts which are absolutely unobservable. This is the 
conclusive objection to positivism. … Thus as every theory whatever 
concludes from the present to the future every theory necessarily concludes 
more than can possibly be verified by direct observation (W2: 129). 
 136
 Thus positivism’s rejection of metaphysics, Peirce argues, is the result of its method 
being too restricted to be able to handle metaphysical problems, which ultimately are 
problems relating to the category of Thirdness. Because there is no room in the 
positivist account of experience for the “future” as a mode of being, it is not 
surprising that it is bound to reject metaphysics. Positivism fails to do justice to both 
the fullness of life and inquiry by putting forward and employing a method that is 
deficient to deal with reality as represented by “the love of life”. The way 
‘observation’ is defined in positivism126 prevents it from understanding the true 
nature of metaphysics, whereas Peirce’s pragmatic approach makes this possible. 
5.4 A Brief Account of Peirce’s Own View of Metaphysics 
 What Peirce understands by metaphysics emerges from his attempt to improve 
what he observes to be its “unsatisfactory state” by the employment of his 
pragmatism to establish that it can account for the “future” mode of being, which is 
the subject matter of metaphysics. An understanding of the category of Thirdness is 
thus the key factor in understanding Peirce’s metaphysics. In Peirce’s judgement, 
Thirdness is the mode of being that has not received sufficient attention in other 
philosophers’ theories. In one of his lectures on pragmatism delivered in 1903, Peirce 
makes the following statement. 
In the present situation of philosophy, it is far more important that thirdness 
should be adequately dealt with by our logical maxim of abduction. The urgent 
pertinence of the question of thirdness, at this moment …, when we see that the 
chief difference between philosophers is in regard to the extent to which they 
allow elements of thirdness a place in their theories, is too plain to be insisted 
upon (CP 5.208). 
                                                 
126 This may seem to be emphasising the place of observation in positivism too much, since the 
focus of some logical positivists, such as A. J. Ayer, is on the principle of verification: “a statement is 
held to be literally meaningful if and only if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable,” A. J. Ayer, 
Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd ed.,1946,  reprint , (England: Penguin Books), 1987, p. 12. My point, 
however, is that despite the fact that the principle of verification recognises that some statements are 
still meaningful though they are not directly observable, it still fails to go beyond observation in order 
to realise the “future” mode of being as expounded by pragmatism. Of course, Ayer talks about 
“possible observation,” indicating the he has in mind some reference to future observation as the 
means for the verification of statements. However, he is not talking about “possible observation”, in 
this context, as a distinct mode of being, but simply relating it to the statements concerned as if they 
related to the same mode of being. 
 137
 5.4.1 What is Metaphysics for Peirce? 
 Peirce understands metaphysics as the science that studies “the most general 
features of reality and real objects” (CP 6.6). He describes the concept of “reality” in 
terms of his theory of categories, saying that, 
Reality is an affair of Thirdness as Thirdness, that is, in its mediation between 
Secondness and Firstness. … Metaphysics is the science of Reality (CP 5.121). 
Peirce’s account of metaphysics is not as simple and clear as it may seem to be in the 
first instance. This is mainly because his view of metaphysics is derived from his 
understanding of the relation between metaphysics and logic, which in turn is based 
on his several different approaches to his theory of categories. Peirce holds that 
“Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical principles 
not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being” (CP 1.487). I should point 
out that Peirce is careful to distinguish his position from that of Kant, namely, that 
metaphysics is derived from logic, for he argues that Kant is “mistaking the logical 
and metaphysical correspondents in almost every case” (CP 5.448n1). 
 In contrast to Kant, Peirce takes the view that the categories are inherent in 
reality, in that they are discovered to be the most basic features or elements of 
experience. Early in his career (eg. in his ‘New List’), Peirce shared Kant’s view that 
the categories are conceptions derived from the table of forms of judgement for 
unifying the manifold of experience. Later Peirce concludes that the categories 
spring from studying the phenomena as such.127 Peirce is simply concerned to find 
the most satisfactory approach compatible with his view that metaphysics is a valid, 
proper field of inquiry. An effective approach to clarifying Peirce’s view of 
metaphysics would be from the standpoint of intentional logic. 
 Two characteristic features of intentional logic are of relevance to clarifying 
Peirce’s position. First, intentional logic insists that the logical is dependent on the 
real, in the sense that the determinations of the former rest solely on the basis that it 
is for displaying the structure of the latter.128 Secondly, the formal structure of 
intentional logic is fundamentally triadic, in that it includes the existing subject (and 
by implication the community of inquiry) as a third term in its determination of the 
meaning of concepts, thus expanding the notion of dyadic relation as widely 
                                                 
127 John E. Smith, Purpose and Thought: The Meaning of Pragmatism, 1978, p. 127. 
128 Henry B. Veatch, 1952, pp. 7-28. 
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 represented in positivistic logic as concerned simply with the extensional relations 
between signs and things signified, facts and propositions.129 
 In the light of this account of intentional logic, one can say that Peirce could 
have added another sense in which logic is dependent on metaphysics. According to 
his classification of the sciences, metaphysics depends on logic for its fundamental 
principles, and logic depends on metaphysics for the data on which to operate. 
Although this relation of inter-dependence between metaphysics and logic is useful 
for determining certain aspects of his overall philosophical position, it is too rigid to 
account for another sense in which logic is dependent on metaphysics for Peirce, 
namely, that the whole end or intention of logic is contained within metaphysics. 
Logic, of course, has its own immediate goal, which Peirce identifies as the study of 
the laws and necessary conditions of the relation between the phenomenon and truth. 
But the point is that the laws that logic formulates would not be meaningful unless 
they are applicable to reality, or, to use Peirce’s phrase, “operative in nature.” The 
approach of intentional logic harmonises with Peirce’s scholastic realism by showing 
that the logical as a meaningful form of inquiry rests ultimately on its function to 
intend reality, and in these terms his claim of the logical principles as “truths of 
being” becomes plausible. 
 For Peirce, in giving an account of metaphysics, the question of method is prior 
to the question of the truth of metaphysics. The latter question is only worth pursuing 
if there is an appropriate method in place to be employed in its pursuit. This is 
reflected in his criticism of positivism where he attacks its underlying logic for 
dismissing metaphysics on the ground that the truth of the statements of metaphysics 
cannot be verified because they are beyond observation. In his classification of the 
sciences logic is prior to metaphysics, because it provides the basic constitutive 
principles of the method to be employed in metaphysics. However, he makes his 
point as follows. 
The general law of metaphysics is little understood. The attention of thinkers 
has been so rivetted upon the question of its truth, that they have largely 
overlooked the importance of determining precisely what it is, even if it be not 
absolutely true, since it is certainly the product of natural thought and of 
reasoning which, however far it may be carried beyond the legitimate 
conclusion, is nevertheless true reasoning of a valid type (CP 1.486). 
                                                 
129 Ian E. Thompson, 1981, p. 195. 
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 By “The general law of metaphysics” Peirce means the application of the logical 
categories to the real world (which I have already discussed). Despite the fact that 
Peirce sees the question of truth as an important one, he wants to point out that to 
pursue the question of the truth of metaphysics would be problematic without having 
an appropriate method in place first.  
5.4.2 Some Characteristic Features of the ‘Future’ Mode of Being 
 Three of the characteristic features of the category of Thirdness130 are of great 
importance to our understanding of Peirce’s metaphysics, and why it relates to the 
‘future’ mode of being. These are: mediation, generality, and continuity. 
 First, Thirdness as mediation (between Firstness and Secondness), necessarily 
involves a triadic relation by introducing the sign-user as the third essential element 
of inquiry. It requires that our attempt to understand reality must be conducted within 
a sign-like framework, which involves the sign (the concept or concepts employed in 
our understanding of things), the object of sign (thing or things which the sign stands 
for or represents), and the sign-user (the person or mind, or community of inquiry, 
which uses the sign to represent its object). That is, the sign-user, which Peirce calls 
the ‘interpretant,’ mediates between the sign and its object. 
 Secondly, Thirdness is general. I have explained what Peirce means by 
something is general in my discussion of “The Common-sense Position of 
Pragmatism,” but as an illustration mainly for the other two features of Thirdness. 
However, let us consider Peirce’s homely example of a cook who desires to make an 
apple pie for her master. The cook does not desire this particular apple pie or that, 
but she has an idea of what kind of apple pie she desires for her master (for example, 
a sweet apple pie). The cook’s idea of the kind of apple pie she desires for her master 
is just a pure possibility in the sense that it is not actualised yet. Between her idea of 
what kind of apple pie she desires for her master and the finished product, that is, the 
actual apple pie, is her desire that mediates them. 
What she desires is something of a given quality; what she has to take is this or 
that particular apple. From the nature of things, she cannot take the quality but 
must take the particular thing. Sensation and volition being affairs of action 
and reaction relate to particular things. She has seen only particular apples. But 
the desire has nothing to do with particulars; it relates to qualities. Desire is not 
a reaction with reference to a particular thing; it is an idea about an idea, 
                                                 
130 Vincent G. Potter, 1997, p. 87ff. 
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 namely, the idea of how delightful it would be for me, the cook’s master, to eat 
an apple pie (CP 1.341). 
In this example, desire is Thirdness that mediates between a given quality (Firstness) 
and the concrete instance of that quality (Secondness). Without the desire of the cook 
to select a certain kind of apple, the given quality expected of the particular apples 
which she selects for use, would remain just a mere possibility yet to be actualised in 
the form of concrete apples possessing the desired quality to be selected. So the 
given quality which is a mere possibility without actualisation is a First, and the 
particular selected apples possessing the expected quality is a Second. 
 Thirdly, Thirdness as generality presupposes continuity. When something 
general “extends to the interpreter the privilege of carrying its determination further,” 
it does so because of the real continuity between its present state and its future state 
where the further determination of it would take place. Because of the great 
importance Peirce attributes to the concept ‘continuity,’131 I will discuss it further in 
section 5.3.4. but here I want to stress that it is upon the basis of ‘continuity’ that 
Peirce was able to maintain his realism of the ‘future’ mode of being. 
5.4.3 Metaphysics as an Observational Science 
 Peirce, unlike the rationalist philosophers,132 claims that metaphysics is an 
observational science. He goes on to argue that “even bad metaphysics, really rests 
on observations, whether consciously or not” (CP 6.2). The reason why this is not 
widely recognised, according to Peirce, 
is that it [metaphysics] rests on kinds of phenomena with which every man’s 
experience is so saturated that he usually pays no particular attention to them. 
The data of metaphysics are not less open to observation, but immeasurably 
more so, than the data, say, of the very highly developed science of astronomy 
(CP 6.2).133 
                                                 
131 As indicated when he says, “Continuity represents Thirdness almost to perfection” (CP 1.337). 
132 Such as Descartes and Spinoza. 
133 Frederick Copleston makes a similar observation in his Contemporary Philosophy, Cardinal 
Books edition (London: Burns & Oates, 1963), pp. 83-4, defending metaphysics against the anti-
metaphysical attitude of logical positivism. He writes: “existence is a necessary condition of the 
possession of any characteristics; and it is thus more familiar than any particular characteristic. 
Therefore, if it is possible at all to notice or advert to existence, one can say that the familiarity of 
what is noticed is one of the main reasons why it is comparatively rarely noticed or adverted to.” 
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 The first step towards revealing metaphysics as an observational science is to 
identify that its subject matter is common experience,134 meaning that the phenomena 
with which metaphysics is concerned are accessible (or at least possibly accessible) 
to every human being. This makes it possible for pragmatism to be a method 
appropriate for metaphysics, since pragmatism requires that the objects to which it 
applies must be experientially accessible. The metaphysician, unlike the natural 
scientist, employs no “special means of observation” (CP 1.282) such as microscope, 
and understanding his subject matter does not rely on them. What the metaphysician 
requires in order to conduct his inquiry effectively is a well-founded method or form 
of reasoning derived from logic.135 
 The charge of positivism against metaphysics as an inquiry operating beyond 
the reach of human experience, (and, therefore, that no kind of metaphysical 
knowledge is possible), is based on a form of reductionism that seems to recognise 
only one mode of being, the being of individual particulars or facts. The 
phenomenalism of A. J. Ayer is a classic example of this for all statements about 
physical or material objects must be reducible to sensory experiences (or “sense-
content,” in Ayer’s technical term).136 Because he treats the subject matter of 
metaphysics as corresponding to no sensory experience, he infers that metaphysics 
does not qualify as a source of meaningful statements. Thus, Ayer’s reductionist 
phenomenalism “blinds” him from recognising other modes of being which Peirce’s 
pragmatic metaphysics does recognise. As Peirce illustrates, however, metaphysics is 
concerned with the mode of being designated by the category of Thirdness, the 
reality of which is to be determined not by seeking any corresponding “sense-
contents,” but by our future rational and deliberate conduct guided by it. 
 If positivism had realised that there is more than one mode of being, it could 
have recognised why metaphysics should not be rejected. Yet, this seems impossible 
since positivism restricts “observation” to the realm of sense experience, and thus 
allows for only one mode of being. Pragmatism, by contrast, begins with a theory of 
                                                 
134 In CP 3.560, Peirce writes, “philosophy, although it uses no microscopes or other apparatus of 
special observation, is really an experimental science, resting on that experience which is common to 
us all.” 
135 For “ ‘exact’ logic will prove a stepping-stone to ‘exact’ metaphysics” (CP 3.454). 
136 “… we know that it must be possible to define material things in terms of sense-contents, 
because it is only by the occurrence of certain sense-contents that the existence of any material thing 
can ever be in the least degree verified,” A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, reprint (England: 
Penguin Books, 1987), p. 71. 
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 categories that recognises three modes of being, and then explains how “observation” 
applies to them, though in different ways. For pragmatism, as Peirce observes, 
The things that any science discovers are beyond the reach of direct 
observation. We cannot see energy, nor the attraction of gravitation, nor the 
flying molecules of gases, nor the luminiferous ether, nor the forests of 
carbonaceous era, nor the explosions in nerve-cells. It is only the premisses of 
science, not its conclusions, which are directly observed (CP 6.2). 
As Sandra B. Rosenthal clarifies this passage correctly, by speaking of “premisses” 
and “conclusions,” Peirce is referring not to the order of deduction, but of abduction. 
She explains that Peirce talks about “the order of discovery, not the order of logical 
analysis. Thus, the premisses are the observed data, while the conclusions are the 
abductive hypotheses from the data.”137 That is, the metaphysician conducts his 
inquiry by extrapolation from his common experience; and this, from a realist point 
of view, is possible because of real “continuity,” which Peirce claims to be 
indispensable to philosophy (CP 6.103). 
5.4.4 ‘Continuity’ and the Metaphysics of the ‘Future’ 
 Peirce defines his conception of “continuity” as follows. 
A true continuum is something whose possibilities of determination no 
multitude of individuals can exhaust. Thus, no collection of points placed upon 
a truly continuous line can fill the line so as to leave no room for others, 
although that collection had a point for every value towards which numbers, 
endlessly continued into the decimal places, could approximate (CP 6.170). 
Because no individual or set of individuals “can exhaust” the truly continuous aspect 
of reality, metaphysics (and inquiry in general) must not take individual particulars 
as its ultimate concern. Real “continuity” requires that metaphysics serves its 
purpose upon a realist basis by dismissing the so-called “inexplicable” of any sort as 
an explanation. If the metaphysician finds himself unable to explain an event at a 
certain point in time, he should not draw the conclusion that that event is 
inexplicable; what he can say though is that he is currently unable to explain it. As 
Peirce argues, there is nothing more detrimental to science than for the scientist to 
take the view that there is something inexplicable. Because: 
to suppose a thing inexplicable is not only to fail to explain it, and so to make 
an unjustifiable hypothesis, but, much worse, it is to set up a barrier across the 
road of science, and to forbid all attempt to understand the phenomenon (CP 
6.171). 
                                                 
137 Sandra B. Rosenthal, Charles Peirce’s Pragmatic Pluralism, 1994, p. 152, n86. 
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  Resorting to the idea of the inexplicable runs counter not only to real 
continuity, but also to inquiry as a hopeful human enterprise. This relates to Peirce’s 
pragmatic notion of truth where cooperation and collaboration among the inquirers 
are essential, because the truth of ideas or beliefs is a matter not for an individual 
inquirer, but for the community of inquirers. The reliability of a truth claim made by 
an individual inquirer consists in the truth claim being assessed with reference both 
to reality and the working principles accessible to the community of inquirers. In 
other words, no individual inquirer is in a more privileged position to have access to 
truth than any other inquirers. 
 Also, the idea of “continuity” must be reflected in metaphysics as a necessary 
element by allowing a place for it in the theories and hypotheses of the 
metaphysician. In his description of his doctrine of “synechism,” the cornerstone of 
which is the concept of “continuity,” Peirce says: 
[Synechism is] that tendency of philosophical thought which insists upon the 
idea of continuity as of prime importance in philosophy and, in particular, upon 
the necessity of hypotheses involving true continuity (CP 6.169). 
 The doctrine of synechism denies “the inexplicable” in order to give way to 
“continuity” as a necessary condition of metaphysics. Thus, instead of dwelling on 
the past and present, the metaphysician attributes a special importance to future 
events, and this is because it is only the future where we can have some rational 
control on the course of events. It is here that intentional logic can help us understand 
the relation between pragmatism and metaphysics for Peirce.138 
 Peirce applies his synechism to his classification of the sciences, where all the 
sciences are related to another in a strictly hierarchical manner. Each science 
provides the science below it in the hierarchy with its fundamental principles, 
whereas, in the upward direction, each science provides the one above it with its 
data. On this basis, Peirce argues that metaphysics is of great importance to the 
special sciences, and that it would be a hindrance for the special scientist to pursue 
his inquiry without any metaphysics, let alone a well-thought-out metaphysics. 
[T]he special sciences are obliged to take for granted a number of most 
important propositions, because their ways of working affords no means of 
bringing these propositions to the test. In short, they always rest upon 
metaphysics. … The philosopher alone is equipped with the facilities for 
                                                 
138 Kelly A. Parker, in his The Continuity of Peirce’s Thought (Nashville and London: Vanderbilt 
University Press, 1998), p. 116, expresses a similar point when he says: “the very possibility of an 
awareness of teleology presupposes a felt continuity of present and future.” 
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 examining such “axioms” and for determining the degree to which confidence 
may safely be reposed in them. Find a scientific man who proposes to get along 
without any metaphysics … and you have found one whose doctrines are 
thoroughly vitiated by the crude and uncritized metaphysics with which they 
are packed. … In short, there is no escape from the need of a critical 
examination of “first principles” (CP 1.129). 
It is a misinterpretation of Peirce to say that he is arguing that the special scientist 
must be a metaphysician first of all in order to be a good scientist in his specific field 
of inquiry. Rather, he implies that some kind of metaphysics is necessarily 
presupposed in the special sciences. This makes the task of the metaphysician an 
important one to the scientist, as the task of the logician is to the metaphysician. So, 
Peirce argues, not just any kind of metaphysics will do; it has to be a well-thought-
out metaphysics based on well-established logic that science requires. He argues that 
modern science is unsatisfactory, because it is based on an inadequate empiricist 
epistemology and nominalist metaphysics. 
 Another important aspect of Peirce’s doctrine of synechism is that it allows for 
ethics to be an essential factor in inquiry. With the future course of events being the 
most important aspect of experience, human beings can have a “say” in its 
determination by exercising a degree of rational control in accordance with the 
normative and ethical considerations that are set out by the community of inquirers. 
The inquirer is expected to follow the working standards of the community of 
inquirers. For example, individual inquirers have the responsibility to be honest in 
following the established principles of the community of inquirers when conducting 
their inquiries. 
The logic which observational science uses is not, like the logic that the books 
teach, quite independent of the motive and spirit of the reasoner. There is an 
ethics indissolubly bound up with it - an ethics of fairness and impartiality - 
and a writer, who teaches, by his example, to find arguments for a conclusion 
which he wishes to believe, saps the very foundations of science by trifling 
with its morals (CP 6.3). 
 The ethics inherent in science requires that the scientist cannot stabilise his 
beliefs in real things by wishful thinking, but by application of the procedure and 
rules of science itself, precisely because these are based on recognition of reality as 
independent of our thinking about it. 
 There is an important connection here with the question of meaning. Despite 
the fact that “meaning” is widely accepted as an area of logical inquiry, it still 
remains a task for the metaphysician to utilise only the theory of meaning that is 
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 appropriate for his own inquiry as a metaphysician. This suggests that what Peirce 
calls “the Kantian principle that metaphysical conceptions mirror those of formal 
logic” (CP 3.487), may be expanded by saying that logical principles, or in particular 
the theory of meaning, should mirror what metaphysics should be like. A distinction 
may thus be drawn between Kant and Peirce. Whereas Kant recognises the centrality 
of the question of meaning to philosophical inquiry to the extent of doubting the 
possibility of metaphysics as a proper area of inquiry yielding possible knowledge, 
Peirce shows how the pursuit of the question of meaning leads inevitably into an 
account of what metaphysics should be like. The factor which seems most 
fundamentally responsible for this difference is shown in their treatment of the 
notion of thing-in-itself. For Kant we can only make sense of the appearances of the 
thing-in-self; the meaning of the real thing eludes us. Peirce, however, takes the 
notion of a thing-in-itself as a mental fiction, and argues that we can and do have real 
knowledge of real things. Peirce’s dismissal of the thing-in-itself as a fiction is based 
not on Kant’s dyadic relation between signs and things signified, but on his own 
triadic theory of meaning and reality, according to which there are always three 
terms involved in the process of meaning determination, namely, interpretant, sign 
and thing signified.  
5.5 The Metaphysical Side of Pragmatism 
 Pragmatism is fundamentally a metaphysical position to be arrived at by 
application of the ‘pragmatic maxim’ (which strictly speaking is a logical principle) 
for meaning clarification. A distinction needs to be drawn here between two different 
views that may easily get confused. One is the view that logic is the source from 
which one can deduce metaphysics; the other view is that logic is instrumental in 
clarifying the position of metaphysics, which may otherwise remain obscure. 
Whereas the former view is reductionist in holding that metaphysics is reducible to 
logic, the latter view (adopted by Peirce and on which the argument of this thesis is 
based) completely rules out reductionism. 
 When Peirce strongly insists on his pragmatism as a logical principle initially 
devised for meaning clarification, he means not only that pragmatism is a product of 
his logical inquiry, but also that clarification of the meaning of fundamental concepts 
is the most important issue to be addressed in the early stage of any science or field 
of inquiry. This does not mean, however, that pragmatism does not involve direct 
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 consideration of metaphysics, nor does Peirce deny any close connection between 
pragmatism and metaphysics. What becomes clear is that in defining metaphysics, 
pragmatism approaches the ‘What?’ question by way of an examination of the 
‘How?’ question. 
5.5.1 The Metaphysical Problem as Pragmatically Formulated 
 Perhaps Peirce’s most revealing statement on the metaphysical basis of 
pragmatism is from one of his unpublished papers written in c. 1905, where he 
claims that an understanding of pragmatism requires an understanding of the 
metaphysical problem it attempts to solve. Here he emphasises: 
Now whoever cares to know what pragmaticism is should understand that on 
its metaphysical side it is an attempt to solve the problem: In what way can a 
general be unaffected by any thought about it? Hence before we treat of the 
evidences of pragmaticism, it will be needful to weigh the pros and cons of 
scholastic realism. For pragmaticism could hardly have entered a head that was 
not already convinced that there are real generals (CP 5.503; see also 8.12). 
Despite the fact that Peirce strongly insists that his pragmatism is not a metaphysical 
doctrine,139 the reasons for which I have already discussed, here it is evident in the 
passage just quoted that accepting “that there are real generals” is a condition for 
understanding pragmatism. It is fair to say then that Peirce’s pragmatism is such a 
rich philosophical position that it comprises both logical and metaphysical 
propositions. The emphasis he puts on the metaphysical side of pragmatism suggests 
that Peirce here speaks of pragmatism on a different level when he considers how 
pragmatism is related to metaphysics, as compared with the passages in which he 
considers pragmatism in itself as a logical maxim. These are two points of view from 
which pragmatism can be judged and bring us full circle to an overall account of 
pragmatism. Although pragmatism is a logical maxim for clarifying the meaning of 
our concepts, it is also about the meaning of concepts considered as real, or at least 
potentially real. Pragmatism, therefore, involves a recognition of the distinction 
between the logical and the real by stressing that the function of the former is to 
express the latter. That is, pragmatism as a logical maxim is for clarifying and 
expressing our concepts about the real world.140 
                                                 
139 Eg. “Suffice it to say once more that pragmatism is, in itself, no doctrine of metaphysics, no 
attempt to determine any truth of things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard 
words and of abstract concepts” (CP 5.464). 
140 See Henry B. Veatch, 1952, pp. 16-7. 
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  Peirce’s pragmatic formulation of the metaphysical problem puts the focus of 
approach to the reality of generals on “In what way can a general be unaffected by 
any thought about it” (CP 5.503). The most important thing with the pragmatic 
approach is that it avoids the difficulty with the dichotomy of the mind-body problem 
where one entity becomes dependent on the other. For Descartes, the body is 
dependent for its existence on the thinking self. The difficulty with the Cartesian 
position is that it fails to realise that thinking can take place if and only if the 
thinking subject does exist first of all. Although Descartes resorts to the concept of 
God to provide an answer to this difficulty, it ‘solves’ the problem at the price of 
Descartes remaining locked in his own (abstract) world to which no one but he has 
access. Instead of preoccupying himself with seeking a fundamental entity to connect 
the body and the thinking subject, Peirce focuses on finding out how a real general is 
“unaffected by our thinking about it.” Thus Peirce goes beyond the mind-body 
dichotomy to consider the reality of generals in terms of a triadic relation. He 
introduces the way in which generals are “unaffected by our thinking about” them as 
a Thirdness or Representation. As a result, Peirce’s pragmatism does not collapse 
into either materialism or idealism, as happened in the dyadic way of thinking of 
rationalism and empiricism, based on the mind-body dichotomy. 
5.5.2 Does Pragmatism Make Any Metaphysical Assertion? 
 If pragmatism is recognised as offering a more effective and fruitful approach 
to the question of the reality of generals, I must consider whether or not pragmatism 
makes any metaphysical claims or assertions. The importance of this question is that 
its exploration sheds some light on why pragmatism could, and should, be considered 
from the two points of view I have touched upon earlier. For whether or not 
pragmatism can be said to make any metaphysical assertion depends on what point of 
view one takes in attempting to answer the question. In one sense, it could be said 
that pragmatism does not make any metaphysical assertion, but simply concerns 
itself with clarifying the meaning of concepts, including the concepts employed in 
metaphysics. Christopher Hookway,141 for example, holds this view and thinks it to 
be Peirce’s preferred position. Although I agree that this is one position Peirce 
                                                 
141 ‘Metaphysics, Science, and Self-Control: A Response to Apel,’ Peirce and Contemporary 
Thought: Philosophical Inquiries, ed. Kenneth Laine Ketner, 1995, p. 399. 
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 adopts, I argue that this is too restricted a view to account for the fact that in its own 
peculiar way pragmatism does make some metaphysical assertions. 
 As I have pointed out, instead of asking whether there are any real generals, or 
whether generals are real, pragmatism asks how generals are not affected by our 
thinking about them. The point is that pragmatism as a logical maxim is set to serve 
the assertion that there are real things; for without that assertion, pragmatism would 
be a meaningless enterprise, no matter how hard we think of it as only a logical 
principle. In his classification of the sciences, Peirce describes logic as the science of 
the category of Secondness, and metaphysics as the science of Thirdness. His whole 
point is that the sciences are just as closely related to one another as are the three 
categories. That is, according to his theory of categories, Secondness is meaningful 
because of the Thirdness it involves. Similarly, pragmatism as a logical maxim 
would simply remain meaningless if it did not involve metaphysics. 
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  This chapter explores the nature and scope of Peirce’s semiotic, or theory of 
signs and their functions, with the specific aim of determining its role in his account 
of inquiry. I will argue that his semiotic theory requires that observation and 
objectivity are recognized as essential elements of inquiry (and thinking in general). 
Peirce shows that both of these elements are presupposed by the representative 
nature of signs — the fundamental elements of semiotic. As such semiotic becomes a 
logical tool or method for demonstrating the metaphysical assertion that there are 
real things. 
 Discussion of Peirce’s semiotic will help to clarify that realism is both a 
condition and consequence of pragmatism.142 It will become evident that for Peirce 
realism and pragmatism are interdependent because realism depends upon 
pragmatism for ascertaining and explicating how reality exists independently from 
our thinking about it, whereas pragmatism presupposes the realist metaphysical 
assertion that there are real things. 
 While Peirce appears to be preoccupied with his theory of signs, and sees sign 
and sign-action in every phenomenon, he did not seek to reduce reality to a semiotic 
system, where the real would be construed as only that which is sign-like. For Peirce, 
such a reductionist view of reality would result either in a dismissal of metaphysics 
or require that metaphysics be reducible to logic. As I will show, both these views 
are inconsistent with Peirce’s overall philosophical position, which recognises the 
distinction between the logical and the real as important. He maintains that the 
function of the logical is to represent or to intend the real, whereas the function of the 
real is not to represent either the logical or anything else.143 
6.1 The Science of Semiotic 
 It is evident that Peirce attaches great importance to semiotic.144 His position 
stems ultimately from his conviction that “We think only in signs” (CP 2.302), and 
that “all thought is in signs” (CP 5.253). Hence, the scope of Peirce’s semiotic is the 
whole of human thought, whether as embodied in human reasoning, discourse, or 
                                                 
142 See discussion in chapter 4. 
143 Henry Babcock Veatch, 1952, pp. 16-17. 
144 In noticing the dominance of semiotic in Peirce’s philosophy, Nathan Houser rightly remarks in 
his ‘Introduction,’ The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, vol. 1, ed. Nathan Houser 
and Christian Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992): “[Semiotic] constitutes the very 
heart of [Peirce’s] philosophy,” (p. xxx). “Perhaps it is best to describe his philosophy as a semiotic 
philosophy,” (p. xxxv). 
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 communication. This implies that semiotic is necessary for any science or inquiry. 
Peirce writes: 
… the woof and warp of all thought and all research is symbols, and the life of 
thought and science is the life inherent in symbols; so that it is wrong to say 
that a good language is important to good thought, merely; for it is of the 
essence of it (CP 2.220). 
 Peirce conceives of semiotic as the theory or formal study of signs as such. 
Semiotic aims at observing: 
the characters of … signs as we know, and from such an observation … we are 
led to statements … as to what must be the characters of all signs used by a 
“scientific” intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by 
experience (CP 2.227). 
Semiotic treats signs not only as the central part of our experience, but it is really by 
virtue of signs that we are “capable of learning by experience.” In a letter to Lady 
Welby on 12 October 1904, Peirce emphasizes the importance of studying signs as 
they make knowledge itself possible.  
It appears to me that the essential function of a sign is to render inefficient 
relations efficient, - not to set them into action, but also establish a habit or 
general rule whereby they will act on occasion. … All other relations, of which 
we know so many, are inefficient. Knowledge in some way renders them 
efficient; and a sign is something by knowing which we know something more 
(SS 31).145 
 Fundamental to Peirce’s semiotic approach is his insistence on the triadic 
structure or three-term relationship inherent in the concept and function of a sign. I 
will discuss what is implied in this account of signs later. For my immediate purpose, 
I need only point out that in relation to knowledge semiotic considers not just the 
known and the knower, or the object and the subject, but also the representation of 
the known by the knower, or ‘the interpretant’ in Peirce’s terms. The dyadic or two-
term relation between the knower and the known is inefficient, according to Peirce’s 
semiotic theory, because the third term, which is the knower’s knowledge or 
representation of the known is not yet considered. An inefficient relation would 
become efficient once some representation of the known by the knower starts to 
develop. This representation, or knowledge, “is a habit or general rule whereby” the 
knower “will act on occasion.” 
                                                 
145 Peirce believes that “the highest grade of reality is only reached by signs; that is by such ideas 
as those of Truth and Right and the rest” (SS 23). 
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  Because a sign could be anything at all, real or imaginary, semiotic as such is 
not primarily interested in the question of reality. The primary concern of semiotic is 
the question of the nature and principles applicable to the functions of signs as such. 
The question of reality becomes a matter of interest to semiotic only in consideration 
of a sign’s capacity to be a sign of something else. From the semiotic point of view, 
‘experience’ does not necessarily refer to experience of real things, but to any entity 
that is significative. 
6.1.1 Logic Considered as Semiotic 
 Peirce identifies logic in general with semiotic, and there are two main reasons 
for this identification of logic with semiotic: 
 The first has to do with Peirce’s view of science — for he defines science as a 
process of inquiry within (the community of discourse of) a community of scientists 
or inquirers engaged in the actual practice of inquiry. While he understands that there 
is another view of science, that it is a body of organised knowledge and truth, he 
criticises this view as incomplete and limited, insofar as it does not account for the 
fact that science is “a living historic entity” (CP 1.44),146 with a social dimension 
implied in the very notion of a community of inquirers. This communal characteristic 
of science (as a community of discourse) is not captured by what we call 
mathematical or symbolic logic, which Peirce refers to as logic in the narrow sense. 
Logic in the narrow sense, or symbolic logic, is just a part of logic in general, which 
Peirce identifies with semiotic. 
 His second reason for identifying logic in general with semiotic, as he defines 
it, is that it serves the purpose of preventing logic from falling into a kind of 
psychologism — the view that logical principles are derived from the empirical 
findings of psychology. Peirce strongly opposed any psychologistic view of logic, 
because: 
If the logician is to talk of the operations of the mind at all … he must mean by 
“mind” something quite different from the object of study of the psychologist. 
… Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. A definition of a sign will be 
                                                 
146 “If we are to define science, not in the sense of stuffing it into an artificial pigeon-hole where it 
may be found again by some insignificant mark, but in the sense of characterizing it as a living 
historic entity, we must conceive it as that about which such men as I have described busy 
themselves” (CP 1.44). 
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 given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line 
as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time.147 
For semiotic, the phrase ‘laws of thought’ as it appears in the most common 
definition of logic as “the science of the necessary laws of thought” (CP 1.444), 
refers not to laws derived from empirical psychology but to the necessary laws of 
signs as such. Logic in general, then, is “only another name for semiotic” (CP 2.227), 
the study of signs and their functions.148 
6.1.1.1 The Division of Semiotic 
 Peirce’s division of semiotic into three branches is based on his reflection on 
the triadic nature of the sign-using function and its relationships. He says: “In 
consequence of every representamen being thus connected with three things, the 
ground, the object, and the interpretant, the science of semiotic has three branches” 
(CP 2.229). These branches are pure grammar, logic proper, and pure rhetoric.149 
 The task of pure grammar lies in considering the conditions of signs qua signs; 
that is, “to ascertain what must be true of the representamen used by every scientific 
intelligence in order that they may embody any meaning” (CP 2.229). It involves 
studying the classes of signs, the components of signs and characteristic principles 
that distinguish one species of signs from another. Logic proper “is the formal 
science of the conditions of the truth of representations” (CP 2.229). It is concerned 
with the relations of signs to its objects, establishing the conditions by which signs 
truly represent their object. The task of pure rhetoric “is to ascertain the laws by 
which in every scientific intelligence one sign gives birth to another, and especially 
one thought brings forth another” (CP 2.229). Pure rhetoric also studies, as part of its 
task, “the necessary conditions of the transmission of meaning by signs  
                                                 
147 Quoted in Fisch, 1986, p. 343. 
148 “Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only another name for semiotic … the 
quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs. By describing the doctrine as “quasi-necessary,” or 
formal, I mean that we observe the characters of such signs as we know, and from such an 
observation, by a process which I will not object to naming Abstraction, we are led to statements, 
eminently fallible, and therefore in one sense by no means necessary, as to what must be the 
characters of all signs used by a “scientific” intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of 
learning by experience” (CP 2.227). 
149 Peirce called these branches variously. He also called Pure grammar: Speculative grammar, 
Formal grammar, Universal grammar, General grammar, Stechiology. He refers to Logic proper as 
Critic, General Logic; and Pure rhetoric as Speculative rhetoric, Formal rhetoric, Universal rhetoric, 
General rhetoric, Methodeutic, Objective logic. See James Jakób Liszka, A General Introduction to 
the Semeiotic of Charles Sanders Peirce, (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
1996), pp. 9-11. 
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 from mind to mind, and from one state of mind to another” (CP 1.444). 
 Peirce’s attribution of a specific task to each and every branch of semiotic 
shows that he considered it equally important to study the three necessarily inter-
connected aspects of signs: the sign itself (or representamen), the object of the sign, 
and the interpretant. The inclusion of pure rhetoric, as a proper part of semiotic, is 
however the most unique aspect of Peirce’s theory of signs and their functions. It 
acknowledges the involvement of the inquirer by way of ‘the interpretant’ as an 
important part of inquiry. It not only makes study of the role of the interpretant as the 
subject matter of pure rhetoric, but by the same means pure rhetoric becomes an 
essential part of semiotic as a whole, or logic in general. More specifically, pure 
rhetoric takes it as an essential part of its task to inquire into how a sign appeals to its 
interpretant or sign-user and to clarify the conditions and principles involved (CP 
8.338). 
 The equal recognition of the three ingredients of signs and the triadicity of the 
relation holding between them stems ultimately, Peirce argues, from the sign-relation 
itself, which is irreducibly triadic: 
A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic 
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, 
called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which 
it stands itself to the same Object. The triadic relation is genuine, that is its 
three members are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any 
complexus of dyadic relations (CP 2.274). 
He argues further for the triadicity of the sign relation by explaining it from the point 
of view of the interpretant. 
That is the reason the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic 
relation to the Object, but must stand in such a relation to it as the 
Representamen itself does. Nor can the triadic relation in which the Third 
stands be merely similar to that in which the First stands, for this would make 
the relation of the Third to the First a degenerate Secondness merely. The Third 
must indeed stand in such a relation, and thus must be capable of determining a 
Third of its own; but besides that, it must have a second triadic relation in 
which the Representamen, or rather the relation thereof to its Object, shall be 
its own (the Third’s) Object, and must be capable of determining a Third to this 
relation. All this must equally be true of the Third’s Thirds and so on endlessly 
(CP 2.274). 
6.1.2 Semiotic and the Sciences 
 Semiotic is not about a particular kind of sign for a particular kind of inquiry, 
but about signs themselves, in their most universal features that are supposed to be 
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 applicable in every form of inquiry. Peirce himself acknowledges the universal 
applicability of the theory of signs when he speaks of his own experience of studying 
various sciences and their relation to semiotic, in a letter to Lady Welby: 
It has never been in my power to study anything - mathematics, metaphysics, 
gravitation, thermodynamics, optics, chemistry, comparative anatomy … 
astronomy, psychology, phonetics, economics, the history of science, whist, 
men and women, wine, metrology — except as a study of semeiotic.150 
 Some critics of Peirce fail to see the intended universal applicability of his 
semiotic. Richard Rorty, for example, criticises Peirce, saying, “For all his genius, 
however, Peirce never made up his mind what he wanted a general theory of signs 
for, nor what it might look like, nor what its relation to either logic or epistemology 
was supposed to be.”151 Since Rorty himself does not provide any evidence for this 
criticism, it is fair to say that it is a consequence either of an over-generalised 
observation, or a failure to understand the fundamental propositions and implications 
of Peirce’s semiotic. However, as I have previously shown, there are sound reasons 
why Peirce identifies logic in general with semiotic, and his account of 
representation explains how his semiotic relates to his epistemology. 
 Since an understanding of signs and their functions is necessary for any 
science, as explained earlier, semiotic may be said to be the science of the sciences. 
For semiotic is the only science concerned directly with the medium of thought itself, 
i.e. the sign. What distinguishes all other sciences from one another is the particular 
type of signs that constitutes the subject matter of that science. For example, “physics 
studies natural signs, psychology mental signs, linguistics verbal signs, anthropology 
socially conventional signs, art criticism visually aesthetic signs,”152 and so on. 
Despite the differences between the kinds of signs constitutive of each science, 
semiotic applies to each and every science, for it deals not with this or that kind of 
signs, but with the common and definitive nature of signs per se. 
                                                 
150 Quoted in James Jakób Liszka, 1996, p. 7. 
151 Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1982), p. 161.  
152 James Jakób Liszka, 1996, p. 9. 
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 6.2 The Components and Relationships of Signs as Paradigmatic for Truth 
and Meaning 
6.2.1 Representamen 
 I have repeatedly mentioned the concept of sign, its three components, and the 
triadic relation that holds between them. Peirce’s technical term for sign considered 
in itself and apart from both its object and interpretant is ‘representamen.’ A 
“representamen … is something which stands to somebody for something in some 
respect or capacity” (CP 2.228). A representamen could be anything at all, depending 
on the particular context and circumstances in which it is identified and considered. 
However, it is necessary that the representamen must be both relational and 
representational in order to become a sign proper. Peirce argues for the necessary 
relational character of signs thus: 
if there be anything that conveys information and yet has absolutely no relation 
nor reference to anything with which the person to whom it conveys the 
information has, when he comprehends that information, the slightest 
acquaintance, direct or indirect - and a very strange sort of information that 
would be - the vehicle of that sort of information is not, in this volume, called a 
Sign (CP 2.231). 
Similarly, with reference to the necessity of representation, Peirce emphasises, “in 
order that anything should be a Sign, it must “represent” … something else … its 
Object” (CP 2.230). Both relation and representation are shown to intend the same 
thing, namely the triadicity of the sign-using relationship. 
 On the one hand, a representamen cannot begin to function as a sign if it does 
not stand in any relation to something else, i.e. its object, but to identify such an 
absolutely isolated entity is an impossible task, for such an entity, if there is one, is 
totally unspeakable. Representation, however, implies that the relation in which the 
representamen is involved, is triadic in nature, for the representamen must represent 
its object to some (actual or possible) interpretant. 
 On the other hand, relation may be contrasted with representation by 
considering the ontological and the logical status of the representamen. The 
ontological status of a representamen consists in its being related to things other than 
itself; that is, its function consists simply in being a part of a scheme of things related 
to one another. Theoretically, a representamen acquires its logical status once it 
comes to stand in a specific relation to an interpretant. However, the logical status of 
a representamen has to do with it standing in some actual or possible relation to a 
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 subject (interpretant) who comes to understand the representamen, as representing 
something else. This does not mean that the representamen derives its ontological 
status from its logical status, but rather that both the ontological and the logical status 
of the representamen mutually imply one another and are inseparable from one 
another in fact and in theory. However, an actual understanding of the ontological 
status of a representamen only begins to take place when its logical status is clarified. 
The representamen’s ontological status is logically prior to its logical status, that is, 
the representamen must be a part of the scheme of inter-related things first before its 
interpretant can be identified or established. 
6.2.2 The Object of a Sign 
 The object of a sign is whatever is signified or represented by the sign. Peirce 
distinguishes two kinds of object of signs: the immediate object and the mediate, or 
dynamical, object.153 The difference between these two kinds of objects of signs is 
that the immediate object is implied within the sign whereas dynamical object “is the 
Object outside of the Sign” (SS 83). “The sign,” Peirce says, “must indicate it [the 
dynamical object] by a hint; and this hint, or its substance, is the Immediate Object” 
(SS 83). The distinction between immediate object and dynamical object may appear 
paradoxical in the sense that it seems to introduce a fourth term into the triadic 
relation of signs. A closer look at the matter, however, shows that it is not the case. 
 The distinction is not between two different objects of the same sign, as may 
normally be illustrated by saying, for example, sign (C) has a dynamical object (B) 
and an immediate object (A). On the contrary, it is about the same object of the same 
sign with the difference lying between the object as it really is in itself and the object 
as the sign represents it. An adequate symbolic expression of the example above 
would be that sign (C) has a dynamical object (B), and an immediate object (B’). 
 The distinction between the immediate and dynamical objects of signs provides 
the theoretical ground for Peirce’s insistence on the objectivity of semiotic inquiry. It 
allows the objective content or dynamical object of a sign to stand in its own right, 
while the “Being [of the immediate object] is … dependent upon the Representation 
of it in the Sign” (CP 4.536). By distinguishing the immediate object,  
                                                 
153 Peirce sometimes calls it “dynamoid object”, or “real object”. 
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 from the dynamical object, Peirce seeks to prevent a sign and its dynamical object 
from collapsing into one another; a collapse that would have the sign-relation 
reduced into a dyadic relation between the sign and its interpretant. 
6.2.3 Interpretant 
 The third term of the triadic relation of signs, the ‘interpretant,’ refers to (actual 
or possible subjects, or) an individual mind or group of minds which interprets or 
uses a sign; or, in terms of the definition of signs given earlier, it is ‘somebody’ for 
whom the sign stands as a sign. The interpretant, as an essentially distinct component 
of sign relation, marks a departure in Peirce’s semiotic from the traditional notion of 
signs, according to which sign is “a member of a dyadic relation between signifier 
and signified.”154 For, as I have noted, with the inclusion of the interpretant, Peirce 
makes the sign relation a necessarily triadic relation. 
 Peirce identifies three different kinds of interpretant: the immediate, 
dynamical, and final interpretant. The distinction between these three interpretants is 
a difference between the states (of ‘sophistication’) of interpretation or the 
interpretant’s understanding of the sign. He characterises the three interpretants in a 
letter to Lady Welby in 1909 as follows: 
My Immediate Interpretant is implied in the fact that each Sign must have its 
peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter. My Dynamical 
Interpretant is that which is experienced in each act of Interpretation and is 
different in each from that of any other; and the Final Interpretant is the one 
Interpretative result to which every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is 
sufficiently considered. The Immediate Interpretant is an abstraction, 
consisting in a Possibility. The Dynamical Interpretant is a single actual event. 
The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends (SS 111). 
 Before this characterisation, Peirce in an unpublished paper ‘Pragmatism’ 
dated c.1906, distinguished between the emotional interpretant, the energetic 
interpretant, and the logical interpretant. Peirce’s description of this trichotomy of 
interpretants appears to be different from that of the three kinds of interpretant given 
in the letter to Lady Welby. He identified emotional interpretant as a feeling, 
energetic intrepretant an action, and logical interpretant a habit-change. By habit-
change Peirce means “a modification of a person’s tendencies toward action, 
                                                 
154 Menno Hulswit, ‘A Guess at the Riddle of Semeiotic Causation,’ Transactions of the Charles S. 
Peirce Society, vol. XXXIV, no. 3, (Summer, 1998), p. 642. 
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 resulting from previous experiences or from previous exertions of his will or acts, or 
from a complexus of both kinds of cause” (CP 5.476). 
 There is a difference among Peirce scholars in their interpretation of these two 
trichotomies of interpretants. Some claim that they are not identical, whereas others 
view them as meaning the same thing.155 Since each side of the issue stands equally 
well supported by evidences found in Peirce, I will not pursue this dispute any 
further. For my purpose I will consider something else that can be of assistance in 
understanding Peirce’s semiotic, namely his concern to distinguish stages in our 
developing understanding of signs or of the meaning of a particular sign. 
 Apart from the obvious similarities between the two trichotomies of 
interpretants, the division of interpretants in both trichotomies is concerned with the 
growth or development of our understanding of signs, as tending from a less to a 
more conscious state of mind. As evident in his characterisation of the first 
trichotomy, the immediate interpretant is the least developed of the interpretants. It is 
merely the effect caused by the sign without any reflection on it. The dynamical 
interpretant is more developed than the immediate interpretant, in that it involves 
some degree of thought, although a dynamical interpretant of a particular sign may 
vary from one instance to another. The final interpretant is the most developed of all 
the interpretants, for it is the ‘ideal’ “toward which the actual tends.” Unlike the 
dynamical interpretant, the final interpretant is free from variation, at least in 
principle. In other words, the growth of our understanding of the meaning of 
concepts embodies a teleology (“tendency to an end”156) inherent in the whole of 
sign relation or process. The immediate interpretant has a tendency to cause a 
dynamical interpretant, which in turn tends to cause a final interpretant. 
 The second trichotomy of emotional, energetic, and logical interpretants 
expresses the same teleology. As said earlier, the emotional interpretant is not only 
the feeling produced by a sign, but is also “The first proper significate effect of a 
sign” (CP 5.475). In turn, the emotional interpretant tends to develop into an 
energetic interpretant, which is marked by the involvement of an effort or action. 
Peirce says of the energetic interpretant. 
                                                 
155 See ibid., pp. 648, 683-4. Hulswit refers to T. L. Short’s argument, and reference to Peirce, for 
the two trichotomies of interpretants as different. Hulswit, on the other hand, cites a different passage 
from Peirce in favour of an argument for the two trichotomies as identical. 
156 Joseph Ransdell, ‘Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914).’ 25 pages, 56 paragraphs. 14 Oct. 1998 
<http://www.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/eds.htm>. 
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 If a sign produces any further proper significate effect, it will do so through the 
mediation of the emotional interpretant, and such further effect will always 
involve an effort. I call it the energetic interpretant (CP 5.475). 
Whereas the energetic interpretant is an effect of the emotional interpretant, the 
logical interpretant is an effect of the energetic interpretant, and this involves a 
mental effort. The main difference between energetic interpretant and logical 
interpretant is that the former is a single act, whereas the latter is a habit (of action), 
which is essentially general in nature. 
 While the two trichotomies of interpretants are both concerned with the 
(process of) growth in our understanding of concepts, they have a different point of 
emphasis from one another. The focus of the first trichotomy is on truth, and that of 
the second trichotomy is on meaning. As I have pointed out, Peirce defines final 
interpretant as “that toward which the actual tends” (SS 111). He clarifies what he 
means here when he says: 
there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, which I call the Final Interpretant, 
because it is that which would finally be decided to be the true interpretation if 
consideration of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were 
reached (CP 8.184; the latter emphasis added). 
Compare this with what he says of his pragmatic notion of truth: “The opinion which 
is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the 
truth” (CP 5.407). With the second trichotomy, there is a similarity between his idea 
of logical interpretant, defined as “habit-change”, and his pragmatic definition of 
meaning, according to which the meaning of a concept is the habit or rule of action 
resulting from believing in that concept. 
6.3 Semiotic as the Basis for Inquiry 
 I have noted the great importance Peirce attributes to his semiotic as an 
effective tool both in his scientific and philosophical inquiry. Finally I will focus on 
two further features of semiotic that are important for inquiry. First, semiotic makes 
it possible for every science to be observational without any metaphysical 
commitment to the question of the nature of reality. Secondly, semiotic assumes 
objectivity an essential part of any kind of inquiry. 
6.3.1 Observation in Inquiry 
 Semiotic understands ‘observation’ in a very broad sense. It is concerned with 
observation not in relation to the reality of things, but in relation to things as signs. 
There are different modes of observation employed in different sciences, for example 
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 use of a telescope as a special means of observation for the astronomer is different 
from direct participant-observation by an anthropologist of a remote community. 
Semiotic, however, takes as of primary importance the common formal structure of 
the sign-relation involved in every mode of observation. Observation is a complex 
and active process that involves the employment both of the senses and analysis in 
seeking to make sense of any sign-relation in any given situation. Peirce expresses 
his view of observation as follows: 
modern students of science have been successful because they have spent their 
lives not in their libraries and museums but in their laboratories and in the 
field; and while in their laboratories and in the field they have been not gazing 
on nature with a vacant eye, that is, in passive perception unassisted by 
thought, but have been observing - that is, perceiving by the aid of analysis - 
and testing suggestions of theories (CP 1.34). 
Even the sciences such as mathematics that have been generally described as non-
observational do involve observation, Peirce maintains, except that in mathematics, 
“it is observation of artificial objects” (CP 1.34).157 
 Because semiotic bases its understanding of observation upon the formal 
triadic structure of the sign relation, (which emphasises the continuity and inter-
relationship between the three components of signs), a clear-cut distinction between 
observation and reasoning or analysis is not acceptable to Peirce. This is because 
observation is not a distinct type of inference that stands in its own right, but a stage 
of the process of inference. Thus Peirce criticises Kant: 
he [Kant] drew too hard a line between the operations of observation and of 
ratiocination. He allows himself to fall into the habit of thinking that the latter 
only begins after the former is complete; and wholly fails to see that even the 
simplest syllogistic conclusion can only be drawn by observing the relations of 
the terms in the premisses and conclusion (CP 1.35; emphasis added). 
6.3.2 The Metaphysical Neutrality of Semiotic 
 Semiotic is metaphysically neutral, not because it has no metaphysical pre-
suppositions or implications whatsoever, but because its main concern is not to do 
with the question of reality as such. Peirce by strongly insisting that his pragmatism 
is merely a logical maxim, and is not a metaphysical doctrine, is saying that the 
metaphysical consideration of things falls outside the concern of semiotic, and  
                                                 
157 See also CP 1.240. 
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 pragmatism in particular. Thus the metaphysical neutrality of semiotic has to do with 
the ‘division of labour’ involved in the system or classification of the sciences, and 
not with the question whether semiotic should do away with metaphysics. Whereas 
the question of the reality of signs falls within the domain of metaphysics, the 
question of the logical structure, function and principles governing the use of signs as 
such is a concern of semiotic. 
6.3.3 The Question of the Relation between Objectivity and Realism in Peirce 
 Objectivity is the second main feature of inquiry provided by semiotic. 
Because semiotic requires the subject matter of inquiry to be treated as a sign or 
group of signs, the inquirer is compelled to understand his subject matter as meaning 
or representing something other than itself, showing that there is always a degree of 
‘externality’ involved in (the use of) every sign. This ‘externality’ is manifested in 
the ‘object of the sign,’ and applies both to the sign itself and also to the interpretant. 
The object of the sign is external to the sign itself because it is that for which the sign 
stands or that which it represents. Similarly, it is external to the interpretant, for the 
interpretant is the mind or somebody to which the object is represented by the sign. 
 A distinction may be drawn between the ‘object of the sign’ and the ‘object of 
thought.’ The objectivity of the latter does not have the same scope as that inherent 
in the former. The objectivity manifested in the ‘object of thought’ is designated by 
the fact that there is thought and a purpose, i.e. something other than itself, which it 
intends. Yet, the ‘object of thought’ is liable to fall into the subjectivity implied in 
doctrines such as idealism. Because the ‘object of thought’ is grounded upon a 
dichotomy between the object on the one hand, and the subject on the other hand, the 
idealist can still maintain the central idea of the ‘object of thought,’ but argues for the 
‘object’ of thought as an entity restricted to the realm of thought itself by saying that 
ideas are the only objects of thought. 
 On the other hand, for Peirce, the ‘object of sign’ ensures objectivity to a 
greater extent, in the sense that both the object of sign and the sign itself are external 
to the interpretant or the knowing subject. Unlike the case of the ‘object of thought’ 
(where the object could be reduced or restricted to the thinking subject, hence to 
subjectivity), the ‘object of sign’ stands more secure against such subjectivity by 
insisting that the object of sign is irreducible either to the sign or to the interpretant. 
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  Richard A. Lee expresses some concern about how Peirce tried to use medieval 
or Scotist realism for a purpose for which it was not intended. Lee argues that the 
problem with Peirce’s argument is that he attempted to make Scotist realism provide 
science with objectivity, which for Lee is foreign to the central issue of the medieval 
debate between realism and nominalism.158 Lee’s criticism fails to note two points 
important for our purpose. First, Peirce though claiming to be a committed Scotist, 
was still critical of Scotus for allowing some nominalist tendencies in his realism 
(see CP 8.208). Peirce thus took the view that Scotist realism needed to be employed 
critically and developed, and not just applied uncritically. Accordingly, Peirce 
identifies his realism as “extreme realism” (CP 5.470), and his metaphysics as 
“objective idealism” (CP 6.25). 
 Secondly, Peirce sees the issues of realism and objectivity as more closely 
inter-connected than allowed for in Lee’s position. As Vincent G. Potter rightly 
points out, Peirce “prefers to phrase his realism in terms of the objective reality of 
laws rather than in terms of universals.”159 The important point here is that for Peirce 
the question of objectivity, which for him is a logical question, is required for a 
solution of the metaphysical question in the debate between realism and nominalism: 
“whether laws or general types are figments of the mind or real” (CP 1.16). 
Elaborating further on this question, Peirce writes: 
If this be understood to mean whether there really are any laws and types, it is 
strictly speaking a question of metaphysics and not of logic. But as a first step 
toward its solution, it is proper to ask whether, granting that our common-sense 
beliefs are true, the analysis of the meaning of those beliefs shows that, 
according to those beliefs, laws and types are objective or subjective. This is a 
question of logic rather than of metaphysics - and as soon as this is answered 
the reply to the other question immediately follows after (CP 1.16). 
What Lee is saying about Peirce’s realism is quite the reverse of his position. For Lee 
assumes that Peirce wanted to retrieve Scotistic realism in order to “ensure the 
objectivity of our concepts against the rampant subjectivism introduced into 
philosophy since Descartes.”160 However, Peirce is clearly of the view that the 
question of objectivity is an essential question to be settled before considering the 
                                                 
158 Richard A. Lee, Jr., ‘Peirce’s Retrieval of Scotistic Realism,’ American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly, ed. Vincent M. Colapietro, vol. lxxii, no. 2, (Spring, 1998), p. 194. 
159 Vincent G. Potter, 1997, p. 82. 
160 Richard A. Lee, JR., 1998, p. 194. 
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 question of realism. In other words, for Peirce a sound realist philosophy cannot do 
without an objective approach to inquiry, as enabled by his semiotic. 
 Moreover, Lee fails to realise that Peirce bases his argument on his 
classification of the sciences, according to which logic is prior to metaphysics. That 
is, the question of the meaning of ‘objectivity’ is to be dealt with before the question 
of reality. Again, Lee’s understanding of Peirce as using Scotist realism to “ensure 
the objectivity of our concepts” is incorrect. It is true that Peirce’s scholastic realism 
seeks to undermine the subjectivism introduced into philosophy since Descartes, but 
it is incorrect to think, as seems to be implied in Lee’s account of Peirce, that Peirce 
assumes a position that attempts to deal with the question of reality without any 
independent consideration of the question of objectivity. Here it is important to 
remember that the principle of Peirce’s classification of the sciences is fundamental 
to his whole philosophy. 
 Lee might have realised the close connection between Peirce’s realism 
(‘Scotistic realism’) and objectivity, had he investigated the bearing of his 
pragmatism on the issue at hand. This is because pragmatism for Peirce is a method 
of thinking not only for the purpose of meaning clarification, but also for showing 
how universal concepts are really “operative in nature.” Instead of seeking after some 
kind of static ‘object’ or ‘thing’ as proof of or evidence for the reality of concepts, 
pragmatism looks for the ‘habit of conduct’ instituted by accepting and following 
those concepts, considered as beliefs. 
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  This final chapter is concerned primarily with clarifying the relationship in 
Peirce’s philosophy between his categories, theory of signs and pragmatism, by 
examining their relationship in the light of his theory of inquiry. For, as I have 
repeatedly argued, Peirce developed his categories and theory of signs as 
philosophical tools applicable to reality in the process of inquiry — an approach that 
is coextensive with pragmatism. 
 I will begin my discussion by first elaborating on why inquiry is the framework 
within which to consider the relationship between the categories and signs, followed 
by an argument showing that the categories are pertinent to logic. Then I will seek to 
clarify the distinction between the categories and signs by using the Scholastic 
distinction between ‘real beings’ and ‘beings of reason’. While the distinction 
between ‘real beings’ and ‘beings of reason’ is useful, my analysis suggests that 
Peirce’s conception of sign goes beyond it and demonstrates that there is a sense in 
which the ‘sign’ does not belong either to the realm of ‘real beings’ or that of ‘beings 
of reason’. What is significant to Peirce’s distinction between the categories and 
signs is the question of whether there are ‘extra-semiotic entities’. 
 My conclusion on the distinction between the categories and signs, and the 
relationship between them, will be brought to bear on the question of the relation 
between logic and metaphysics. I will argue that for Peirce, whereas the validity of 
signs as logical tools (and the validity of the semiotic approach in general) is based 
on his theory of the categories, the legitimacy of logic is grounded in metaphysics. 
This follows from Peirce’s conviction that inquiry is the framework for considering 
both the relation between the categories and signs, and also applies, to the 
relationship between logic and metaphysics. Having determined the relation between 
the categories and signs, and that between logic and metaphysics, it becomes evident 
that pragmatism is a metaphysical position based on a certain view of logic. A brief 
account of intentional logic will be given in order to show that while it shares some 
fundamental ideas with Peirce’s semiotic, he goes further in treating as real what 
would normally be taken by intentional logic as belonging to the realm of ‘beings of 
reason’. This difference will be dealt with by discussing why the ‘sign’ is not, and 
cannot be, a category. 
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 7.1 The Categories and Signs as Understood within the Context of Inquiry 
 ‘Categories’ and ‘signs’ are two of the most fundamental ideas in Peirce’s 
philosophy. He views them as the basic conceptions to be employed in all inquiry. 
Here I use ‘inquiry’ in the broadest Peircean sense,161 which includes events and 
activities such as experience, understanding, interpretation, meaning clarification, 
science, and life in general. 
7.1.1 The Reasons for adopting ‘Inquiry’ as the Framework for Considering the 
Relation between the ‘Categories’ and ‘Signs’ 
 Both the categories and signs are investigated and derived in the first place not 
for their own sake, but first and foremost as ‘instruments’ to be used in our attempt to 
understand reality, that is, they are to fulfil some purpose. This is not to say that the 
categories and signs cannot be studied in their own right — for they are the subject 
matter of the theory of categories and the theory of signs or semiotic respectively. I 
employ inquiry, however, as the framework for determining the relations between the 
categories and signs in order to do justice to the fact that they arise from inquiry (and 
from our experience), and are adopted for the purpose of conducting further inquiry 
(and interpreting and understanding our ‘future’ experience). Thus the categories and 
signs are both a priori and a posteriori. 
 It is hard to make sense of the categories and signs if we try to consider them in 
isolation from the context in which they arise; their whole being and meaning 
depends on their context. Because they arise from inquiry itself, and are to be used 
for further inquiry, the categories and signs must reflect the nature of inquiry in 
general, by sharing some characteristics common to all forms of inquiry. It is upon 
the basis of these shared common characteristics that the categories and signs can be 
said to be applicable to all forms of inquiry. What the categories, signs, and inquiry 
have in common, however, are triadicity or triadic relation and intentionality. 
 The triadic relation of inquiry holds between the object of inquiry, the inquirer, 
and the inquirer’s knowledge of the object of inquiry. As regards the categories, the 
triadic relation, as I have discussed in chapters 1 and 2, is determined by the category 
of Thirdness, which essentially involves both the categories of Firstness and 
Secondness. I have pointed out too in the preceding chapters that a triadic relation is 
                                                 
161 This is the sense in which Peirce uses the term ‘inquiry’ in his ‘Fixation of Belief.’ See chapter 
3 above for a fuller discussion of Peirce’s notion of inquiry. 
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 definitive of the very concept of sign, in that it is the triadic relation holding between 
a representamen, object of sign, and an interpretant. 
 Such a triadic relation — whether in the case of inquiry, the categories, or signs 
themselves — is always intentional. In general, truth is the purpose of inquiry, as the 
purpose of inquiry applies to other related terms such as knowledge, meaning, 
understanding, and fact. The intentionality of the categories is defined by the 
category of Thirdness. It is the category of Thirdness which serves to unify the 
‘manifold of experience’ and representation of reality. The intention of signs for the 
interpretant (person or persons) consists in what the sign represents — its object. 
7.1.2 The Categories as Pertinent to Logic 
 In order for signs (and the semiotic approach in general) to be workable and 
useful as ‘instruments’, they must be applicable to reality. Peirce, in his criticism of 
some of the past metaphysical theories, points out that metaphysics is not about 
“meaningless gibberish” (CP 5.423), but about meaningful conceptions (CP 5.294; 
5.423). By “meaningless gibberish” Peirce means the explanation of words by other 
words, which are themselves explained by other words “without any real conception 
ever being reached” (CP 5.423). Underlying Peirce’s criticism of the past 
metaphysical theories is his pragmatism, which defines the meaning of concepts not 
by words, but by the rule or habit of action that follows from our understanding of 
concepts. What is central here to pragmatism is that fundamentally the meaning of 
concepts is based on reality. Vincent G. Potter points to the same principle when he 
says of Peirce’s “metaphysical realism”: “whatever is needed to explicate reality 
must be granted a place within reality.”162 
 The function of a sign by nature is to represent something to somebody (CP 
2.228). The inclusion of ‘somebody’ (the interpretant), although implicit, indicates 
that the sign’s representation of its object is assumed to be intelligible and 
meaningful to the person for whom the representation is a sign. The whole concept of 
sign in general, and the interpretant in particular, is simply to make the signified 
intelligible and meaningful. A road sign, for example, is effective as a sign if, and 
only if, it serves its purpose successfully, that is, if it is meaningful to us. A road sign 
that is poorly designed, and is unintelligible because it does not serve its purpose  
                                                 
162 Vincent G. Potter, 1997, p. 84. What Potter is paraphrasing is CP 1.351. 
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 successfully, is useless and meaningless. 
 The sign, then, is substantiated, hence made meaningful by the habit of action 
with which it is identified. That is, the sign is inevitably bound to reality by way of 
the category of Thirdness. According to Peirce, the habit of action, as so many other 
generals, is real not with reference to a static entity considered determinately fixed, 
but as a dynamic, evolving or developmental event or process. Thus Carl R. 
Hausman can say of Peirce’s notion of the real: 
Peirce’s conception of generals as reals was not … a commitment to the reality 
of universals in the sense in which universals are construed as static, 
completely determinate identities. For Peirce, generals are dynamic; they are 
tendencies that grow. A general should not be thought of apart from a telos. 
With respect to being a habit, a third or general is what it is by virtue of its 
influence on its future instances.163 
While a consideration of the sign may be conducted purely in abstract terms, 
pragmatism requires that to be meaningful it must be based on reality by employing 
the category of Thirdness, which Peirce identifies, as I have shown, as the ‘future’ 
mode of being. It is for this reason that pragmatism is ultimately a metaphysical 
position based on this recognition of the reality of the ‘future’ mode of being. 
7.2 The Distinction between the Categories and Signs 
 To claim that there is a relation between the categories and signs presupposes a 
distinction between them. For a relation between any two entities, whatever they may 
be, implies that the two entities in question are distinct from one another. 
7.2.1 The Distinction between ‘Beings of Reason’ and ‘Real Beings’ 
 Scholastic logicians introduced a distinction between ‘beings of reason’ and 
‘real beings’.164 Beings of reason are the logical concepts or signs we use in our 
understanding of real beings, and their existence depends on their being thought. 
Real beings, on the other hand, are things that exist independently of our thinking 
about them. In terms of this distinction, signs belong to the realm of beings of reason, 
and the categories to that of real beings; the categories exist as they are, whereas 
signs exist for representation of the categories, or instances of them. 
 Another related distinction employed by the scholastic logicians is between  
                                                 
163 Carl R. Hausman, 1993, p. 14. 
164 Henry B. Veatch, 1952, ch 2. 
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 what they call first intentions and second intentions. According to this distinction, 
what we seek to understand are first intentions (or first intentional objects). Second 
intentions are the logical concepts and signs we use to refer to first intentions, or the 
first intentional objects that we seek to understand. Roughly, the categories are first 
intentions, in the sense that we know them by means of second intentions. In 
ontological terms, the distinction made is between the categories as having an 
(absolutely) independent existence and the signs as existing in a relation that is 
dependent on the categories. 
7.2.2 The Distinction between Categories and Signs as both Relative and Absolute 
 It follows from our account of the distinction between beings of reason and real 
beings that the categories and signs may be considered as being both relative and 
absolute. A relative distinction is one that is based on something not universally 
distinct from any other thing, but distinct from other things only in relation to that 
thing being viewed from a certain perspective. An absolute distinction is based on 
something universally distinct from any other thing regardless of the point of view 
taken. 
 In terms of their ontological status, the distinction (between categories and 
signs) is absolute, in that the existence of signs as signs is always dependent on there 
being categories (or instance(s) of them) to represent, whereas the categories do exist 
independently of whether or not there is a sign or any signs whatever. On the other 
hand, the distinction between the categories and signs is relative, in that the 
distinction depends on whether we talk about things as they are in themselves or 
merely as signs. Smoke, for example, can be said to be a sign, depending on whether 
it represents anything to us. As a thing or object, smoke is in itself regardless of 
whether or not it represents something to us. Smoke as a sign (say, of fire) in this 
sense belongs to what the scholastics call the “instrumental signs”. An “instrumental 
sign” is one that we must know first before we come to know the object it signifies. 
Thus, we would be aware of fire only after we first know its sign, smoke.165 
 This is not to say that the scholastics never considered signs in an absolute 
sense. What they call “formal signs” are signs that exist simply to intend. As Veatch 
expresses it: 
                                                 
165 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
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 A formal sign is one whose whole nature and being are simply a representing, 
or a meaning, or a signifying of something else. Such signs, in other words, are 
nothing but meanings or intentions. Thus if one were to ask, “What is it to be a 
formal sign?”, the answer would be, “It is simply to be of or about something 
else.”166 
 Peirce’s semiotic, however, goes beyond the semiotic of the scholastics. The 
latter with its instrumental/formal distinction between signs involved a dichotomy 
between ‘entities’ that are signs relatively and those that are signs absolutely. This 
does not mean that the scholastics’ semiotic is not of great value, for Peirce 
acknowledged his indebtedness to scholastic semiotic. However, this dichotomy, as 
John Deely observes, diverts the scholastics167 from recognising what Peirce takes as 
fundamentally important in the very being of a sign: namely, “that the sign consists 
not in a type of sensible thing, but in a pure relation, irreducibly triadic, indifferent 
both to the physical status of its objects and to the source of its immediate 
provenance, nature or mind.”168 
 Thus when we say, for example, ‘smoke is a sign of fire’ and ‘a fossil bone is a 
sign of dinosaur’, the sign proper here refers neither to the smoke nor to the bone 
themselves, but to the same relation that is equally present in both cases, though, of 
course, the two cases are materially different from one another.169 As Deely explains, 
… strictly, it is neither the smoke nor the bone, but the relation itself so 
formed which constitutes the sign in its actual being as sign. Technically 
speaking, the smoke and bones are not signs, but rather sign-vehicles. 
 The sign-vehicle, thus, in contrast to the sign-relation, is the representative 
element in the sign, while the relation arising from this foundation, obtaining 
(or obtainable) over and above the foundation, and terminating at a signified 
object, alone makes this representative element a representation of something 
other than itself. In the absence of this relation, hence, the foundation 
becomes merely virtual or material as a foundation, and is then experienced, 
instead, simply as a self-representation or object.170 
 In terms of Deely’s sign-vehicle/sign-relation distinction, for ‘smoke’ to be a 
sign depends on its being a part of a particular sign-relation. Smoke, as a sign-vehicle 
stands in a particular sign-relation, and cannot actually be separated from it. This is 
because everything is a potential sign (or sign-vehicle), meaning everything is 
                                                 
166 Ibid., p. 13. 
167 Except John Poinsot who, according to John Deely’s research, reached substantially the same 
conclusion. John Deely, ‘The Ethics of Terminology,’ American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 
vol. LXXII, Issue No. 2, (Spring, 1998), p. 200. 
168 Ibid. 
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 always both an object in its own right and at the same time a possible part of a sign 
relation. Thus Peirce says, “that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not 
composed exclusively of signs” (CP 5.448n1). 
7.2.3 Clarifying the Question of ‘Extra-Semiotic Entities’ 
 Considering Peirce’s view “that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is 
not composed exclusively of signs”, and the idea (discussed in chapter 6) that Peirce 
neither suggests nor endorses any form of a semiotically-reductionist view of reality, 
it is fair to ask: Are there any ‘real’ things apart from ‘signs’? 
 From the Peircean point of view the question at issue is not about whether there 
is anything real that is not a sign, or a sign that is not real. Rather, as Fisch puts it, 
“The fundamental distinction is not between things that are signs and things that are 
not, but between triadic or sign-action and dyadic … action.”171  
 The question of whether there are ‘extra-semiotic entities’ (i.e. Are there any 
‘real’ things apart from ‘signs’?) assumes a dichotomy between reality and the sign. 
As I have noted repeatedly, this is a dichotomy that Peirce sets out to reject. 
Pragmatism argues that the relation embodied in the activity of inquiry (and the 
process of experience) is triadic in nature, and it is different from the dyadic relation 
assumed in empiricist epistemology. The dyadic relation involves no thought, for it 
results simply from an action between two objects caused by “brute force” (CP 
5.472). This is why Peirce argues that a dyadic relation cannot be the basic formal 
structure of inquiry, which for him is co-extensive with life: 
if pragmaticism really made Doing to be the Be-all and the End-all of life, that 
would be its death. For to say that we live for the mere sake of action, as 
action, regardless of the thought it carries out, would be to say that there is no 
such thing as rational purport (CP 5.429). 
 If inquiry is essentially concerned with the meaning and truth of reality, it must 
embody the triadic nature of the sign-using relationship. The question of ‘extra-
semiotic entities’, then, does not really arise in Peirce’s semiotic and pragmatism. 
For not only does it assume a dichotomy and demarcation between the real and the 
sign, but it also fails to recognise that the focus of Peirce’s semiotic is the importance 
of relations in general, and the triadic sign relation in particular. The sign is not to be  
                                                 
171 Max H. Fisch, 1986, p. 330. 
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 contrasted with reality, but to be understood as the underlying, all-embracing 
relationship in reality of sign, thing signified and interpretant. 
7.3 A Consideration of the Relation between Logic and Metaphysics within 
the Framework of Inquiry 
7.3.1 Some General Features of Peirce’s View on the Relation between Logic and 
Metaphysics 
 Corresponding to the relation between signs and categories is the relation 
between logic and metaphysics. As noted in the preceding chapters, Peirce in his 
hierarchical classification of the sciences places logic before metaphysics, and 
identifies the former with the task of providing the latter with principles, and the 
latter with that of providing the former with data on which to operate. Consequently, 
Peirce describes metaphysics as follows, “Metaphysics consists in the results of the 
absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as 
truths of being” (CP 1.487). 
 The idea “truths of being”172 here indicates how closely related logic and 
metaphysics are for Peirce. Unlike the view of logic favoured by some mathematical 
logicians where logic is considered a system mainly, if not entirely, of axioms and 
definitions, Peirce takes logic173 to be a normative science, meaning it is a science of 
the principles of correct reasoning and the norms of inquiry. Again, unlike the 
mathematical logician, Peirce’s theory of logic assumes both a dynamic view of 
inquiry and its actual exercise within a community of inquirers. He takes the view 
that the principles of correct reasoning and norms of inquiry identified by logic (or 
semiotic) not only are (shown to be) valid, but they are also (shown to be) applicable 
to, and true of, reality, in the actual process of or activity of inquiry. 
 Because inquiry is the theoretical (and practical) framework within which 
Peirce develops his view of logic just given, he is able to make the claims that logic 
is a normative science, and that it depends on ethics (CP 4.240; 1.577). What Peirce 
means here in relation to the latter claim is that just as ethics is a science of self- 
                                                 
172 In CP 1.300, Peirce states the same idea as “applicable to being.”  
173 This is not say that Peirce rejects mathematical logic. In fact, Peirce’s contribution to 
mathematical logic is considered to be of great magnitude and importance. I refer here to Peirce’s 
theory of logic where he insists that logic, as intentional rather than merely extensional logic, is an 
essential branch of philosophy, as a normative science, and as semiotic. 
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 control in relation to social matters (in which the distinctions between right and 
wrong, good and bad, etc. are central), logic is concerned with self-control in thought 
or reasoning where the distinctions between truth and falsity, validity and invalidity, 
etc. are mostly important. Peirce says, “logic as the science of the principles of how 
thought ought to be controlled, so far as it may be subject to self-control, in the 
interest of truth.”174 Further, just as a society would be chaotic without some ethical 
principles or norms, thought or reasoning would be poorly conducted without some 
logical principles. Thus for metaphysics to be successful in its inquiry requires the 
norms (of inquiry) discovered by logic (or semiotic). 
7.3.2 Some Fundamental Ideas of Intentional Logic 
 Intentional logic may be characterised in a number of ways. My discussion of 
intentional logic will be far from being comprehensive. However, for my purpose, 
the important characteristic of intentional logic is its inclusion of the existing, 
thinking subject in its consideration of meaning.175 By means of this characteristic, 
intentional logic takes meaning to be the expression of the triadic relation between 
the thinking subject, reality, and language, and this conviction, that meaning is based 
on a triadic relation, is common to pragmatism and intentional logic. 
 The similarities between intentional logic and pragmatism cannot be taken too 
far, for semiotic theory has different restrictions and implications for each of them. 
From Peirce’s point of view, intentional logic, though it maintains a triadic relation 
for meaning, tends to fall back into a form of dichotomy when it demands as 
necessary the distinction between the real and the logical,176 (see section 7.2.1 
above). This is due to its restriction of the scope of its notion of ‘sign’. Because it 
sees ‘sign’ not as an underlying relation of, hence inseparable from, reality, 
intentional logic tends to contrast signs and reality. On the other hand, pragmatism in 
taking ‘sign’ as inseparable from reality, proceeds to consider that the important 
question is not about the real versus the logical, but about the difference between 
sign (triadic) relation and dyadic relation, within the context of interpretant, sign, and 
object signified, or between thinking subject, reality, and language. 
                                                 
174 Quoted in Beverly Kent, Charles S. Peirce: Logic and the Classification of the Sciences, 
(Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987), p. 19. 
175 Ian E. Thompson, 1981, p. 195. 
176 Henry B. Veatch, 1952, pp. 16-17. 
 176
 7.3.3 The ‘Sign’ is not a Category 
 Given all the things that have been said about Peirce’s conception of sign, one 
may wonder why Peirce does not include ‘sign’ in his list of categories. This is 
because to make the sign a category would give rise to the same problem associated 
with the question of ‘extra-semiotic entities’ discussed earlier. For it would follow, 
from treating the sign as a category, that all the categories (and instances of them) 
other than the sign are not in any sign relation. As expressing the underlying relation 
of reality, the sign relation holds between the three categories of Firstness, 
Secondness, and Thirdness in the same irreducibly triadic structure of the sign itself, 
which Peirce states as follows. 
… the third category - the category of thought, representation, triadic relation, 
mediation, genuine thirdness, thirdness as such - is an essential ingredient of 
reality, yet does not by itself constitute reality, since this category … can have 
no concrete being without action, as a separate object on which to work its 
government, just as action cannot exist without the immediate being of feeling 
on which to act (CP 5.436). 
To attribute the same status to the sign that he does to the categories would vitiate the 
whole structure of Peirce’s philosophy. 
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 CONCLUSION 
 
 This thesis has been concerned with clarifying the relationship in Peirce’s 
philosophy between his theory of categories and particular brand of pragmatism. In 
this thesis I have defended the claim that his theory of categories is the ultimate 
foundation of his pragmatism, and that he presents his form of pragmatism as the 
only adequate method for metaphysics. 
 In my Introduction I remarked that the problem which provoked my study of 
Peirce’s philosophical writings was to examine the reasons for Peirce’s apparent 
indecision about the foundation of pragmatism. He attributed the foundation of 
pragmatism in some parts of his writings to his theory of categories (eg. CP 8.256) 
and in others to his semiotic or theory of signs (eg. 8.191) without any clear 
statement on how these seemingly different foundations are related. Thus, I have 
sought to clarify the relation between these ‘two foundations’, in order to 
demonstrate why Peirce believed his form of pragmatism to be an appropriate 
method for metaphysics. 
 I began my discussion in chapter 1 by remarking that Peirce’s general 
philosophical project is both a methodological and a metaphysical quest, in that it 
seeks to establish a theory of categories that are applicable to both thought and 
reality. In consequence, his theory of categories requires as necessary both 
metaphysical and epistemological realism, in order to ground his view that things are 
both real and knowable. Further, because it is founded on the theory of categories, 
pragmatism must reflect both metaphysical and epistemological realism. 
 I introduced Peirce’s theory of categories by discussing his paper the ‘New 
List.’ There Peirce derived five categories: being, quality, relation, representation, 
and substance. The uniqueness of his theory of categories, as distinct from those of 
Aristotle and Kant, consists in the relation of inter-dependence he insists upon 
between these five categories, namely, that they are all involved in the formation of 
every meaningful proposition. I also discussed some later changes Peirce made to his 
theory of categories presented in the ‘New List.’ The most obvious of these changes 
is the reduction of the number of categories from five to only three categories. He 
excluded being and substance from his list of categories, and retained only quality, 
relation, and representation which he later called his standard technical terms 
Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness respectively. The arguments he offers for these 
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 changes, I noted, include his sign theory of cognition, and certain discoveries he 
made in the logic of relations and quantification theory. 
 The exclusion of being and substance from his list of categories works both 
ways, however; it works both for and against him. On the one hand, it makes it easier 
for Peirce to maintain and develop his semiotic, in the sense that he does not have to 
find a place for being and substance in the triadic or three-term relation of signs, 
which he insists upon. On the other hand, it marks the beginning of a problem that 
becomes central throughout his philosophy. The ‘individual subject’177 (or ‘first 
substance’ in Aristotle’s terminology) is taken as implied within the category of 
Thirdness in his theory of categories; as the basis for prediction in his 
phenomenology, and the community of inquirers in his theory of inquiry; for the 
focus on the ‘future’ mode of being in his metaphysics, and the importance of the 
interpretant in his semiotic. In other words, the individual subject becomes ‘locked’ 
within the irreducible triadic relation embodied in his theory of categories in 
particular, and his philosophy in general, within which his pragmatism operates. 
 Consequently, the classical distinction between the ‘transcendentalia’ as the 
ground for the possibility of other categories and the categories178 themselves, has 
diminished to a point that they become merged together. It seems that apart from the 
practical uses of his phenomenology, theory of inquiry, and semiotic for his general 
philosophy, Peirce tended to rely on these areas of his philosophy to provide the 
‘transcendentalia’ for his categories. 
 As I discussed in chapter 2, his phenomenology assumes a ‘presuppositionless’ 
standpoint where it can disclose the ‘purity’ of the phenomenon without 
presupposing any idea or theory, whether metaphysical or otherwise. His claim to a 
presuppositionless standpoint for phenomenology is questionable. The very idea of 
phenomenology as a science of the phenomenon, I have argued, relies on 
presupposing the existence of the phenomenon, whether mental or physical in 
character. He seems to think that since phenomenology derives its working principles 
                                                 
177 This is a major point of John F. Boler’s criticism of Peirce in his Charles Peirce and Scholastic 
Realism: A Study of Peirce’s Relation to John Duns Scotus (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1963). However, while I agree with some of Boler’s criticism of Peirce, I disagree with his going so 
far as to say that there is no place in Peirce’s theory of categories for individual things. My point is 
that there is a place for individual things in Peirce’s categories, but they are contained within the 
category of Thirdness, or ‘future’ mode of being. 
178 Scott MacDonald, ‘Transcendentals,’ The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert 
Audi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 809-810. 
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 from the only science above it in his hierarchical classification of the sciences, 
namely, mathematics, and since mathematics is concerned not with the reality status 
of the objects of thought, but only with the hypothetical state of things, 
phenomenology therefore can be a presuppositionless science that makes no 
metaphysical claims. 
 This, I believe, is not a sufficient argument to prove phenomenology to be a 
presupppositionless science. The fact that he claims phenomenology to rely on 
mathematics for its principles presupposes that there is some reason on which the 
claim can be based. When he states that the ‘generalising power of the 
mathematician’ is one of the three methods required for phenomenological inquiry, 
he is implying that the phenomenologist should be like the mathematician. However, 
the problem here is that Peirce argues on the one hand that mathematics is concerned 
only with the hypothetical states of things and on the other that it should serve as a 
paradigm of exact thinking in philosophy. However, without circularity, this cannot 
be a sufficient justification for the claim either that phenomenology can derive its 
first principle from mathematics, or that it is a presuppositionless science. 
Furthermore, it must be realised that the mathematical principles (whatever they may 
be) which phenomenology borrows for its own use are (or at least thought to be) 
really applicable to or useful to phenomenology. 
 However, given his realist intentions, his phenomenology might be thought to 
be effective in providing the required experiential ground for his philosophy. His 
approach gives him reasons to claim that philosophy can be both an ‘observational’ 
science and a science of ‘discovery’.  
 In his phenomenology the individual subject seems to gain some recognition, 
but only to a certain extent before it is subsumed, in accordance with his 
classification of the sciences, under logic, and then metaphysics. The individual 
subject, or the phenomenologist, can observe whatever phenomenon appears to the 
mind, and in the process can make some ‘discovery’. What he means by ‘discovery’ 
here is individually based. It refers to some phenomenon that the individual subject 
knows for the first time, and is thus regarded as ‘new’ so far as the observing 
individual subject is concerned. Thus his phenomenology provides his philosophy 
with a kind of experiential ground based on his account of the growth of the 
individual subject’s experience and knowledge. 
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  I have argued that in order to do justice to Peirce’s philosophy, his 
phenomenology alone cannot function as an adequate basis for philosophical method 
without reference to the other two main branches of his philosophy, namely logic and 
metaphysics. Phenomenology must be understood as only part of philosophy as a 
whole, not as synonymous with it.  
 While trying to do justice to his emphasis on phenomenology, this only points 
to a further difficulty with his philosophy. It shows how rigid his classification of the 
sciences, and his theory of categories on which he based his classification, in fact is. 
Because he follows his (tri-partite and hierarchical) theory of categories in 
classifying the sciences, he ends up with a strictly hierarchical system that requires 
phenomenology (which he also defines as the science of Firstness) to be the first 
science to which philosophy must attend before logic and metaphysics. Whether 
phenomenology is to be regarded as logically or experientially prior to logic and 
metaphysics is not clear. 
 His classification of the sciences fails to account for the fact that what he 
identifies and describes as phenomenology is a kind of inquiry or observation that 
can happen at any time and anywhere during our pursuit of philosophy. There is no 
guarantee that in following his ordering of the branches of philosophy it would be 
better to study phenomenology rather than metaphysics first, then logic, and then 
phenomenology, or logic first, then phenomenology, and then metaphysics. Further, 
attending to phenomenology first, as he proposed, could hardly be a successful affair 
if phenomenology is not clear about the meaning of its basic ideas, such as what the 
phenomenon is, and how the hypothetical status of ‘the phenomenon’ is different 
from reality of actual phenomena, and so on. As these ideas are not dealt with in 
mathematics, it is more likely that we are to find answers in logic or metaphysics. 
 The problematic status of the individual subject also features in Peirce’s doubt-
belief theory of inquiry, which is a major part of my discussion of his pragmatism in 
chapter 3. His recognition of the role of psychological doubt as the starting point of 
inquiry in general recognises the essential role of the individual subject or inquirer in 
the process of inquiry. When he argues, for instance, that it is real doubt, (a real 
dissatisfied state of mind experienced by an actual individual subject or inquirer) that 
initiates inquiry, he is putting the individual subject to the fore. I have argued that his 
doubt-belief theory of inquiry escapes collapsing to psychologism due to the logical 
and realist perspective he employs in working out his theory. He uses doubt, after 
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 observing that it is a state of mind that is always implied in every kind of inquiry, as 
a way to identifying the most reliable method (as far as truth is concerned) for fixing 
our belief. This he claims to be the method of science. His move from locating the 
place of doubt in inquiry to focus on identifying the most reliable method for fixing 
true belief, however, emphasises that the individual subject is recognised only for the 
sake of grounding the method of science and the community of inquirers. 
 His pragmatism, in its early or original formulation, resembles the verification 
principle of logical positivism in restricting the meaning of concepts to the ‘sensible 
(or practical) effects’ conceivable with regard to, or resulting from the actual test to 
which an object in question be subjected. I argued that because his pragmatism was 
founded ultimately on his theory of categories, the former was bound to reflect the 
latter and any changes he made to it. For example, because his theory of categories 
had not accepted possibility as a real mode of being by the time he formulated his 
early version of pragmatism, he denied possibilities ontological status, as a mere 
reflection of the modes of speech we use when we make any claims about the 
meaning of an object that has not been tested.  
 When he came to accept possibilities as real modes of being, he then 
reformulated his pragmatism accordingly. His later version of pragmatism treats the 
meaning of an object in terms not of the ‘sensible effects’ and the actual test applied 
to the object, but in the light of what would happen if we were to act upon or follow 
our belief regarding that object. Here his pragmatism is tied to the ‘would-be’ or 
‘future’ mode of being (possibilities), and the individual subject, again, is subsumed 
under this future mode of being. 
 Peirce’s strong insistence on pragmatism as merely a logical maxim for 
meaning clarification could be misleading, and therefore, I have suggested, it should 
not be taken literally. It tends to give us the impression that pragmatism does not 
have any metaphysical presuppositions or implications at all. However, his 
commitment to his theory of categories compelled him to make the link between 
pragmatism and metaphysics explicit; and he sometimes makes this connection more 
explicit than he perhaps realised. 
 The relation between pragmatism and metaphysics became more evident in 
chapter 4, as I examined the close affinity he established between pragmatism and 
realism. His commitment to both a realist theory of categories and his scholastic 
realism makes it inevitable that pragmatism requires a realist approach to inquiry. 
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 The underlying driving force behind pragmatism is the fundamental tenet of his 
scholastic realism, namely, the realist metaphysical claim that there are real generals. 
On its epistemological side, pragmatism functions to demonstrate how generals are 
really operative in nature. The way his pragmatism formulates the epistemological 
question giving rise to the metaphysical claims of his scholastic realism is genuinely 
illuminating and arguably unique in clarifying the meaning of intelligibility. It is 
illuminating because instead of seeking for any corresponding static object or 
substance as the evidence for the reality of generals, pragmatism asks “In what way 
can a general be unaffected by any thought about it” (CP 5.503). It is intelligible 
because it recognises that generals belong to a different mode of being, and thus 
avoids the fallacy or ‘category mistake’ whereby different modes of being are 
confused. The question about the reality of general must be logically different from 
the question concerning the reality of a particular object. 
 Peirce shows, however, that pragmatism is capable of explicating the future 
mode of being to the extent that the individual subject is both communally and future 
oriented. In other words, the individual subject is seen not in its own right, but as a 
term or member of the irreducible triadic relation moulded by generals (or habit of 
conduct as Peirce would also say). 
 In chapter 5 I discussed in more detail the relation between Peirce’s 
pragmatism and metaphysics. What he calls the “critical common-sensism” position 
of pragmatism, the doctrine that there are ‘indubitable propositions’, is illuminated 
by his blending together of fallibilism and ‘indeterminacy’ as an element of reality. 
Unlike the Cartesian ‘indubitable’, which is construed as absolutely impossible to 
doubt any further, the indubitable of the critical common-sensist is considered as 
only relatively and temporarily so. A proposition is indubitable so far as our present 
state of knowledge is concerned, yet there is still room that it may prove false and 
dubitable in the light of further (and future) inquiry and discovery. Underlying both 
the idea of ‘the community of inquirers’ and the common-sense position of 
pragmatism is the element of reality, which Peirce identifies as “indeterminacy”. 
‘Indeterminacy’, it was noted, is both general and vague in character. An object is 
said to be general because it leaves the interpreter or knower with the ‘freedom’ of 
furthering its determination; and it is vague because its further determination may 
have “to be made in some other conceivable signs” (CP 5.447). 
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  One thing of crucial importance that emerges from his critique of the positivist 
view of metaphysics is his conviction that there is more to reality and life in general 
than is allowed for and implied in the positivist perspective and its emphasis on sense 
experience. He rejected the positivist view of metaphysics not because it contains no 
value at all, but because its underlying logic is so limited that it fails to recognise the 
future mode of being (or the category of Thirdness). I remarked that despite the 
similarity between positivism and pragmatism in attributing great significance to 
ideas of meaning and method, Peirce’s pragmatism differs dramatically from 
positivism in recognising the ‘future’ mode of being. 
 The reasons Peirce gives for identifying metaphysics, on the basis of his theory 
of categories, as the science of Thirdness or the future mode of being, and for 
attributing importance to the ‘future’ mode of being is illuminating. He thinks that it 
is only in relation to the future course of events that we can have a ‘say’ regarding 
how things should happen. Three characteristic features of the ‘future’ mode of being 
were discussed: they are: mediation, generality, and continuity. As a form of 
mediation, the ‘future’ mode of being involves a triadic relation (or sign-like 
relation) as providing the framework in which to understand reality. As already 
mentioned, generality, seen as an element of the ‘future’ mode of being, requires that 
with regard to any object a further determination remains to be made in the future — 
whether immediate or remote. The third feature of the ‘future’ mode of being 
presented was continuity. 
 Based on its recognition of the future mode of being, together with its 
identification of common experience as the subject matter of metaphysics in 
particular, and philosophy in general, the pragmatist can claim that metaphysics 
involves some form of observation. Unlike the restricted understanding of 
observation by the positivist, which reflects its commitment to individual particulars 
as the only real things and the identification of ‘the observable’ with the immediate 
sense-data, pragmatist metaphysics counts as ‘observable entities’ those to be 
determined by our future rational and deliberate conduct, shaped by our 
understanding of those entities. 
 Continuity as an aspect of reality and a characteristic feature of the future mode 
of being consists in the assertion that no individual particular or sets of particulars 
can exhaust it.  Thus the real world allowed in his pragmatist metaphysics is a world 
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 of universals or generals with the individual subjects being contained within them. 
This is developed in his theory of signs or semiotic which I discussed in chapter 6. 
 Peirce’s semiotic, I noted, is concerned not with the question of the reality of 
signs, but with signs as such. Thus his semiotic understands observation in a very 
broad sense; it does not restrict observation as something that has to do only with real 
objects, but with any object that is significative — whether real or imaginary. I have 
argued that his semiotic played an important role in his philosophy. Its effectiveness 
as a logical tool and relevance to general semantics rests on his analysis of the 
representative nature of signs. His semiotic requires observation and objectivity as 
essential elements of inquiry, and demonstrates how the meaning of concepts 
consists not in a dyadic, but an irreducibly triatic relation between the sign, the object 
signified, and the interpretant. Importantly Peirce concludes that since every thought 
involves signs and sign relations, and since thought is involved in every science, 
semiotic is essential for every type of inquiry. 
 I have argued that while he is heavily preoccupied with semiotic, and sees 
every phenomenon (real or otherwise) in terms of signs and sign relations, he does 
not agree with reducing reality to signs, or identifying reality simply with signs. 
 Despite the merits and effectiveness of his semiotic for his own philosophy, 
and his widely recognised contribution to modern semiotic theory, Peirce was never 
clear as to any distinction between the categories and signs. This, I believe, explains 
his indecision on the question of the foundation of his pragmatism — whether to 
found his pragmatism on his theory of categories or on his theory of signs. As a 
consequence, he often speaks of the categories and signs interchangeably, defining 
the categories in terms of signs, and signs in terms of the categories. 
 Finally, in chapter 7, I discussed the relationship between his categories, his 
theory of signs, and Peirce’s pragmatism not only to clarify its place within his 
theory of inquiry, but also to demonstrate that there is another possible reason for his 
indecision about the foundation of pragmatism. I have argued that our awareness of 
the categories and signs, and the relations between them, arise in the first place from 
inquiry (and experience in general) and are employed for our understanding reality in 
further inquiry and future experience. It was observed that there are two important 
characteristics common to inquiry, the categories, and the theory of signs; namely, 
the irreducibly triadic nature of their relationship and of intentionality. 
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  I also argued the categories are pertinent to logic, in the sense that signs as 
logical concepts are by nature to intend reality as represented by the categories. That 
is, the meaning of concepts is based on reality. I made use of the scholastic 
distinction between ‘real beings’ and ‘being of reason’, and some of the fundamental 
ideas of intentional logic both to help clarify the ideas of categories and signs in 
Peirce and to show how his semiotic goes beyond that of the scholastics. 
 Whereas the scholastic distinction falls back to some kind of dichotomy 
between the logical and the real, Peirce’s pragmatism insists that the distinction is 
not about the real versus the logical, but about triadic (or sign) action and dyadic 
action. That is, triadic action involves meaning or an interpretant, and dyadic action 
does not. Thus the question of the ontological status of ‘extra-semiotic reality’ (i.e. 
Are there any real things apart from signs?) does not arise directly in his semiotic. 
 Peirce’s pragmatism is based on this understanding of the categories and signs 
as both distinct from one another, yet inseparable. This, I believe, shows that Peirce 
seems to think that there is an ontological aspect of signs, and this is what he means 
when he says “that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed 
exclusively of signs” (CP 5.448n1). For that reason, I suggested, the sign is not and 
cannot be a category. 
 This seems to further explain his indecision about the foundation of 
pragmatism and his failure to give any explicit account of the distinction and/or 
relation between the categories and signs. Because he finds the categories and signs 
as existentially inseparable, and because he tends to rely on the sign as providing the 
transcendentalia for his categories, he becomes ‘locked in’ to his universe of signs, 
so that he views things only from within the system of signs. 
 The success of Peirce’s philosophy must be measured by his success in 
integrating his theory of categories, phenomenology, scholastic realism and his 
theory of signs to develop pragmatism as a method appropriate for metaphysics. Its 
limitation consists in its treatment of the individual subject, as he has subsumed the 
individual subject within the irreducible triadic relation basic to his theory of 
categories and semiotic. The result is that it cannot view the world except from 
within the trichotomy of which it is a part. 
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